'man,' we are by such propositions taught something more than barely what the word 'man' stands for: and therefore the Knowledge contained in it is more than verbal.

For this teaches but the signification of words.—Before a man makes any proposition, he is supposed to understand the terms he uses in it. The hearer, also, is supposed to understand the terms as the speaker uses them. And therefore he trifles with Words, who makes such a proposition, which, when it is made, contains no more than one of the terms does, and which a man was supposed to know before. And this is no farther tolerable than where a man goes to explain his terms to one who is supposed, or declares himself, not to understand him; and then it teaches only the significa tion of that Word and the use of that sign.

But no real knowledge.--We can know, then, the truth of two sorts of Propositions with perfect certainty; the one is, of those trifling propositions which have a certainty in them, but it is only a verbal certainty, but not instructive. And, secondly, we can know the truthand so may be certain-in propositions which affirm something of another, which is a necessary consequence of its precise complex idea, but not contained in it: as that the external angle of all triangles is bigger than either of the opposite internal angles;' which relation of the outward angle to either of the opposite internal angles making no part of the complex idea signified by the name triangle,' this is a real truth, and conveys with it instructive, real, Knowledge.

General propositions concerning substances are often

trifling.-We, having little or no knowledge of what combinations there [may] be of simple ideas existing together in Substances but by our senses, cannot make any universal, certain Propositions concerning them any farther than our Nominal Essences lead us; which being to a very few and inconsiderable truths, in respect of those which depend on their real constitutions, [Thirdly] the general propositions that are made about Substances, if they are certain, are, for the most part, but trifling. And if they are instructive, [they] are uncertain, and such [that] we can have no knowledge of their real truth, how much soever constant observation and analogy may assist our judgments in guessing. Hence it comes to pass, that one may often meet with very clear and coherent discourses that amount yet to nothing. For, it is plain, that Names of substantial beings, as well as others, as far as they have relative significations affixed to them, may, with great truth, be joined negatively and affirmatively in propositions, as their relative definitions make them fit to be so joined; and propositions consisting of such terms may, with the same clearness, be deduced one from another, as those that convey the most real truths; and all this, without any knowledge of the nature or reality of things existing without us. By this method. one may make demonstrations and undoubted propositions in words, and yet thereby advance not one jot in the knowledge of the truth of things.

And why. He that has liberty to define,' i. e. determine the signification of his Names of Substances (as certainly every one does in effect who makes them stand for his own ideas), and makes their significations at a

venture, taking them from his own or other* men's fancies, and not from an examination or inquiry into the nature of things themselves, may, with little trouble, demonstrate them one of another, according to those several respects and mutual relations [which] he has given them one to another; wherein, however things agree or disagree in their own nature, he needs mind nothing but his own notions, with the names he has bestowed upon them: but thereby no more increases his own knowledge, than he does his riches who, taking a bag of counters, calls one in a certain place, 'a pound,' another 'a shilling,' and a third a penny;' and so proceeding, may undoubtedly reckon right, and cast up a great sum according to his counters, without being one jot the richer, or without even knowing how much a pound, shilling, or penny is, but only that one is contained in the other twenty times, and contains the other twelve.

Using words variously is trifling with them.—[Fourthly]† Though yet concerning most words used in discourses, especially argumentative and controversial, there is this more to be complained of, which is the worst sort of trifling, and which sets us yet farther from the certainty of Knowledge [which] we hope to attain by them, or find in them, viz.—that most writers are so far from instructing us in the nature and knowledge of things, that they use their words loosely and uncertainly; and do not, by using

The Twenty-ninth Edition, 8vo.—one in very general use-has or rather;' which is evidently an erroneous reading.-ED.

Fourthly' is here substituted for the usual 'Thirdly:' for it is plain that in page 371 a 'third' distinct class of Trifling Propositions' has been already exhibited.-ED.

them constantly and steadily in the same significations, make plain and clear deductions of words one from another, and make their discourses coherent and clear, (how little soever it were instructive); which were not difficult to do, did they not find it convenient to shelter their ignorance or obstinacy under the obscurity and perplexedness of their terms: to which, perhaps, inadvertency and ill custom do much contribute.

Marks of verbal propositions.-To conclude; barely verbal Propositions may be known by these following marks:

Predication in abstract.-First, All Propositions wherein two Abstract terms are affirmed one of another, are barely about the signification of sounds. For, since no Abstract idea can be the same with any other but itself, when its Abstract name is affirmed of any other term it can signify no more but this—that it may or ought to be called by that Name-or-that these two Names signify the same Idea. Thus should any one say, that 'parsimony is frugality,' that 'gratitude is justice,' that this or that action is or is not 'temperance;' however specious these and the like propositions may at first sight seem, yet when we come to press them and examine nicely what they contain, we shall find that it all amounts to nothing but the signification of those

terms.

A part of the definition predicated of any term.-Secondly, All Propositions wherein a part of the complex idea which any term stands for is predicated of that term, are only verbal; v. g. to say, that 'gold is a metal,' or heavy.' And thus all propositions wherein more

comprehensive words, called genera, are affirmed of subordinate, or less comprehensive, called species or individuals, are barely verbal.

CHAPTER IX.

OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF EXISTENCE.

General certain propositions concern not existence.— Hitherto we have only considered the Essences of things, which-being only Abstract ideas, and thereby removed in our thoughts from particular Existence (that being the proper operation of the mind in Abstraction, to consider an idea under no other existence but what it has in the Understanding)—give us no Knowledge of real Existence at all. Where, by the way, we may take notice, that universal Propositions, of whose truth or falsehood we can have certain Knowledge, concern not Existence; and farther, that all particular affirmations or negations that would not be certain if they were made general, are only concerning Existence; they declaring only the accidental union or separation of ideas, in things existing, which in their Abstract natures have no known necessary union or repugnancy.

A threefold knowledge of existence.-Let us proceed now to inquire concerning our Knowledge of the Existence of things, and how we come by it. I say, then, that we have the Knowledge of our own Existence by intuition; of the Existence of GOD by demonstration; of [that of] other things by sensation.

and