Jurisdiction.

Evidence.

As soon as the land is shown to be in the parish, and the person summoned to be the occupier and rated, the rate is good on the face of it and jurisdiction attaches (Ex parte Birmingham, 18 L. J. M. C. 89). The justices have no power to inquire into the validity of a rate, good upon the face of it (Ex parte May, 31 L. J. M. C. 161; 2 Best & S. 426; 26 J. P. 340), nor to state a case thereon, that being a matter for an appeal against the rate (R. v. JJ. Gloucestershire, 29 L. J. M. C. 117; 6 Jur. N. S. 293; 24 J. P. 263; 1 L. T. N. S. 294); but they may enquire into the cases of the party assessed having no assessable property in the parish or of some formalities not having been complied with (Luton Board of Health v. Davis, 29 L. J. M. C. 173; 6 Jur. N. S. 580; 8 W. R. 411; 24 J. P. 677; 2 L. T. N. S. 172), although they cannot entertain the question of whether or not the occupation is beneficial (R. v. JJ. Warwickshire, 29 L. J. M. C. 176; 6 Jur. N. S. 629; 8 W. R. 435; 24 J. P. 727; 2 L. T. N. S. 233), and the Court will not grant a mandamus if the issue of the distress warrant would be a manifest injustice (R. v. Porker, 26 L. J. M. C. 199; 7 E. & B. 155; 3 Jur. N. S. 771; 5 W. R. 234; 21 J. P. 549). The rate is the order, and the limitation of time in 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43 does not apply to proceedings for enforcing it, the duty of the justices being ministerial and not judicial; if a question of law arises as to their power to issue the warrant of distress they may state a case under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43 (Sweetman v. Guest, 37 L. J. M. C. 59; L. R. 3 Q. B. 262; 16 W. R. 426; 32 J. P. 212). The justices may require proof of the due making and allowance (x),

warrant may be addressed to the churchwardens and overseers, or overseers, parish constable, or any other person (Id. s. 4). Any number of local rates and taxes, of the same or different kinds, due from the same person, may be included in one complaint, summons, warrant or document before justices, to be construed for each rate or tax as a separate document, and invalidity of one rate not to affect the others; no costs shall be allowed for several complaints, &c., when in the opinion of the justices one would have sufficed (25 & 26 Vict. c. 82, s. 1). Upon payment of the rate, and costs incurred up to the time of payment, all proceedings shall cease (12 Vict. c. 14, s. 6). Any person aggrieved by the distress may appeal to the sessions (17 Geo. 2, c. 38, s. 7).

(x) Making and allowance.-The rate is to be made by the churchwardens and overseers of the parish, by and with the consent of two or more justices of the county, whereof one to be of the quorum, dwelling in or near the parish (43 Eliz. c. 2, s. 1), or the mayor or head officer, being a justice, in any town or place corporate and city (s. 8). There must be a heading to the rate showing for what purpose and by what authority it is made (Re Eastern Counties Railway, 25 L. J. M. C. 49; 2 Jur. N. S. 161; 4 W. R. 261; 26 L. T. 257), and the overseers must sign a declaration at the end according to the form in the schedule to 25 & 26 Vict. c. 103, although it need not be in the precise words (Paynter v. R., 16 L. J. M. C. 136; 10 Q. B. 908). The rate is deemed made when allowed by the justices, and if they sever in their allowance then on the day of the last allowance (32 & 33 Vict. c. 41, s. 17); a distress warrant which recited that the rate was made on a day which was in fact the day upon which it was allowed has been held good (Ormerod

and publication (y) of the rate, the rating of the defendant, demand (z), and refusal (a).

Real Estate.

25 & 26 VICT. C. 53.

(Transfer of Land Act, 1862.)

105. If in any proceeding to obtain the registration of any Person making land, or any land certificate or certificate of title, or otherwise in false statements. any transaction relating to land which is or is proposed to be put upon the registry, any person acting either as principal or agent shall, knowingly and with intent to deceive, make or assist or join in or be privy to the making of any material false statement or representation, or suppress, conceal, or assist or join in v. Chadwick, 16 L. J. M. C. 143; 16 M. & W. 367; 11 J. P. 138). The allowance by the justices is a purely ministerial act, and, if the rate be good on the face of it, they cannot refuse to allow it (R. v. Godolphin, 13 L. J. M. C. 57; 1 Dowl. & L., P. C. 830; 8 J. P. 251; R. v. Earl of Yarborough, 12 Ad. & E. 416; 4 J. P. 539); their allowance must be written at the end, and not in the middle, of the rate (Re JJ. North Staffordshire, 23 L. J. M. C. 17; 18 J. P. 297; 22 L. T. 136). The production of a book purporting to contain a poor rate, with the allowance of the rate by the justices, shall, if the rate is made in the form prescribed by law, be primâ facie evidence of the due making and publication of such rate (32 & 33 Vict. c. 41, s. 18).

(y) Publication.-No rate shall be deemed valid (R. v. Newcomb, 4 T. R. 368) and sufficient to collect the same until public notice after it has been allowed by the justices has been given on the Sunday following (17 Geo. 2, c. 3, s. 1) by a printed or written notice affixed before Divine service at or near the principal door of all the churches and chapels in the parish (7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 45, s. 2; Ormerod v. Chadwick, supra); the notice is as good put up before the second service as the first, and no signature of the churchwardens or overseers to it is necessary (Burneley v. Överseers of Methley, 28 L. J. M. C. 152; 7 W. R. 422; 23 J. P. 661; 33 L. T. 132). Publication may be proved by the production of the rate book (32 & 33 Vict. c. 41, s. 18).

(z) Demand. The exact sum due must be demanded (Hurrell v. Wink, 8 Taunt. 369), and where the amount comes to the fraction of a farthing the ratepayer is not bound to pay the farthing, and a demand including it is bad (Morton v. Brammer, 29 L. J. M. C. 218; 2 L. T. N. S. 600). The demand need not be personal (R. v. JJ. Gloucestershire, 24 J. P. 39), it is sufficient if made by a collector on the premises (Yewdall v. Craven, 29 J. P. 197; 11 L. T. N. S. 368). Where the occupier is not living on the land or premises assessed, nor in the parish for which the rate is made, or where the address is not known and cannot be found, the demand may be delivered in writing to the person having custody of the place, and if no such person can be found it may be affixed on a conspicuous part (31 & 32 Vict. c. 122, s. 39); in the case of a corporation, company, or public trustees the demand may be by letter through the post to the clerk or secretary, or personally upon him, at the office (Id. s. 40).

(a) Refusal.-A warrant which alleged the refusal to pay to have been "duly proved" before the justices, instead of proved upon oath, has been held good (Ormerod v. Chadwick, supra).

c. 53.

25 & 26 Vict, or be privy to the suppressing, withholding, or concealing from any judge, or the registrar, or any person employed by or assisting the registrar, any material document, fact, or matter of information, every person so acting shall be guilty of a Misdemeanor (b).

Fraud.

Interpretation of termis.

Making false statement and suppression of deeds and evidence.

Forging or making fraudulent alterations.

Interpretation of terins.

138. If any person fraudulently procures, assists in fraudulently procuring, or is privy to the fraudulent procurement of any order of the Court of Chancery in relation to registered land, or fraudulently procures, assists in fraudulently procuring, or is privy to the fraudulent procurement of the entry on the register of any caveat or notice of a charge, or of the erasure from the register or alteration on the register of any caveat or notice of a charge, such person shall be guilty of a Misdemeanor (b).

140. [Person" includes Her Majesty, her heirs and successors, and the Duke of Cornwall for the time being, and also a body politic or corporate; "Land" includes messuages, tenements, and hereditaments, corporeal or incorporeal.]

25 & 26 VICT. c. 67.

44. If in the course of any proceeding before the Court under this Act any person acting either as principal or agent shall, knowingly and with intent to deceive, make or assist or join in or be privy to the making of any material false statement or representation, or suppress, conceal, or assist or join in or be privy to the suppressing, withholding, or concealing from the Court any material document, fact, or matter of information, every person so acting shall be deemed to be guilty of a Misdemeanor (b).

45. If in the course of any proceeding before the Court under this Act any person shall fraudulently forge or alter or assist in forging or altering any certificate or other document relating to such land or to the title thereof,—or shall fraudulently offer, utter, dispose of, or put off any such certificate or other document, knowing the same to be forged or altered, such person shall be guilty of Felony (c).

48. [" Person" includes a body politic or corporate; and "Land" does not include any incorporeal hereditaments, but includes all corporeal tenements and hereditaments not expressly excepted.]

(b) Triable at Sessions. Bail Compulsory. No Costs.
Triable at Assizes. Bail Discretionary. Costs allowed.

Receivers of Stolen Goods.

24 & 25 VICT. c. 96, ss. 91–97 (e); 34 & 35 VICT. c. 112, s. 19. See also 7 WILL. 4 & 1 VICT. c. 36, s. 30, “ POST OFFICE," ante;

28 GEO. 3, c. 55, s. 3, "STOCKING FRAMES," post.

c. 96. the principal is

91. Whosoever shall receive (ƒ) any chattel, money, valuable 24 & 25 Vict. security, or other property whatsoever, the stealing, taking, extorting, obtaining, embezzling, or otherwise disposing whereof Receiving, where shall amount to a felony, either at common law or by virtue guilty of se ony. of this Act, knowing the same to have been feloniously stolen,

(e) The rest of this statute is set out in "LARCENY," ante.

(f) Manual possession or touch is unnecessary in order to sustain a conviction for receiving stolen goods; it is sufficient if there be a control by the receiver over the goods (R. v. Smith, Dears., C. C. 494; 24 L. J. M. C. 135; 1 Jur. N. S. 575; 6 Cox, C. C. 554; 3 W. R. 484; 19 J. P. 348). A person having a joint possession with the thief may be convicted as a receiver (S. C. and R. v. Hobson, Dears., C. C. 400; 6 Cox, C. C. 410; 18 J. P. 727; 24 L. T. 170). Where on the trial of a prisoner for receiving there was evidence of a criminal intent to receive, and of a knowledge that the goods were stolen, but the exclusive possession of them still remained in the thieves, it was held that he had no possession either actual or constructive (R. v. Wiley, 2 Den., C. C. 37). Where two persons were indicted, one with stealing a live sheep, and the other with receiving 20 lbs. of mutton, part of the goods, knowing the same to have been stolen, it was held that the indictment was good against the receiver, and that he could be convicted (R. v. Cowell and another, 2 East, P. C. 617).

It makes no difference whether a receiver receives for the purpose of profit or advantage, or whether he does it to assist the thief (R. v. Davis, 6 C. & P. 177; R. v. Richardson, 6 C. & P. 336).

Goods were stolen and sent by the thief in a parcel by railway addressed to prisoner. A policeman belonging to the railway company, from information, examined the parcel at the station at the place of its destination and stopped it. It was called for by one of the thieves on the day of its arrival and refused to him. It was afterwards taken to an address designated by the thief, and there received by the prisoner:-Held, not guilty, as the goods had ceased to be stolen goods at the time of the receipt by the prisoner (R. v. Schmidt, 35 L. J. M. C. 94; 10 Cox, C. C. 172; L. R. 1 C. C. R. 15; 12 Jur. N. S. 149; 14 W. R. 286; 30 J. P. 100; 13 L. T. N. S. 679).

A person receiving goods from a partner, who is liable to be convicted for stealing them (though he be jointly interested in them) under 31 & 32 Vict. c. 116, s. 1, cannot be convicted of the offence, though he may know that the same had been stolen by such partner (R. v. Smith, 39 L. J. M. C. 112; 11 Cox, C. C. 511; L. R. 1 C. Č. R. 266; 18 W. R. 932; 34 J. P. 484; 22 L. T. N. S. 554).

Belief without actual knowledge is sufficient to maintain an indictment for receiving goods knowing them to have been stolen (R. v. White, 1 F. & F. 665).

Husband and wife.-To connect the wife with the matter it was proved that some time after a burglary the wife was seen dealing with part of the stolen things, when she made a statement importing a knowledge that the things had been stolen, and that they were to be made away with:-Held, that it is for the jury to find whether the wife received the things from her

c. 96.

24 & 25 Vict. taken, extorted, obtained, embezzled, or disposed of, shall be guilty of Felony (h). [No person shall be prosecuted a second time for the same offence.]

Indictment (i).

Receiving, where

the principal is guilty of a misdemeanor.

92-94. [Separate receivers may be included in the same indictment in the absence of the principal; and on an indictment for jointly receiving, persons may be convicted of separately receiving (k).]

95. Whosoever shall receive any chattel, money, valuable security, or other property whatsoever, the stealing, taking, obtaining, converting, or disposing whereof is made a misdemeanor by this Act, knowing the same to have been unlawfully husband or in his absence (R. v. Wardroper, 29 L. J. M. C. 116; 8 Cox, C. C. 284; 6 Jur. N. S. 232; 8 W. R. 217; 24 J. P. 117; 1 L. T. N. S. 416).

Where a husband and wife were jointly indicted for receiving stolen goods, and the jury found both guilty, stating that the female prisoner received them without the control or knowledge of, and apart from her husband, and that he afterwards adopted her receipt:-Held, that the conviction could not be sustained against the husband (R. v. Dring, 7 Cox, C. C. 382; Dears. & B., C. C. 329; 3 Jur. N. S. 1132; 6 W. R. 41; 21 J. P. 766; 30 L. T. 158).

A thief delivered goods to prisoner's wife in the absence of the husband, and she paid him 6d. on account. Afterwards prisoner met the thief, and with a guilty knowledge, agreed with him for the price, and paid the balance: -Held, that the prisoner could be convicted of receiving (R. v. Woodward, L. & C. 122; 31 L. J. M. C. 91; 8 Jur. N. S. 104; Cox, C. C. 95; 10 W. R. 298; 26 J. P. 116; 5 L. T. N. S. 686).

A husband may be convicted of feloniously receiving property which his wife has stolen voluntarily and without restraint on his part (R. v. McAthey, L. & C. 250; 32 L. J. M. C. 35; 9 Cox, C. C. 251; 11 W. R. 73; 26 J. P. 805; 7 L. T. N. S. 433).

Evidence. To sustain a conviction against a receiver, there must be evidence that the property was stolen (R. v. Dolan, Dears., C. C. 436; 19 J. P. 55); and by some other person (R. v. Densley, 6 C. & P. 399).

An admission of his guilt made by a thief whilst in custody, in the presence of the receiver, is evidence against the receiver (R. v. Cox, 1 F. & F. 90).

Recent possession of stolen property is evidence either that the person in possession stole the property, or that he received it knowing it to have been stolen (R. v. Langmead, L. & C. 427; 28 J. P. 343; 10 L. T. N. S. 350).

Pawnbroker's duplicate.-A conviction for receiving a pawnbroker's duplicate, knowing it to have been stolen, is good (R. v. Morrison, 8 Cox, C. C. 194; 5 Jur. N. S. 604; 1 Bell, C. C. R. 158; 7 W. R. 554; 33 L. T. N. S. 228). (h) Triable at Sessions. Bail Discretionary. Costs allowed (s. 121). (i) An indictment may contain a count for stealing and another for receiving against the same person, who if acquitted on the first count may be convicted on the second (R. v. Huntley, Bell, C. C. 238; 29 L. J. M. C. 170; 24 J. P. 133; 1 L. T. N. S. 384; R. v. Hilton, Bell, C. C. 20; 28 L. J. M. C. 28; 5 Jur. N. S. 47; 8 Cox, C. C. 87; 7 W. R. 59; 22 J. P. 770; 32 L. T. 151); or if acquitted on the count for receiving, may be convicted on the count for stealing (R. v. Coggins, 12 Cox, C. C. 517; 38 J. P. 38; 29 L. T. N. S. 469).

(k) If A. in the absence of B. feloniously receives stolen property from the thief, and A. subsequently delivers it to B., who knowingly receives it, both may be jointly indicted (R. v. Rearden, 35 L. J. M. C. 171; 10 Cox, C. C. 241; L. R. 1 C. C. R. 31; 12 Jur. N. S. 476; 14 W. R. 663; 30 J. P. 437; 13 L. T. N. S. 449).