most languages have to express them by; and therefore it is not to be wondered that most of these Particles have diverse and sometimes almost opposite significations. In the Hebrew tongue there is a Particle consisting but of one single letter, of which there are reckoned up, as I remember, seventy-I am sure above fifty -several significations.

Instance in but.' But' is a Particle-none more familiar-in our Language: and he that says it is a 'discretive conjunction,' and that it answers 'sed' in Latin, or 'mais' in French, thinks he has sufficiently explained it. But it seems to me to intimate several relations the mind gives to the several propositions or parts of them which it joins by this monosyllable.

First- But, to say no more:' here it intimates a stop of the mind in the course it was going, before it came to the end of it.

Secondly

I saw but two plants:' here it shows that the mind limits the sense to what is expressed with a negation of all other.

Thirdly [and] Fourthly-You pray; but it is not that God would bring you to true religion, but that He would confirm you in your own:' the first of these 'buts' intimates a supposition in the mind of something otherwise than it should be; the latter shows that the mind makes a direct opposition between that and what goes before.

Fifthly- All animals have sense; but a dog is an animal:' here it signifies little more but that the latter proposition is joined to the former, as the minor of a syllogism.

This matter but lightly touched here.—To these, I doubt not, might be added a great many other significations of this Particle, if it were my business to examine it in its full latitude, and consider it in all the places [where] it is to be found: which if one should do, I doubt whether in all those manners [in which] it is made use of, it would deserve the title of discretive,' which grammarians give to it. But I intend not here a full explication of this sort of Signs.

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CHAPTER VIII.

OF ABSTRACT AND CONCRETE TERMS.

Abstract terms not predicable one of another, and why.— The ordinary Words of Language and our common use of them would have given us light into the nature of our ideas, if they had been but considered with attention. The mind, as has been shown, has a power to abstract its ideas; and so they become Essences-general essences-whereby the sorts of things are distinguished. Now, each abstract idea being distinct so that of any · two the one can never be the other, the mind will, by its intuitive Knowledge, perceive their difference; and therefore in propositions no two whole ideas can ever be affirmed one of another. This we see in the common use of Language, which permits not any two Abstract words or names of Abstract ideas-to be affirmed one of another. For, how near of kin soever they may seem to be, and how certain soever it is that 'man is an animal,' or 'rational,' or 'white,' yet every one, at first

hearing, perceives the falsehood of these propositions— Humanity is animality' or 'rationality,' or 'whiteness:' and this is as evident as any of the most allowed maxims. All our affirmations, then, are only in Concrete, which is the affirming-not one Abstract idea to be another, but-one Abstract idea to be joined to another; which Abstract ideas, in Substances, may be of any sort; in all the rest, are little else but of Relations; and in Substances the most frequent are of Powers. V. g. ‘A man is white' signifies that the thing that has the Essence of Man has also in it the Essence of whiteness, which is nothing but a power to produce the idea of whiteness in one whose eyes can discover ordinary objects; or, 'A man is rational' signifies that the same thing that has the Essence of a Man has also in it the Essence of Rationality, i. e. a Power of reasoning.

They show the difference of our ideas. This distinction of names shows us also the difference of our ideas: for if we observe them, we shall find that our Simple ideas have all Abstract as well as Concrete Names: the one whereof is (to speak the language of grammarians) a 'sub.stantive,' the other an 'adjective;' as 'whiteness, whitesweetness, sweet.' The like also holds in our ideas of Modes and Relations; as, 'justice, just-equality, equal;' only with this difference, that some of the Concrete names of Relations amongst men are chiefly, 'substantives;' as 'paternitas, pater;' whereof it were easy to render a reason. But as to our ideas of Substances, we have very few or no Abstract names at all. For though the Schools have introduced animalitas, humanitas, and some others, yet [these] hold no proportion with that

infinite number of names of Substances to which they never were ridiculous enough to attempt the coining of Abstract ones: and those few that the Schools forged, and put into the mouths of their scholars, could never yet get admittance into common use, or obtain the license of public approbation. Which seems to me at least to intimate the confession of all mankind, that they have no ideas of the Real Essences of Substances, since they have not names for such ideas: which no doubt they would have had, had not their consciousness to themselves of their ignorance kept them from so idle an attempt. And, therefore, though they had ideas enough to distinguish gold from stone, and metal from wood, yet, they but timorously ventured on such terms as ' aurietas' and 'saxietas,' or the like names, which should pretend to signify the real Essences of those Substances whereof they knew they had no ideas. And, it was only the doctrine of substantial forms,' and the confidence of mistaken knowledge, which first coined and then introduced ‘animalitas,' and 'humanitas,' and the like; which yet went very little farther than their own Schools. Indeed, ‘humanitas' was a word familiar amongst the Romans, but in a far different sense; and stood not for the Abstract Essence of any Substance; but was the Abstract Name of a Mode, and its Concrete [was] 'humanus,' not 'homo.'

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CHAPTER IX.

OF THE IMPERFECTION OF WORDS.

Any words will serve for recording.—As to the first of [the before-mentioned uses of Words]—for the recording our own thoughts for the help of our own memories, whereby, as it were, we talk to ourselves-any Words will serve. For, since sounds are voluntary and indifferent signs of any ideas, a man may use what Words he pleases to signify his own ideas to himself; and there will be no Imperfection in them if he constantly use the same sign for the same idea; for then he cannot fail of having his meaning understood, wherein consist the right use and perfection of Language.

Communication by words civil or philosophical.-Secondly, As to communication [by] Words, that too has a double use: I. Civil. II. Philosophical.

First, By their Civil use I mean-such a communication of thoughts and ideas by Words as may serve for the upholding common conversation and commerce about the ordinary affairs and conveniences of civil life, in the societies of men one amongst another.

Secondly, By the Philosophical use of Words I mean— such a use of them as may serve to convey the precise notions of things, and to express, in general propositions, certain and undoubted Truths which the mind may rest upon and be satisfied with, in its search after true Knowledge. These two uses are very distinct: and a great deal less exactness will serve in the one than in the other, as we shall see in what follows.