Sect. 9 (2).

(d.) Has been rated in respect of the qualifying property to all poor rates made during those twelve months for the parish wherein the property is situate (¿); and

(e.) Has on or before the twentieth of the same July paid all such rates, including borough rates (if any), as have become payable by him in respect of the qualifying property up to the then last preceding fifth of January(k). (3.) Every person so qualified shall be entitled to be enrolled as a burgess, unless he

(a.) Is an alien (); or

(b.) Has within the twelve months aforesaid received union or parochial relief or other alms (m); or

(c.) Is disentitled under any Act of Parliament (n).

(a) It is provided by the County Electors Act, 1888 (51 Vict. c. 10), s. 2, post, that "for the purpose of the election of county authorities in England the burgess qualification, that is to say, the qualification enacted by s. 9 of the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882, shall extend to every part of a county not within the limits of a borough, and a person possessing in any part of a county outside the limits of a borough such burgess qualification shall be entitled to be registered under the Act as a county elector in the parish in which the qualifying property is situate. Sections 9, 31, 33, and 63 of the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882, and any enactments of that or any other Act affecting the same, shall extend to so much of every county as is not comprised within the limits of a municipal borough, in like manner as if they were herein reenacted, with the substitution of 'county' for 'borough,' and of county elector' for 'burgess,' and with the other necessary modifications."

(b) By s. 45, sub-s. (8), post, every person enrolled in the burgess roll shall be deemed to be enrolled as a burgess, and every person not enrolled in the burgess roll shall be deemed to be not enrolled as a burgess,

By s. 63, post, women may be enrolled as burgesses, and by that section, as applied by the County Electors Act, 1898 (51 Vict. c. 10), s. 2, sub-s. (2), women may also be enrolled as county electors.

(c) This is no longer the only qualification of a burgess or county elector. It is provided by the County Electors Act, 1888 (51 Vict. c. 10), s. 3, that every person who is entitled to be registered as a voter in respect of a 101. occupation qualification within the meaning of the provisions of the Registration Act, 1885, which are set out in the schedule to that Act, shall be entitled to be registered as a county elector, and to be enrolled as a burgess, in respect of such qualification, in like manner in all respects as if the section of the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882, relating to a burgess qualification included the said 101. occupation qualification. The schedule to the 51 Vict. c. 10, above referred to, is as follows:

"DEFINITION OF TEN POUNDS OCCUPATION QUALIFICATION.

"A person entitled to be registered as a voter in respect of a ten pounds occupation qualification in a borough, municipal or parliamentary(a.) Must during the whole twelve months immediately preceding the

fifteenth day of July have been an occupier as owner or tenant of some land or tenement in a parish [or township] of the clear yearly value of not less than ten pounds; and

(b.) Must have resided in or within seven miles of the borough during six Sect. 9 (3). months immediately preceding the fifteenth day of July; and

(c.) Such person, or someone else, must during the said twelve months have been rated to all poor rates made in respect of such land or tenement; and

(d.) All sums due in respect of the said land or tenement on account of any poor rate made and allowed during the twelve months immediately preceding the fifth day of January next before the registration, or on account of any assessed taxes due before the said fifth day of January, must have been paid on or before the twentieth day of July.

"If two or more persons jointly are such occupiers as above mentioned, and the value of the land or tenement is such as to give ten pounds or more for each occupier, each of such occupiers is entitled to be registered as a voter.

“If a person has occupied in the borough different lands or tenements of the requisite value in immediate succession during the said twelve months, he is entitled in respect of the occupation thereof to be registered as a voter in the parish [or township] in which the last occupied land or tenement is situate."

(d) Occupation.-It is provided by s. 257, sub-s. (3), post, that nothing in this Act shall entitle any person to be enrolled as a citizen of the city of Oxford or burgess of the borough of Cambridge by reason of his occupation of any rooms, chambers, or premises in any college or hall of either of these universities.

By s. 33, sub-s. (2), post, the qualifying property need not be throughout the twelve months constituting the period of qualification the same property, or in the same parish.

For the distinction between an occupier and a lodger the following cases may be referred to:-Bradley v. Baylis, 8 Q. B. D. 194; 51 L. J. Q. B. 183; 46 L. T. (N.s.) 253; 30 W. R. 823; 45 J. P. 847; Morton v. Palmer, 9 Q. B. D. 89; 51 L. J. Q. B. 307; 46 L. T. (N.s.) 285; 30 W. R. 115; 46 J. P. 150; Ness v. Stevenson, 9 Q. B. D. 245; 47 J. P. 134; Ancketill v. Baylis, 10 Q. B. D. 577; 52 L. J. Q. B. 104; 48 L. T. (N.s.) 343; 31 W.R. 233; 47 J. P. 356; Heawood v. Bone, 13 Q. B. D. 179; 51 L. T. (N.S.) 125; 48 J. P. 710; M'Laughlin v. Chambers, [1896] 2 Ir. Rep. 497.

Occupation of a dwelling-house by virtue of an office, service or employment within the meaning of 48 Vict. c. 3, s. 3, is no qualification for the municipal franchise. McClean v. Pritchard, 20 Q. B. D. 285; 58 L. T. (N.s.) 337; 36 W. R. 508; 52 J. P. 519. This decision will also apply to county electors. The distinction between occupation such as gives the occupier the service franchise and occupation within the meaning of this section, is pointed out in Marsh v. Estcourt, 24 Q. B. D. 147; 59 L. J. Q. B. 100; 38 W. R. 495: 54 J. P. 294.

Spaces in a market place the precise position of each of which was known and determined, were held to entitle the occupiers to the borough franchise. Hall v. Metcalfe, [1892] 1 Q. B. 208; 61 L. J. Q. B. 53; 66 L. T. (N.s.) 496 ; 8 T. L. R. 46.

Where a tenant became bankrupt, but continued in occupation and paid rent during the whole of the qualifying period, the trustee in bankruptcy not interfering, it was held that he must be regarded as having been in occupation during the whole of the qualifying period for the purposes of the parliamentary franchise. Mackay v. McGuire, [1891]1 Q. B. 250; 60 L. J. Q. B. 24; 64 L. T. (N.s.) 83; 39 W. R. 109; 55 J. P. 214; 7 T. L. R. 55.

Where the occupier of premises transferred then to a company, and on the same day took from the company a demise of part of the premises which he

NOTE.

Sect. 9 (3). continued to occupy as an office, it was held that there had been a continuous occupation of the office during the whole of the qualifying period. Timmins v. Albiston, [1895] 2 Q. B. 58; 64 L. J. Q. B. 564; 59 J. P. 663.

NOTE.

A husband residing with his wife, who carried on business in her own name, and was the rated occupier of the premises, was held not to be entitled to be registered as the occupier. Prentice v. Markham, 9 T. L. R. 58.

Weekly tenants of stalls in a market building which was closed and locked during the night, were held not to be occupiers within the meaning of s. 30 of the Municipal Corporations (Ireland) Act, 1840. Lovell v. Callaghan, [1894] 2 Ir. R. 346.

As to occupation on succession by descent, marriage, etc., see s. 33, post.

(e) The words "joint or several" were inserted with reference to the decision in R. v. The Mayor, etc. of Exeter, L. R. 4 Q. B. 114, post. Where several persons entitled to occupy a house jointly by agreement between themselves, arranged to occupy separately in turn during the year, it was held that they were not entitled to be registered as having been in joint occupation during the qualifying year. Rowland v. Pritchard, 62 L. J. Q. B. 319; 68 L. T. (N.S.) 586; 57 J. P. 759; 9 T. L. R. 279. For a case where several persons had separate rooms in a house, using the rest of the rooms in common, see Hollands v. Chambers, 32 L. R. Ir. 156.

It is provided by s. 31, post, that where an occupier is entitled to the sole and exclusive use of any part of a house, that part shall not be deemed to be occupied otherwise than separately by reason only that the occupier is entitled to the joint use of some other part. See the note to that section.

(f House, warehouse, etc.-By s. 31, post, the ternis house, warehouse, counting-house, shop, or other building, include any part of a house, where that part is separately occupied for the purposes of any trade, business, or profession; and any such part may, for the purpose of describing the qualification, be described as office, chambers, studio, or by any like term applicable to the case. See the notes to that section, post.

It will be observed that the text requires occupation of some building. The alternative qualification under s. 3 of the County Electors Act, 1888, already mentioned (see note (c) supra), requires occupation only of some land or tenement.

Upon the meaning of these terms reference may be made to the following

cases :

The word "house" means primâ facie a dwelling-house. Surnam v. Darley, 14 M. & W. 181; Nunn v. Denton, 8 Scott N. R. 794; Daniel v. Coulsting, ib. 949. It probably means a dwelling-house in the above section, contrasted as it is with places of business. It should be observed that the meaning of a word may vary considerably according to the purposes and objects of the Act in which it is used. Consequently, the decisions on the meaning of the word "house" as used in the Metropolis Management and Public Health Acts must not be taken to apply generally. Under these Acts a church has been held not to be a house, while a dissenting chapel is a house. Angell v. Paddington Vestry, L. R. 3 Q. B. 714; 37 L. J. M. C. 171; 32 J. P. 742; Caiger v. St. Mary, Islington (Vestry of), 50 L. J. M. C. 59; 45 J. P. 570; Wright v. Ingle, 16 Q. B. D. 379; 55 L. J. M. C. 17; 34 W. R. 221. On the other hand, a church has been held to be a house within the meaning of a bye-law prescribing a building-line. Folkestone (Mayor, etc. of) v. Woodward, L. R. 15 Eq. 159; 42 L. J. Ch. 782. It may be doubted whether these decisions throw any light on the meaning of the word "house" as used in the text.

"Counting-house" includes a solicitor's office. Re Creek, 3 B. & S. 459.

"Shop." In an Irish case stalls in a market building which were open in Sect. 9 (3) front, and fitted with moveable benches, and let to weekly tenants, were held not to be shops. Lovell v. Callaghan, [1894] 2 Ir. R. 346.

The words "or other building" must be read as signifying other buildings ejusdem generis, according to the well-known rule for the construction of statutes. The words are almost precisely similar to those in the Reform Act, 2 Will. 4, c. 45, s. 27. Under that Act a stable built of stone and having a tiled roof was held to be a building. Whitmore v. Bedford, 5 M. & G. 9; 13 L. J. C. P. 55. Rooms in a factory were let to cotton spinners separately, the rents varying according to the size of the room. The approach to the room was either by a common staircase leading from the entrance to the factory (to which there was a door which was never fastened), or by separate outside staircases, or by doors opening into the yard. Each tenant had his own spinning machine (which was worked by a steam-engine belonging to the landlord), it being part of each contract that the landlord should supply steam power), and also the exclusive use of his room, and the key to the door thereof. It was held that the occupier of each room was the exclusive occupier of a building within the meaning of 2 Will. 4, c. 45, s. 27. Wright v. Stockport (Town Clerk of), 5 M. & G. 33; 13 L. J. M. C. 50. A shed stood against a wooden paling, but was not fastened to it. Six posts put into the ground supported a tarpaulin or a tar cloth which formed the roof. One of the sides of the shed was boarded up with boards fastened to the posts by nails. It was held that the shed was a building. Watson v. Cotton, 5 C. B. 51 ; 17 L. J. C. P. 68. The tenant of land in a borongh erected thereon at his own expense a wooden structure with boarded sides and a thatched roof, and supported by wooden posts let into the ground, and used the same for storing potatoes and other things connected with his business of a market gardener. It was held that the shed was a building. The tenant had erected in like manner on the land a pigstye with a slated roof; but in other respects similar to the structure before mentioned. Semble, that this was not a building. But where an electioneering agent, for the purpose of creating a vote, erected a shed made of wood having four boarded sides and a boarded roof and being supported by four posts let into the ground, the court, acting on Cook v. Humber, 11 C. B (N.S.) 33, held that this was not a building. ERLE, C.J., said that an erection to be a building within the Act ought to be in some degree adapted to be used by man either for residence or for the industry to which the statute relates, and also to have the degree of durability which is included in the idea of a building. Powell v. Farnie, Powell v. Boraston, 18 C. B. (N.s.) 168, 175; 34 L. J. C. P. 73: 11 L. T. (N.s.) 736; 11 Jur. (N.S.) 162. A stone building having four walls and a door, used by the tenant for keeping guano and other manures used upon the adjoining land, was held to be a building. So also a stone building roofed, having three sides, and being open in front, with a loft over, used only for milking a cow and keeping a pig, was held a building; and similar erections used only for keeping hay or affording shelter to cattle were held to be buildings. Morrish v. Harris, L. R. 1 C. P. 156; 35 L. J. C. P. 101.

These cases indicate with tolerable clearness what is a building within the meaning of the text. The decisions on the meaning of the word in other Acts, such as the Public Health Acts, can hardly be cited as authorities upon the construction of the text, having regard to the different objects of the Some of the more important of these may, however, be enumerated. Tunstall Turnpike Trustees v. Lowndes, 20 J. P. 374; R. v. Gregory, 5 B. & Ad. 555; 3 L. J. M. C. 25; Stevens v. Gourlay, 7 C. B. (N.s.) 99; 1 F. & F. 498; 29 L. J. C. P. 1; 1 L. T. (N.S.) 33; Poplar Board of Works v. Knight, 13

statutes.

NOTE.

Sect. 9 (3). E. & E. 408; 28 L. J. M. C. 37; 5 Jur. (N.s.) 196; Bowes v. Lowe, L. R. 9 Eq. 636; Thompson v. Sunderland Gas Co., 2 Ex. D. 429; Fielding v. Rhyl Improvement Commissioners, 3 C. P. D. 272; Richardson v. Brown, 49 J. P. 661.

NOTE.

(9) The qualifying property need not during the whole qualifying year be the same property or in the same parish. See s. 33, post.

(h) Residence.-It is provided by the 48 Vict. c. 9, that from and after the passing of that Act (1885) a man shall not be disqualified from being enrolled or voting as a burgess at any municipal election in a borough, in respect of the occupation of any house, by reason only that during a part of the qualifying period, not exceeding four months in the whole, he has, by letting or otherwise, permitted such house to be occupied as a furnished dwelling-house by some other person, and during such occupation by another person has not resided in or within seven miles of the borough.

It is also provided by 54 Vict. c. 11, post, that a person shall not be disqualified from being registered in the local government register of electors for a county or borough in respect of his occupation of any house, warehouse, counting-house, shop, building, land or tenement, by reason only that during part of the qualifying period not exceeding four months at any one time, he has in the performance of any duty arising from or incidental to any office, service, or employment held or undertaken by him, not resided in or within the required distance from such county or borough.

These enactments must be borne in mind as qualifying some of the cases hereafter cited with reference to continuity of residence.

The term "residence" has always to be interpreted with reference to the purpose of the statute in which it is used. See Blackwell v. England, 27 L. J. Q. B. 124. As used in the text it has evidently the same meaning as it has in the Parliamentary Registration Acts, and the following cases decided with reference to these Acts and to the corresponding provisions of the Municipal Corporations Act, 1835, will serve to explain the text. A., a freeman of the borough of T., resided with his wife and family and carried on his business of a wine merchant at G., more than seven miles from T. He paid ninepence a week for the use of a bedroom and a dark closet in the house of a friend at T., A. keeping the key of the closet in which he deposited wine samples. He slept in the bedroom twelve times in six months. It was held that he had not resided in T. during the twelve months. Whithorn v. Thomas, 7 M. & G. 1. It was held in Powell v. Guest, 18 C. B. (N.s.) 72 ; 34 L. J. C. P. 69; 11 L. T. (N.s.) 599, that a man had not resided in a borough when he had for a portion of the qualifying period been detained in a gaol situate more than seven miles distant therefrom under a sentence of imprisonment for an assault without the option of paying a fine. A., after carrying on business and residing at Exeter for many years, went to live in London. He continued his business, which compelled him often to visit Exeter, and he kept some offices and rooms there. He was in Exeter about twenty times during the period from Michaelmas to July, staying each time from four to ten days. On these occasions he always transacted his business, slept, and took some of his meals in his own rooms. It was held that the question was one of fact, and depended upon whether there had been such a degree of inhabitance as to be in substance and in common sense a residence, and that there was sufficient evidence to show that A. had a residence in Exeter as well as in London. R. v. Exeter (Mayor of), Wescomb's case, L. R. 4 Q. B. 110; 19 L. T. (N.s.) 397. A. occupied a house in Exeter jointly with his partner, and carried on his business there. He had the exclusive use of a furnished bedroom and sitting-room. He lived more than seven miles