prove any such inconsistency, it must be by some philosophical and metaphysical arguments, and not common sense.

There is a grand illusion in the pretended demonstration of Arminians from common sense. The main strength of all these demonstrations lies in that prejudice, that arises through the insensible change of the use and meaning of such terms as liberty, able, unable, necessary, impossible, unavoidable, invincible, action, &c. from their original and vulgar sense, to a metaphysical sense, entirely diverse; and the strong connection of the ideas of blamelessness, &c. with some of these terms, by a habit contracted and established, while these terms were used in their first meaning. This prejudice and delusion are the foundation of all those positions they lay down as maxims, by which most of the scriptures they alledge in this controversy are interpreted, and on which all their pompous demonstrations from scripture and reason depend. From this secret delusion and prejudice they have almost all their advantages it is the strength of their bulwarks, and the edge of their weapons. And this is the main ground of all the right they have to treat their neighbours in so assuming a manner, and to insult others, perhaps as wise and good as themselves, as "weak bigots, men that dwell in the dark caves of superstition, perversely set, obstinately shutting their eyes against the noon-day light, enemies to common sense, maintaining the first-born of absurdities, &c. &c." But perhaps an impartial consideration of the things which have been observed in the preceding parts of this enquiry, may enable the lovers of truth better to judge whose doctrine is indeed absurd, abstruse, self-contradictory, and inconsistent with common sense, and many ways repugnant to the universal dictates of the reason of mankind.

Corol. From the things which have been observed it will follow, that it is agreeable to common Sense to suppose that the glorified saints have not their freedom at all diminished in any respect; and that God himself has the highest possible freedom, according to the true and proper meaning of the term; and that he is, in the highest possible respect, an agent, and active in the exercise of his infinite holiness; though he acts therein, in the highest degree, necessarily and his actions of this kind are in the highest, most absolutely perfect manner virtuous and praiseworthy; and are so for that very reason, because they are most perfectly necessary.

SECT. V.

Objections, that this Scheme of Necessity renders all Means and Endeavours for avoiding Sin, or obtaining Virtue and Hapiness, vain, and to no Purpose; and that it makes Men no more than mere Machines in Affairs of Morality and Religion, answered.

Arminians say, If sin and virtue come to pass by a necessity consisting in a sure connection of causes and effects, antecedents and consequents, it can never be worth while to use any Means or Endeavours to obtain the one and avoid the other; seeing no endeavours can alter the futurity of the event, which is become necessary by a connection already established.

But I desire that this matter may be fully considered; and that it may be examined with a thorough strictness, whether it will follow that Endeavours and Means, in order to avoid or obtain any future thing, must be more in vain, on the supposition of such a connection of antecedents and consequents, than if the contrary be supposed.

For endeavours to be in vain, is for them not to be successful; that is to say, for them not eventually to be the Means of the thing aimed at, which cannot be but in one of these two ways; either, first, That although the Means are used, yet the event aimed at does not follow; or, secondly, If the event does follow, it is not because of the Means, or from any connection or dependence of the event on the Means, the event would have come to pass as well without the Means as with them. If either of these two things are the case, then the Means are not properly successful, and are truly in vain. The success or non-success of Means, in order to an effect, or their being in vain or not in vain, consists in those Means being connected, or not connected, with the effect, in such a manner as this, viz. That the effect is with the Means, and not without them; or, that the being of the effect is, on the one hand, connected with Means, and the want of the effect, on the other hand, is connected with the want of the Means. If there be such a connection as this between Means and end, the Means are not in vain the more there is of such a connection, the further they are from being in vain; and the less of such a connection, the more they are in vain.

Now, therefore, the question to be answered-in order to determine, whether it follows from this doctrine of the necessary connection between foregoing things, and consequent ones,

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that means used in order to any effect are more in vain than they would be otherwise-is, whether it follows from it, that there is less of the forementioned connection between means and effect; that is, whether on the supposition of there being a real and true connection between antecedent things and consequent ones, there must be less of a connection between Means and effect, than on the supposition of there being no fixed connection between antecedent things and consequent ones: and the very stating of this question is sufficient to answer it. It must appear to every one that will open his eyes, that this question cannot be affirmed without the grossest absurdity and inconsistence. Means are foregoing things, and effects are following things: And if there were no connection between foregoing things and following ones, there could be no connection between means and end; and so all means would be wholly vain and fruitless. For it is only by virtue of some connection that they become successful: It is some connection observed, or revealed, or otherwise known, between antecedent things and following ones, that directs in the choice of means. And if there were no such thing as an established connection, there could be no choice as to means; one thing would have no more tendency to an effect than another; there would be no such thing as tendency in the case. All those things, which are successful means of other things, do therein prove connected antecedents of them and therefore to assert that a fixed connection between antecedents and consequents makes means vain and useless, or stands in the way to hinder the connection between means and end, is just so ridiculous as to say, that a connection between antecedents and consequents stands in the way to hinder a connection between antecedents and consequents.

Nor can any supposed connection of the succession or train of antecedents and consequents from the very beginning of all things, the connection being made already sure and necessary, either by established laws of nature, or by these together with a decree of sovereign immediate interpositions of divine power on such and such occasions, or any other way (if any other there be ;) I say, no such necessary connection of a series of antecedents and consequents can in the least tend to hinder, but that the means we use may belong to the series; and so may be some of those antecedents which are connected with the consequents we aim at, in the established course of things. Endeavours which we use, are things that exist; and, therefore, they belong to the general chain of events; all the parts of which chain are supposed to be connected and so Endeavours are supposed to be connected with some effects, or some consequent things or other. And certainly this does not hinder but that the events they are

connected with may be those which we aim at, and which we choose, because we judge them most likely to have a connection with those events, from the established order and course of things which we observe, or from something in divine Revelation.

Let us suppose a real and sure connection between a man having his eyes open in the clear daylight, with good or gans of sight, and seeing; so that seeing is connected with his opening his eyes, and not seeing with his not opening his eyes; and also the like connection between such a man attempting to open his eyes, and his actually doing it: the supposed established connection between these antecedents and consequents, let the connection be never so sure and necessary, certainly does not prove that it is in vain, for a man in such circumstances to attempt to open his eyes, in order to seeing: his aiming at that event, and the use of the Means, being the effect of his will, does not break the connection or hinder the

success.

So that the objection we are upon does not lie against the doctrine of the necessity of events by a certainty of connection and consequence: On the contrary, it is truly forcible against the Arminian doctrine of contingence and self-determination, which is inconsistent with such a connection. If there be no connection between those events wherein virtue and vice consists, and any thing antecedent: then, there is no connection between these events and any Means or Endeavours used in order to them: and if so, then those means must be in vain. The less there is of connection between foregoing things and following ones, so much the less there is between Means and end, Endeavours and success; and in the same proportion are Means and Endeavours ineffectual and in vain.

It will follow from Arminian principles, that there is no degree of connection between virtue or vice, and any foregoing event or thing: or, in other words, that the determination of the existence of virtue or vice does not in the least depend on the influence of any thing that comes to pass antecedently, as its cause, Means, or ground; because, so far as it is so, it is not from self-determination: and, therefore, so far there is nothing of the nature of virtue or vice. And so it follows, that virtue and vice are not at all, in any degree, dependent upon, or connected with, any foregoing event or existence, as its cause, ground, or Means. And if so, then all foregoing Means must be totally in vain.

Hence it follows, that there cannot, in any consistence with the Arminian scheme, be any reasonable ground of so much as a conjecture concerning the consequence of any Means and Endeavours, in order to escaping vice or obtain

ing virtue, or any choice or preference of Means, as having a greater probability of success by some than others; either from any natural connection or dependence of the end on the Means, or through any divine constitution or revealed way of God bestowing or bringing to pass these things, in consequence of any Means, Endeavours, Prayers or Deeds. Conjectures, in this latter case, depend on a supposition that God himself is the giver, or determining Cause of the events sought but if they depend on self-determination, then God is not the determining or disposing Author of them: and if these things are not of his disposal, then no conjecture can be made from any revelation he has given, concerning any method of his disposal of them.

Yea, on these principles, it will not only follow that men cannot have any reasonable ground of judgment or conjecture that their means and Endeavours to obtain virtue or avoid vice will be successful, but they may be sure they will not; they may be certain that they will be in vain; and that if ever the thing which they seek comes to pass, it will not be at all owing to the Means they use. For Means and Endeavours can have no effect at all, in order to obtain the end, but in one of these two ways: either (1.) Through a natural tendency and influence to prepare and dispose the mind more to virtuous acts, either by causing the disposition of the heart to be more in favour of such acts, or by bringing the mind more into the view of powerful motives and inducements: or, (2.) By putting persons more in the way of God's bestowment of the benefit. But neither of these can be the case. Not the latter; for, as has been just now observed, it does not consist with the Arminian notion of self-determination, which they suppose essential to virtue, that God should be the Bestower, or (which is the same thing) the determining, disposing Author of Virtue. Not the former; for natural influence and tendency suppose causality, connection, and necessity of event, which are inconsistent with Arminian liberty. A tendency of Means, by biassing the heart in favour of virtue, or by bringing the will under the influence and power of motives in its determinations, are both inconsistent with Arminian liberty of will consisting in indifference, and sovereign self-determination, as has been largely demonstrated.

But for the more full removal of this prejudice against the doctrine of necessity, which has been maintained, as though it tended to encourage a total neglect of all Endeavours as vain; the following things may be considered.

The question is not, Whether men may not thus improve this doctrine: we know that many true and wholesome doctrines are abused: but, whether the doctrine gives any just occasion for such an improvement; or whether, on the suppo