the Indian service have had the opportu- | of Her Majesty's service are admitted to nity of making themselves masters of the such appointments in India? I cannot practice and science of war-an advantage conceal from myself, nor do I think that which has not been enjoyed by the officers of Her Majesty's army, with the exception of those who have served in Indiaand there obtained the same advantages as were enjoyed by the Indian officers. I rejoice, my Lords, that some officers of Her Majesty's army now employed in the Crimea have had the advantage of witnessing operations on an extensive scale in India. General Simpson, the head of the Staff, General Pennefather, General Sir Colin Campbell, all holding high command, and enjoying to a considerable extent the confidence of those under their command, and also Colonel M'Murdo, who has been placed at the head of the Land Transport service, and Colonel Harding, the Commandant at Balaklava-who is, I believe, no relation of my noble and gallant Friend opposite all these officers have seen service in India, and all of them acquired a knowledge of war under the late Sir Charles Napier. But there are other officers in the Indian service who have enjoyed similar opportunities of acquiring a knowledge of their profession, and who have commanded with distinction brigades which contained regiments of Her Majesty's troops, and who have obtained great distinction in the Quartermaster General's department. It does appear to me to be contrary to all reason that, when we have at our disposal officers who have acquired distinction in command where war has been carried on on a great scale, we should decline to avail ourselves of their services, and should employ in preference the services of officers who, whatever the claim to distinction they may hereafter acquire, have had no opportunity of showing their talents for war. It cannot surely be held that to appoint Indian officers to command would be an invasion of the privileges of Her Majesty's service. At a recent period, and contrary to all former rule, a regulation of the East India Company has been made, permitting officers of Her Majesty's service to hold Staff appointments of a particular description, and not less than twelve officers of that service now hold appointments which they could not formerly have held. Why, then, should there not be a reciprocity, and Indian of ficers be admitted to Staff appointments, from which they have been hitherto excluded, and which they would fill with great advantage to the country, as officers

any of your Lordships can be blind to the fact, that a great and growing feeling of dissatisfaction exists throughout the country with regard to the conduct of the war, and that feeling is assuming proportions which are extremely alarming; and I much fear that, unless it be determined by Her Majesty's Government to place the fittest men who can be found in command of all the divisions and brigades of the army, and in situations on the Staff, I much fear, I say, that a feeling will grow up with respect to persons in authority, which will be fatal, not only to Her Majesty's Government, but which will go much further, and which will endanger the constitution of Government, by which authority has hitherto been administered in this country. I wish to ask the noble Lord another question, relating to a different subject. I see there is a memorandum, dated April 30, which, under the authority of an order in Council, raises the bounty given to men enlisting for two years to the same amount as that given to men enlisting for a longer period. Now, with regard to that memorandum, I wish to know whether it is to be understood as establishing the principle that the bounty given to men who enlist for a longer period is to be the same as that given to men who enlist for two years only; and whether there is no difference to be made between those who enlist for the longer and those for shorter periods of service? If that be so, I fear that the result will be that all persons who are desirous of enlisting will enlist for the short period, because at the end of that period they will have the option of re-engaging for a longer service, and with the certainty of receiving some further bounty. It seems to me, too, that men who enlist for the longer period settle down better to the work and become better soldiers than those who are uncertain whether they shall remain for a longer period than two years only, and I would therefore prefer enlisting men for the longer period. But of this I am quite sure that, if the same bounty is given to men who enlist for two years as to those who enlist for a longer period, all will be desirous of enlisting for two years. I think that when this memorandum was issued, it would have been advisable to notify that, if the bounty given to men enlisting for two years was to be raised to the same amount as that given to men enlisting for

specting the intended question and the nature and extent of the answer which he expected to receive. This has enabled me not only to meet the noble Earl in the same spirit evinced by him to myself, but also to give your Lordships the fullest information in my power upon the subjects to which he so ably refers. With reference to the question which the noble Earl has addressed to me on the subject of the Indian officers, I may state that the memorandum to which he adverts goes no further in its spirit than it does in its letter

the longer period, the bounty of men enlisting for the longer period would also be increased. I fear, however, that in dealing with this question the noble Lord has made the same mistake with regard to the bounty offered as was made in the case of the militia, and the consequences of which we all so deeply deplore. My own impression is, that, if instead of offering the limited bounty of 20s. to the militia upon reattestation, a higher bounty had been offered, a very large number of men would have been retained in the ranks of the militia who have now returned to their homes.-namely, to confer upon those officers a There is another point to which I wish to call the attention of the noble Lord. I am told that steps have been taken to engage the services of 1,000 navvies to work in the trenches, and that these navvies are to be placed under a gentleman who is to have a salary of 2,000l. a year-that is, a salary which is superior by 761. only to the united salaries of a major general and and a lieutenant general, and is superior by about 2007. to the salary of all the officers attached to the Quartermaster General's Department in the Crimea. I take it for granted that those navvies will not consent to serve for the same pay as that given to the Sappers and Miners; and it is a matter of serious consideration whether men employed in the same duties and exposed to the same danger should be paid at different rates. What I desire to know is, whether it is true that it is intended to form a corps of this description, and, if so, whether it is to be of a military or civil character? I can hardly imagine it can be of a civil character, because it must be employed under fire like the rest of the troops; but if it be of a military character, what rank is to be given to this gentleman who is to be rewarded with a salary which surpasses that of the officers on the Quartermaster General's Staff? I desire, also, to know what is the difference between the pay to be given to this body of men and the Sappers and Miners; what authority is to be given to the officers commanding them; and under what authority are the men to

serve?

LORD PANMURE: My Lords, upon former occasions I have had to complain that when questions were asked notice was not given beforehand of the subject to which noble Lords intended to refer; but I am bound to state that in all cases in which questions have been addressed to me by the noble Earl opposite, I have always received the fullest information re

social position and authority, which has hitherto been recognised by courtesy, but with respect to which some doubt previously existed. No one can rejoice more than I do at any mark of favour bestowed upon officers of the Indian army, and no one would be more unwilling than myself to say anything which tends to detract from the praise which is due to them. They have for a very long period maintained the honour of the British name throughout the vast terrritory in which that army has served, they have maintained the integrity of the Indian portion of the empire, and they have assisted in extending it; still it is my opinion, as well as that of many others, that the services and distinctions of the Indian officers have been somewhat unfairly used to put in the back ground, by comparison, the services and distinctions of the officers of the Queen's service. I think, in a military point of view, the opportunities those officers have had of practically learning the art of war in the Indian campaigns have certainly given them great advantages; but I do not hold that those advantages ought to entitle them to more than a fair consideration, and they should not be used as an argument to prevent us from giving the officers in the Queen's service the fair opportunities which that service affords of showing by his services to the country whether they are able to carry out in practice the military knowledge which they already possess in theory. I cannot see, my Lords, because the Indian officers have already carved with their swords the way to military distinction, why the same opportunities should be denied to the Queen's officers of carving with their swords the way to the same military distinctions. I have seen it stated that the officers in the Queen's service are now classed in two classes-the Peninsulars, who are said to be too old to be effective; and the Know

7

{LORDS}

Indian Officers-Bountiesnothings, who are too young to know anything. That is not a fair mode of describing the officers of Her Majesty's army; for, reserving always the opinion that the services which are most calculated to advance the interests of the country ought to be taken advantage of, I know of no reason why well educated and well trained British officers, although they may not have seen service, should not be allowed to go into active service. I am not one of those who would adopt the course of confining the services of the officers of the Queen's army, whether belonging to the establishment or to the Indian army-for they are alike the Queen's soldiers-and I am not narrow-minded enough to think that we ought to make a distinction between the officers of the two services. Although progress in reform in these matters is slow, it is also sure, and as an instance of the manner in which the subject is treated, I may refer to the fact that in the Act of last Session the office of Commander in Chief of the army in India was thrown open to officers of the East India Company's service. With regard to the appointment of Queen's officers to the staff in India, to which the noble Earl has alluded, I am given to understand that it has arisen more from accident than from any other cause-it happens that the staff situations in India are very numerous, and that they have been filled by officers of the Indian army, very much to the detriment of the performance of the regimental duties of that army; and it was found necessary to recall some of those officers to their regimental duties and on their recall the vacancies on the staff were filled by officers of the Queen's army. Those are the circumstances, I am told, which form the ground of the statement which the noble Earl has just made. I do not believe that the officers of the Indian army were superseded by officers in the Queen's service; but I am informed that the change was made in consequence of the number of Indian officers who held staff appointments, and that the change was necessary, in order that the regiments in India should be made the more efficient. With reference to the next question-culties suggested by the noble Earl on a namely, the bounty given to the recruits, that is a subject to which my attention was called by my noble Friend the Commander in Chief when the Act was first introduced. My noble Friend asked whether it was intended to sanction the principle that men enlisting under the new Act should receive

Navvies for the Crimea.

8 the same bounty as the men who enlisted under the Act of 1847. After maturely considering the subject-taking into view the fact that the men enlisted under the Act of 1847 were enlisted at the age of eighteen for ten or twelve years, that they had the opportunity, after five years' service, of acquiring an addition to their pay for good conduct, and that they had the opportunity after the expiration of their first term of service, of re-engaging themselves for a second period; taking also into consideration that none of these advantages will accrue to the men who enlist at the age of twenty-four for a service of two or at the most of three years, that the men who would enlist would probably be between the ages of twenty-four and thirtyfive, who, from their habits of labour, would be, even if not efficient as drilled soldiers, efficient as strong men-I did not feel myself justified in giving to those men a lower rate of bounty than we gave to a boy of eighteen years. It must be remembered, too, that none of these regulations are permanent, but may be varied according to circumstances; and if I find that that arrangement is such as to create discontent or prevent the enlistment of young men of eighteen years and upwards, I may consider whether some alteration may not be required. With regard, my Lords, to a general increase of bounty, I perfectly agree with the noble Earl that an increased bounty will, at all times, obtain an increased number of recruits, and probably before very long I may have to propose to your Lordships to increase the bounty in order to augment the army; but it is naturally my wish not to take that course until it is absolutely necessary. With regard to the question of navvies, it is under the consideration of the Government to form a corps of navvies, not for the purpose of working specially in the trenches, but for carrying on the general work of the army, which has hitherto been done by the Sappers and Miners and by the private soldiers, and the execution of which I am sorry to say has hitherto been detrimental to the health of the men. Yet this work must be done; and in order to obviate the diffi

previous night, and to carry out the views of the noble Earl of having as many fighting men as possible at our disposal, it is considered that we may attach, under the command of the engineers, a body of navvies of stout working men, who will be sent out for the purpose of working either

vinced of one fact, namely, that the noble Baron knew nothing of the circumstances of the case. On that occasion the noble Baron laid the whole blame of the transaction on the Quartermaster General. Whether that was just or not it was not for him to say; but he thought after that imputation by the noble Lord, the country had a right to know on whom the blame ought to rest, and who were the parties by whom a body of troops were despatched for foreign service. He had always understood that, when the Minister for War had received Her Ma

in the trenches or in the camp, as circumstances may require, while the army is engaged in the siege. No definite sum has been fixed upon as the amount of payment to these individuals; but it is utterly impossible to expect that men will come from civil employments, either in the capacity of labourers or of directors, for the usual pay given to the officers and men in Her Majesty's service. I have only this to say, that I shall endeavour, if I think it for the public service that such a corps should be formed, to obtain proper men at the lowest possible remuneration; and Ijesty's Commands for such a purpose, he shall not recommend the adoption of any such corps unless I am convinced that the benefit likely to result from its adoption will be so great as to counterpoise the inconvenience that I cannot but see may arise from employing individuals with the army at a higher rate of pay than that paid to the officers and men belonging to Her Majesty's service. This corps on being formed will be under the command of Major General Jones as commanding engineer, all the arrangements would be directed entirely by him, the men being at the same time under the immediate control of their own superintendents.

THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH said, that the appointment of Her Majesty's officers on the staff of the Indian army was not an exceptional case, but was in consequence of the adoption of a new principle; there must, however, have been sufficient authority to warrant that alteration of the rule. No doubt the paucity of officers in the Indian army might have been the cause of the alteration, but it certainly involved altogether a new principle.

EMBARKATION OF TROOPS TO THE
CRIMEA.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY rose for the purpose of repeating the question which he put to the noble Lord the Secretary for War, on a previous evening. The noble Lord on that occasion complained that the notice of the question he (the Marquess of Salisbury) intended to put was not sufficiently explicit. He could assure the noble Lord that it was not from any want of courtesy that he did not enter more into detail. The whole matter was comprised in the very smallest compass, as it was simply reminding the noble Lord of what must have passed through his own office. With regard to what occurred the other night, their Lordships must be con

communicated with the Commander in Chief at the Horse Guards, and that after conferring together, they made an application to the Admiralty for the transport of those troops; and that on receiving the necessary information from the Admiralty, the Quartermaster-General was then directed to take measures for their removal. It was essentially necessary to know who was to blame in this matter, and why the Guards were sent to Portsmouth for embarkation before the ship Alma was ready to receive them.

The blame of this transaction had been shifted from one quarter to another until it was impossible to find to whom it should attach. He hoped, therefore, the noble Baron would be able to give their Lordships some information on the subject.

LORD PANMURE said, nothing had been further from his intention than to contradict anything which the noble Marquess had stated. What he had said was, that he had heard for the first time from the noble Marquess that the events to which he had called attention had taken place. If the noble Marquess had given him notice of his intention to call attention to those events, he would have prepared himself to give an explanation of them, and would have entered into the details of the facts the other night; but all the notice he had received was, that the noble Marquess intended to put a question with regard to the embarkation of the Guards on board the Alma. The noble Marquess asked what were the regulations for the embarkation of troops for foreign service? Formerly the Secretary at War determined what regiments were to be sent abroad; and it then rested with the Commander in Chief to make the arrangements with the Admiralty and the other authorities as to the embarkation of the troops that might be required. Now, however, it was different, and when it was settled what troops were

to go abroad, the Secretary for War signi- | baggage belonging, not to the detachment fies to the Transport Board the number of of the Guards which then embarked, but troops that were to embark and the time to the Guards already in the Crimea. of the embarkation, the Transport Board With regard to the orders and the counter provided tonnage for those troops by the orders which had been issued, he had to day named; the embarkation is then car- state, that two of these counter orders had ried on by the officer of the Quartermaster arisen from the fact that a storm had taken General's department in conjunction with place at Portsmouth, which had prevented the officers of the Transport Board. With the Alma from being brought into a posirespect to the Alma, on the 20th of March tion proper for the embarkation of the the Admiralty had notified to the War troops, but due notice of this circumstance Department that the Alma would be ready had been given to the troops before they about the 5th of April to receive 1,420 had left London. He had received commen. The Alma was fitted at Liverpool, munications from officers who sailed in the and 420 men of the 18th, 71st, and 50th vessel, to the effect that, whether as reregiments were embarked there; she then garded their accommodation or that of the went to Portsmouth to embark the Guards. men, none of them had ever experienced She had been surveyed by the officer more comfort in a transport, nor had the attached to the Transport department at health of the men ever been a subject of Liverpool, and reported to be fitted to carry less anxiety than while they had been on 1,420 men, and she had also been passed board the Alma. With regard to another by Colonel Scott, the inspecting officer at question of the noble Marquess he begged Liverpool, as fitted to carry that number. to state that he (Lord Panmure) had fallen When she went round to Portsmouth she into a mistake the other night; it was his was reported by the officer there to be in- impression that every regiment which had capable of carrying that number, and he embarked from this country had embarked believed this report arose from the fact with the Minie rifles. He was happy to that, while at Liverpool they had calculated state that all the men who embarked for that a certain number of men would be the East, whether in regiments or detachconstantly on deck and upon watch, they ments, were as far as possible, trained to had not taken that circumstance into con- the use of the Minie rifle ; but as it was sideration at Portsmouth. The authori- desirable to carry on the usual drill on ties therefore determined that the vessel board the vessel which could be better could not carry more than 1,048 men. In done with the old arm, they were armed consequence of this report, the detachments with the smooth-bore musket, which they of the 18th, 71st, and 50th regiments were exchanged at Constantinople for the Minie disembarked at Portsmouth, were marched rifle, which was kept in store there for into barracks, and remained at the depot that purpose. He thought this a sufficient waiting for further orders. His noble explanation of the circumstances; and he Friend (Viscount Hardinge) reminded him had further to say, that the result of the that the commanding officer at Liverpool inquiries he had made convinced him that had written to say that the ship was capa- the Quartermaster General was free from ble of carrying 1,420 men. After some all personal blame in the matter, and that delay-which he thought had been some- if any confusion had taken place it lay bewhat exaggerated-in landing the detach- tween the district officers at Liverpool and ments and embarking the Guards, the at Portsmouth, who had reported differently vessel sailed. The whole of the statements as to the capacity of the ship, and the concerning the Alma were considerably number of men she could properly carry. exaggerated. A statement had been made There was a desire to send the men on that a large portion of the baggage of the board as quickly as possible, and if an troops which had disembarked were car- error had been made, it was on the right ried in the Alma to the Crimea. He had side, namely, to adopt that arrangement found upon inquiry, that nothing belonging which enables the troops to be conveyed to those troops was carried off except a with the greatest comfort and the greatest couple of articles belonging to two officers, possible consideration for their sanitary and he was sure that if these officers had condition. The result was, that there had taken the slightest pains to look after been no complaint of overcrowding, and, them both of those articles would have indeed, none could arise in this case. been rescued. There had been some mis- THE EARL OF HARDWICKE had heard take with regard to the embarkation of the a statement made by the noble Lord which