they think they have as clear as any idea they can have of the Extension of Body; the idea of the distance between the opposite parts of a concave superficies being equally as clear without as with the idea of any solid parts between; and on the other side they persuade themselves that they have, distinct from that of pure space, the idea of something that fills space, that can be protruded by the impulse of other bodies, or resist their motion.

What it is. If any one asks me, what this Solidity is, I send him to his senses to inform him: let him put a flint or a foot-ball between his hands, and then endeavour to join them, and he will know. If he thinks this not a sufficient explication of Solidity, what it is, and wherein it consists, I promise to tell him what it is, and wherein it consists, when he tells me what Thinking is, or wherein it consists; or explains to me what Extension or Motion is, which perhaps seems much easier. The simple ideas we have are such as Experience teaches them us; but if, beyond that, we endeavour by words to make them clearer in the mind, we shall succeed no better than if we went about to clear up the darkness of a blind man's mind by talking, and to discourse into him the ideas of light and colours. The reason of this I shall show in another place.

CHAPTER V.

OF SIMPLE IDEAS OF DIVERS SENSES.

THE ideas we get by more than one sense are of Space or Extension, Figure, Rest, and Motion: for these make

perceivable impressions both on the eyes and touch: and we can receive and convey into our minds the ideas of the extension, figure, motion, and rest of bodies, both by seeing and feeling. But having occasion to speak more at large of these in another place, I here only enumerate them.

CHAPTER VI.

OF SIMPLE IDEAS OF REFLECTION.

Simple ideas of reflection are the operations of the mind about its other ideas.-The mind, receiving the ideas mentioned in the foregoing chapters from without, when it turns its view inward upon itself, and observes its own actions about those ideas it has, takes from thence other ideas, which are as capable to be the objects of its contemplation as any of those it received from foreign things.

The idea of perception, and idea of willing, we have from reflection. The two great and principal actions of the mind, which are most frequently considered, and which are so frequent that every one that pleases may take notice of them in himself, are these two: Perception, or Thinking; and Volition, or Willing. The power of Thinking is called the Understanding; and the power of Volition is called the Will: and these two powers or abilities in the mind are denominated Faculties. Of some of the modes of these simple ideas of Reflection, such as are Remembrance, Discerning, Reasoning, Judging, Knowledge, Faith, &c., I shall have occasion to speak hereafter.

CHAPTER VII.

OF SIMPLE IDEAS OF BOTH SENSATION AND REFLECTION.

Pleasure and Pain.-There be other simple ideas which convey themselves into the mind by all the ways of sensation and reflection; viz. Pleasure, Pain, Power, Existence, Unity.

Delight or uneasiness, one or other of them, join[s itself] to almost all our ideas of Sensation or Reflection; and there is scarce any affection of our senses from without, any retired thought of our mind within, which is not able to produce in us pleasure or pain. By Pleasure and Pain I would be understood to signify whatsoever delights or molests us; whether it arises from the thoughts of our minds, or anything operating on our bodies. For whether we call it satisfaction, delight, pleasure, happiness, &c., on the one side; or uneasiness, trouble, pain, torment, anguish, misery, &c., on the other; they are still but different degrees of the same thing, and belong to the ideas of Pleasure and Pain, delight or uneasiness; which are the names I shall most commonly use for those two sorts of ideas.

The infinitely wise Author of our being,-having given us the power over several parts of our bodies, to move or keep them at rest as we think fit, and also by the motion of them to move ourselves and other* con

The sixth and ninth 8vo editions have our instead of other. The latter is the reading of the fourth edition (folio).-Ed.

tiguous bodies, in which consist all the actions of * body; having also given a power to our minds, in several instances, to choose amongst its ideas which it will think on, and to pursue the inquiry of this or that subject with consideration and attention,-to excite us to those actions of Thinking and Motion that we are capable of,-has been pleased to join to several thoughts and several sensations a perception of delight. If this were wholly separated from all our outward sensations and inward thoughts, we should have no reason to prefer one thought or action to another, negligence to attention, or motion to rest: and so we should neither stir our bodies, nor employ our minds; but let our thoughts (if I may so call it) run adrift, without any direction or design; and suffer the ideas of our minds, like unregarded shadows, to make their appearances there, as it [might] happen, without attending to them: in which state man, however furnished with the faculties of Understanding and Will, would be a very idle, [in]-active creature, and pass his time only in a lazy, lethargic dream. It has therefore pleased our wise Creator to annex to several objects, and to the ideas which we receive from them, as also to several of our thoughts, a concomitant pleasure, and that in several objects to several degrees, that those faculties which he had endowed us with might not remain wholly idle and unemployed by us.

Pain has the same efficacy and use to set us on work that Pleasure has; we being as ready to employ our fa

This is the reading of the sixth edition. Many of the later editions insert our before "body."-ED.

culties to avoid that, as to pursue this: only this is worth our consideration-that pain is often produced by the same objects and ideas that produce pleasure in us. This, their near conjunction, which makes us often feel pain in the sensations where we expected pleasure, gives us new occasion of admiring the wisdom and goodness of our Maker; who, designing the preservation of our being, has annexed pain to the application of many things to our bodies, to warn us of the harm that they will do, and as advices to withdraw from them. But He, not designing our preservation barely, but the preservation of every part and organ in its perfection, hath in many cases annexed pain to those very ideas which delight us. Thus heat, that is very agreeable to us in one degree, by a little greater increase of it proves no ordinary torment; and the most pleasant of all sensible objects, light itself, if there be too much of it, if increased beyond a due proportion to our eyes, causes a very painful sensation: which is wisely and favourably so ordered by nature, that when any object does, by the vehemency of its operation, disorder the instruments of sensation, whose structures cannot but be very nice and delicate, we might by the pain be warned to withdraw before the organ be quite put out of order, and so be unfitted for its proper function for the future. The consideration of those objects that produce it may well persuade us, that this is the end or use of Pain: for though great light be insufferable to our eyes, yet the highest degree of darkness does not at all disease them, because the causing no disorderly motion in it leaves that curious organ unharmed in its natural state. But yet excess of cold as well as