those are which I call Mixed Modes; how the mind comes by them; and that they are compositions made up of Simple ideas got from Sensation and Reflection.

CHAPTER XXIII.

OF OUR COMPLEX IDEAS OF SUBSTANCES.

Ideas of substances, how made.—The mind, being furnished with a great number of the Simple Ideas conveyed in by the Senses, as they are found in exterior things, or by Reflection on its own operations, takes notice, also, that a certain number of these simple ideas go constantly together; which, being presumed to belong to one thing, and words being suited to common apprehensions and made use of for quick dispatch, are called, so united in one subject, by one name. [These], by inadvertency, we are apt afterward to talk of and consider as one simple idea, which, indeed, [are] a complication of many ideas together: because, as I have said, not imagining how these simple ideas can subsist by themselves, we accustom ourselves to suppose some substratum wherein they subsist, an from which they result: which therefore we call Sub

stance.

Our idea of substance in general.—So that if any one will examine his notion of pure Substance in general, he will find he has no other idea of it [than] only a supposition of he knows not what support of such qualities

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[as] are capable of producing simple ideas in us; which qualities are commonly called Accidents. If any one should be asked, "What is the subject wherein colour or weight inheres?" he would have nothing to say but, "The solid extended parts." And if [it] were demanded, "What is it that solidity and extension inhere in," he would not be in a much better case than the Indian, who saying that the world was supported by a great elephant, was asked "What the elephant rested on ?" to which his answer was, "A great tortoise:" but being again pressed to know what gave support to the broad-backed tortoise, replied, "Something, he knew not what." The idea, then, to which we give the general name Substance, being nothing but the supposed, but unknown, support of those qualities we find existing, which we imagine cannot subsist sine re substante, 'without something to support them,' we call that support substantia; which, according to the import of the word, is 'standing under,' or 'upholding.'

Of the sorts of substances.—An obscure and relative idea of Substance in general being thus made, we come to have the ideas of particular sorts of Substances, by collecting such combinations of simple ideas as are, by experience and observation of men's senses, taken notice of to exist together, and are therefore supposed to flow from the particular internal constitution or unknown essence of that Substance. Only we must take notice, that our complex ideas of Substances, besides all these simple ideas [of which] they are made up, have always the confused idea of something to which they belong, and in which they subsist: and therefore, when we speak of

any sort of substance, we say it is a thing having such or such qualities; as, Body is a thing that is extended, figured, and capable of motion; Spirit, a thing capable of thinking; and so hardness, friability, and power to draw iron, we say, are qualities to be found in a loadstone. These and the like fashions of speaking intimate that the Substance is always supposed [to be] something besides the extension, figure, solidity, motion, thinking, or other observable [qualites], though we know not what it is.

No clear idea of substance in general.-Hence, when we talk or think of any particular sort of corporeal Substances, as horse, stone, &c., though the idea we have of [any] of them be but the complication or collection of those several simple ideas of sensible qualities which we find united in the thing called 'horse' or 'stone;' yet because we cannot conceive how they should subsist alone, [or] one in another, we suppose them existing in, and supported by, some common subject; which support we denote by the name Substance, though it be certain we have no clear or distinct idea of that thing we suppose a support.

As clear an idea of spirit as body.-The same happens concerning the operations of the Mind; viz., thinking, reasoning, fearing, &c., which we—concluding [them] not to subsist of themselves, nor apprehending how they can belong to body, or be produced by it-are apt to think the actions of some other Substance, which we call Spirit: whereby yet it is evident, that having no other idea or notion of matter [than as being] something wherein those many sensible qualities which affect our senses do subsist-by supposing a Substance wherein

thinking, knowing, doubting, and a power of moving, &c., do subsist, we have as clear a notion of the substance of Spirit as we have of [that of] Body: the one being supposed to be (without [our] knowing what it is) the substratum to those simple ideas [which] we have from without; and the other supposed (with a like ignorance of what it is) to be the substratum to those operations which we experi[ence] in ourselves within. It is plain, then, that the idea of corporeal Substance in Matter is as remote from our conceptions and apprehensions as that of spiritual Substance, or Spirit; and, therefore, from our not having any notion of the substance of Spirit, we can no more conclude its non-existence, than we can, for the same reason, deny the existence of Body: it being as rational to affirm there is no body, because we have no clear and distinct idea of the substance of matter, as to say there is no spirit, because we have no clear and distinct idea of the substance of a Spirit.

Power, a great part of our complex ideas of substances.— He has the [most] perfect idea of any of the particular sorts of Substances, who has gathered and put together most of those simple ideas which do exist in it; among which are to be reckoned its active Powers and passive Capacities; which, though not simple ideas, yet in this respect, for brevity's sake, may conveniently enough be reckoned amongst them. Thus, the power of drawing iron is one of the ideas of the complex one of that substance we call a 'loadstone,' and a power to be so drawn is a part of the complex one we call 'iron;' which powers pass for inherent qualities in those subjects: because

every substance, being as apt, by the powers we observe in it, to change some sensible qualities in other subjects, as it is to produce in us those simple ideas which we receive immediately from it, does, by those new sensible qualities, introduced into other subjects, discover to us those powers which do thereby mediately affect our senses, as regularly as its sensible qualities do immediately: v. g. we, by our senses, perceive in fire its heat and colour; which are, if rightly considered, nothing but powers in it to produce those ideas in us: we also, by our senses, perceive the colour and brittleness of charcoal, whereby we come by the knowledge of another power in fire, which it has to change the colour and consistency of wood. By the former, fire immediately, by the latter it mediately, discovers to us these several powers, which therefore we look upon to be a part of the qualities of fire, and so make them a part of the complex idea of it. For all those powers that we take cognizance of, terminating only in the alteration of some sensible qualities in those subjects on which they operate, and so making them exhibit to us new sensible ideas-therefore it is that I have reckoned these powers amongst the simple ideas, which make the complex ones of the sorts of Substances; though these powers, considered in themselves, are truly complex ideas. And in this sense I [would] be understood, when I name any of these potentialities amongst the simple ideas which we recollect in our minds when we think of particular substances. For the powers that are severally in them are necessary to be considered, if we will have true, distinct notions of the several sorts of Substances.