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count for the breach of a contract to accept timber, and in a general count for goods sold and delivered: an arbitrator, to whom the cause was referred, found that Defendant was liable to pay, and ordered him to pay to Plaintiff, 75.; he also found that certain of the timbers shipped by Plaintiff were the property of Plaintiff, and at his disposal. The Master having taxed the costs on all the issues in favour of Plaintiff, the Court refused to order a review of the taxation. Rennie v. Mills.

Page 249 8. The sheriff having paid into Court a sum paid to him by Defendant on his arrest on a bill of exchange, Plaintiff obtained and made absolute a rule to take it out of Court, but did not enter an appearance for Defendant. A rule of Defendant's for allowing the monies paid into Court to be deemed equivalent to bail, was discharged. In neither of these rules was there any mention of costs.

A year afterwards Defendant obtained a rule for Plaintiff to deliver up the bill of exchange on payment of costs.

Held, that Plaintiff was entitled to the costs of the latter rule, but not of the two former. Hannah v. Willis. 385 9. Trespass. Pleas, not guilty and son assault demesne; Defendant having a verdict on the latter plea, and Plaintiff on the former, Defendant is not entitled to the

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costs of the issue on the former. Mullins v. Scott. Page 423 10. In an action of trespass against magistrates for turning Plaintiff out of a cottage at the instance of parish officers who claimed the premises as part of the poorhouse, the Court refused to call on Plaintiff to give security for costs, on the ground that the action had been instigated and encouraged by a third person, who had petitioned the House of Lords on the subject, and had thrown out expressions of a determination to see Plaintiff reinstated. Hearsey v. Pechell and Another. 11. A magistrate, who obtains a verdict in an action brought against him for an act done in his judicial capacity, must procure the certificate of the judge who tried the cause, as a condition precedent to his demand of double costs under 7 Jac. 1. c. 5. Penny v. Slade and Another. 12. In an action upon a bill of exchange, drawn in figures for 245l., and in words for two hundred, a verdict was taken for Plaintiff, subject to the opinion of the Court upon a special case: If the Court were of opinion that Plaintiff was entitled to recover either of those sums, a verdict was to be entered accordingly; if neither, a nonsuit: The Court directed a verdict for 200l., which Defendants had been ready to pay, but had not tendered:

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Held, that Plaintiff was entitled

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DEED, CONSTRUCTION OF.

cated this representation to Plaintiff, who became the purchaser instead of B., Held, that an action lay against Defendant at the suit of Plaintiff. Pilmore v. Hood. Page 97

DEED, CONSTRUCTION OF. 1. In 1728 land was let on a building lease, which expired at Ladyday 1824. In 1819 Plaintiff, by virtue of a demise from an underlessee, which expired in 1820, was in possession of a house erected on part of this land, and, under that demise, exercised, as all his predecessors had done, for more than thirty years, a right of way over a passage on one side of his house, as necessary for the use and enjoyment thereof; particularly for repairing the eastern side; the under-lessee's interest expired in 1822: Defendant was in possession of the soil of the passage by virtue of an assignment, in 1791, of the lease of 1728 in 1819, the party possessed of the reversion expectant on the lease of 1728, demised to Plaintiff the house of which he was in possession, as above, for fifty-seven years and a half, to hold from Lady-day, 1824, together with all the appurtenances to the same belonging, subject to a covenant for repairs. In 1822 the reversioner demised the soil of the passage to Defendant for sixty-one years, to hold from Lady-day, 1824: Held that,

under the demise of 1819, Plaintiff was entitled to a right of way over Defendant's passage. Hinchliffe v. The Earl of Kinnoul.

Page 1 2. Premises in which the business of a wine and spirit merchant was carried on were assigned, together with the licence, to Plaintiff by way of mortgage; the occupier forfeited the licence, and Plaintiff's mortgage was paid off; afterwards the assignee of the mortgagor procured a new licence, which he sold to a new occupier of the premises: Held, that Plaintiff could not sue him for the amount obtained on the sale of such licence. Manifold and Another v. Morris, Assignee of Henry Rigmaiden, a Bankrupt.

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should die after testator's daughters and sisters, before N. H., leaving issue male, a moiety of the estate was to go to the first and other sons of M. H. in tail male; and in default of such issue, to N. H. for life, remainder to the use of the first and other sons of N. H. in tail male; and in default of such issue, to testator's right heirs: If N. H., after the death of testator's daughters and sisters, should die before M. H., leaving issue male, a moiety of the estate was to go to the first and other sons of N. H. in tail male; and in default of such issue, to M. H. for life; remainder to the use of the first and other sons of M. H. in tail male; and in default of such issue, to the testator's right heirs. In case M. H. and N. H. should both die without issue male, or such issue male should die without issue male, the estate to go to the use of such person as, at the death of the survivor, should be testator's right heir. Testator's daughter R., his sisters, and M. H., all died without issue in the lifetime of J. Upon her death, Held, that N. H. took an estate tail in the whole of the property. Franks v. Price and Others. Page 37 1. S. seised of lands purchased by himself, by his father, and by his grandfather, devised them to his heir at law (for the finding out of whom he directed advertisements to be published), to hold to his heir in fee, subject to legacies,

payable within a year, to daughters of testator's first cousin on the side of his mother, and to the grand-daughters and co-heiresses of the brother of his father's mother; and if no heir was found, to L., on condition he changed his name to S.: testator's great grandfather was unknown: Held, that the heir qualified to take need not necessarily be of the blood of the testator, and that he might sue within sixty years.

2. L. having taken possession of the property, claiming it as his own, twelve years after testator's death; having adopted the name of S. and having levied a fine with proclamations in the name of S., Held, that such fine was a bar to a writ of right brought by an alleged heir of S., and need not be specially pleaded.

3. Held, also, that a pedigree which purported to have been compiled from monumental inscriptions, family records, and history, was not admissible in evidence.

4. The heir on the part of the great grandfather has a prior claim to the heir on the part of the maternal grandfather. Davies v. Lowndes. Page 161

3. Devise of lands to M. S. for life; with the use of household goods, &c.; remainder to J. S. for life; remainder to the use of the heirs of the body of M. S. in tail; remainder over in succession to divers persons for life, and to the heirs of their bodies respectively in tail; the

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aforesaid limitations to be in strict settlement: Held, that M. S. took an immediate estate for life in the real estates of the testator, and an estate in remainder in tail general in the same, expectant on the determination of the estate for life limited to J. S. Douglas v. Congreve. Page 318 Devise to A. H. for life; remainder to R. H. for life, and to his first and other sons in tail; and for default of issue to A. D. H. for life; remainder to his first and other sons in tail; and in default of such issue to "such person bearing the surname of H. as shall be the male relation nearest in blood to the said R. H., and his heirs for ever." Held, that the ultimate remainder vested in interest upon the death of testatrix. Stert and Another, Executrix and Executor of J. Burn, deceased v. G. Platel.

DIGNITY. See ATTAINder.

DISCLAIMER. See SURRENder.

DISTRESS. See GUARANTY, 3.

DISTRINGAS.

See PRACTICE, 12.

EAST INDIA COMPANY.

See BANKRUPT, 2.

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ESTOPPEL.

EVIDENCE.

783

ELECTION PETITION.

EVIDENCE.

See STATUTE, CONSTRUCTION OF, 4. See DEVISE, 2. INSURANCE, 1.

ESCAPE.

See PLEADING, 7. Plaintiff's attorney being about to issue a ca. sa. against H. at the suit of Plaintiff, requested of the sheriff a particular sheriff's officer; delivered the warrant to that officer; took him in his carriage to the scene of action, and then encouraged an illegal arrest, from which H. afterwards escaped : Held, that Plaintiff could not sue the sheriff for such escape, and that the officer must be taken to be her special bailiff. Doe v. Trye.

ESTATE.

Page 573

See DEED, CONSTRUCTION Of.

ESTATE TAIL.

See RECOVERY.

ESTOPPEL.

When a verdict is found against a Defendant on a plea of set-off, he is estopped from suing the Plaintiff for the demand specified in the plea of set-off. Eastmure v. Laws. 444

EVICTION.

See PLEADING, 1.

MORTMAIN. STATUTE, CONSTRUCTION OF, 2. TRESPASS. 1. Upon a charter-party engaging to pay 4l. 15s. per ton for goods shipped at Bombay for London, cotton to be calculated at fifty cubic feet per ton, — Held, that evidence was admissible for Defendant of a usage to pay according to the measurement taken at Bombay, before the goods are loaded. Also, that Plaintiff was entitled to shew, in reply, that his captain objected to receive the goods at the Bombay measurement; measured them when on board; and delivered an account of that measurement to the shippers. Bottomley v. Forbes.

Page 121 2. Held, that proof of Defendant's having paid for articles ordered by his wife for the use of her own house, was relevant evidence to go to a jury, upon a question whether or not she had placed her niece at a school with his authority and at his charge. M'George v. 3. Defendant, as surety for N., havEgan.

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ing received and promised to pay an account which he was informed had been agreed to by N., and refusing to produce it on the trial of an action brought against him by Plaintiff, the employer of N., Held, that without calling N., Plaintiff might prove by the wit

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