1839. WHALLEY v. able time. Two cases have been cited in which certicates have been granted at considerable distances of time, and it has been contended that they may be WILLIAMSON. granted at any time before final judgment. But neither of the cases establishes that proposition. In Johnson v. Stanton (a), the certificate was granted four days after the trial; a motion was made to review the taxation of costs, on the ground that the certificate should have been granted at the trial; and the Court said, “It conduces to the better administration of justice that the judge should have time to consider of the certificate, rather than to be under the necessity of deciding upon it at the instant." And in Woolley v. Whitby, Abbott C. J. says, "The sound construction of the enactment appears to me to be, that if at the trial the trespass appears to have been wilful, the Judge may grant his certificate at any convenient time. This certainly is the most proper construction, inasmuch as it gives the judge time for consideration, which he ought to have for the due exercise of the discretion vested in him by the statute." It is pressing these cases too far, to infer from them that a judge may grant a certificate at any time before final judgment, even though he should be authorised to grant one after the assizes. If he have authority to revoke, he must at all events exercise that authority within a reasonable time. ERSKINE J. The practice of amending the postea, in which the judge merely makes the entry according to the fact, and exercises no discretion, has no analogy to the case in which at his discretion he deprives a Plaintiff of costs. When he has once done that, if he revokes his decision, he must at all events revoke it within a reasonable time. Rule discharged. (a) 2 B. & C. 621. 1839. DOE dem. LLOYD v. WILliams. Jan. 22. The circumstance that there are only twenty-nine in a county is not a suffi cient ground for changing the venue. WILDE Serjt. obtained on behalf of the Plaintiff, a rule nisi to change the venue in this cause from Radnorshire to an adjoining county, on the ground that there were but twenty-nine special jurymen in the special jurors county of Radnor; that the Defendant's attorney had great influence at Presteign, and many mortgages on small freeholds in the parish where the premises in question lay, and where a considerable proportion of the jurors resided; that there was a ferment in the neighbourhood where the premises lay on the question who was justly entitled to them; that the farmers of the parish had countenanced the Defendant in taking forcible possession of the premises; and that the Defendant was an old bone-setter, who had set the bones of many who might sit on the jury. Evans shewed cause on an affidavit which disclosed that Presteign was eighteen miles distant from the assize town; denied the existence of any ferment on the subject of the title to the premises; and asserted that the Defendant took possession of them as heir to a lunatic, who had executed a deed under which the lessor of the Plaintiff claimed. Wilde relied on the impossibility of striking a special Jury according to the act of parliament; and on the absence of any denial that the farmers in the neighbourhood had countenanced the Defendant in taking forcible possession, or that the Defendant's attorney had a number of mortgages in the parish. 1839. DoE dem. TINDAL C. J. If we were to make this rule absolute, we should be saying that no special jury cause shall be tried in Radnorshire. Should there be a failure of justice for want of jurors we can apply a remedy hereafter. WILLIAMS. The rule must be discharged. LLOYD บ. VAUGHAN J. and BOSANQUET J. concurred. ERSKINE J. The rule was granted on the ground of a ferment in the neighbourhood, which is now denied. Rule discharged. Jan. 22. RIPPON v. DAWSON. was described in a writ of A Defendant A JUDGE at chambers having set aside the writ of summons in this case, because it described the Defendant as of Newcastle upon Tyne in the county of Northumberland, whereas Newcastle-upon-Tyne is a county of itself, summons as of Newcastle Newcastle upon-Tyne consisting of the town and county of Newcastleupon-Tyne, and of certain townships in the county of Corrie obtained a rule nisi to set aside the Judge's order, on the ground that the description was not necessarily incorrect, for by 2 & 3 W. 4. c. 62. several townships in the county of Northumberland were thenceforth to be held within the boundary of Newcastle-upon-Tyne. Besides, it was sufficient if the Defendant lived within 200 yards of the boundary; Jelks v. Fry. (a) Wilde Serjt. who shewed cause, contended that the Northumber- description was bad on the face of the writ; for though by the statute referred to, parts of Northumberland were land. (a) 3 Dowl. 37. within the parliamentary borough of Newcastle-uponTyne, no part of the town and county of Newcastle-uponTyne was within the county of Northumberland. The Defendant's residing within 200 yards of the boundary might render available the service of a writ, describing him as of the town and county of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, but it could not cure the misdescription which alleged Newcastle-upon-Tyne to be in the county of Northumberland. There was no such place in Northumberland. Corrie. The writ does not describe the Defendant as of the town and county of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, but as of Newcastle-upon-Tyne in the county of Northumberland; and part of Newcastle-upon-Tyne being now in Northumberland, the description is not incorrect. The recent statute was not mentioned to the Judge at Chambers; and the Defendant has not deposed that he lives within the town and county. TINDAL C. J. We should have been bound to take judicial notice that Newcastle-upon-Tyne is a town and county of itself; but we are also bound to notice that under the recent statute, Newcastle consists of the town and county of Newcastle, and of townships in the county of Northumberland. The defendant should at least have shewn that he does not reside in that part of the town which is in the county of Northumberland: there is no incongruity on the face of the writ. The rest of the Court concurring, the rule was made 1839. RIFPON v. DAWSON. 1839. Jan. 25. To an action of trover Defendant pleaded, that Defendant being within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty Court of Sierra Leone, Plaintiff recovered a judgment SMITH V. NICOLLS. CASE. The declaration contained six counts:-the first count was for an unfounded charge of illegal trading and seizure of the Plaintiff's ship, the Admiral Owen; 2. for maliciously arresting the Plaintiff for an alleged rescue of the Admiral Owen, and obliging him to enter into recognizances in the sum of 2000l., to appear to the charge within six calendar months then following; 3. for falsely charging the Plaintiff with having feloniously received government stores, alleged to have been feloniously stolen, the Plaintiff knowing the same to have been so stolen, and causing him to be imprisoned for a in that Court long time; 4. for falsely charging the Plaintiff with having received goods, knowing them to have been tion: Held, stolen, and causing his house and premises to be entered and searched for them; 5. for not selling the Plaintiff's goods with due care; and the sixth was a count in trover. against him for the same cause of ac ill. To these counts the Defendant pleaded, 1. not guilty; 2. the statute of limitations; 3. to the fifth count, that Defendant had not the sale or disposal of the goods; 4. to the last count, that the goods were not the goods, &c. of the Plaintiff; and, 5th, to part of the last count, that before and at and during the times in the last count mentioned, the Defendant was a public officer of our Lord the King, to wit, governor and superintendent of a certain island, then parcel of his Majesty's possessions in parts beyond the seas, called Fernando Po, and one of the justices assigned to keep the peace of our Lord the King in and for the said island, the said island then being within the jurisdiction of the Court of Vice-Admiralty, of and for and held 1. £. R. Yl of L. 906 |