followers, I cannot, I say, consider these things, without utterly disbelieving that a man, capable of so passing through the great and final trial of human nature, could be one whose character deserved to be described in the odious terms which have been applied to the Emperor Nicholas. Whatever were his faults, fraud and falsehood were not among them. He was, I think, overbearing, arbitrary, violent when his will was resisted; and is it wonderful that the man should have become so, who for near thirty years had ruled with unlimited power and almost unchecked success the vast dominions of Russia? Would he not have been something more than human if he had remained entirely proof against the trials and temptations of such a position? But I repeat, that his faults were those of a high and noble, not of a low and mean nature, like falsehood and fraud. My Lords, I have thought it my duty to submit to you these views, as to the origin of the war and the conduct and character of our enemy, because, if they could gain acceptance with your Lordships and with the public, they could not fail to have some influence in mitigating that bitter spirit of hostility against Russia which has been manifested by our countrymen, and which, as I have already said, now forms, in my opinion, the chief obstacle to the conclusion of peace. Would, my Lords, that my feeble efforts could contribute, even in the slightest degree, to remove that obstacle and to promote the restoration of peace. To wage an unnecessary war, or to continue a war that may have been just because necessary at the outset, for one hour after it has ceased to be so, is the greatest sin which a nation can commit, and every individual member of the community, from the highest to the lowest, shares in that sin and partakes its fearful responsibility, if he fails to exert whatever influence he may possess in order to check, so far as in him lies, the violation of the laws of God, which, to persevere in such a war, involves. It is this feeling which induces me, my Lords, now to "To thank Her Majesty for having ordered the Protocols of the recent Negotiations at Vienna, to be laid before us : "To inform Her Majesty that this House deeply deplores the Failure of the Attempt to put an End by these Negotiations to the Calamities of the War in which the Country is now engaged: And, But, THE EARL OF CLARENDON: My Lords, I have listened to my noble Friend with all the respect and attention which his knowledge and ability on this subject demand. His very long and able specch this evening has been characterised with his usual skill and earnestness of manner, and if my noble Friend should have failed in convincing your Lordships of the correctness of his views and the soundness of his reasoning, it will certainly not be on account of any want of conviction on his own part. I think, my Lords, that my noble Friend had no reason, because there was no necessity, to account for his motives for having addressed your Lordships on this subject. None of your Lordships will, I am sure, be disposed to dispute that they were honest and straightforward. I have no doubt that my noble Friend thought that he had a public service to perform; and he has accordingly this night performed that service. on the other hand, I may be permitted to say that his motion appears to me to be one the proposal of which cannot be viewed but as a matter of deep regret, and that it is my firm conviction that, neither in its form nor its substance, is it one that ought to be adopted, and that if agreed to by your Lordships, it will be productive of most serious mischiefs. My noble Friend has not succeeded in proving that which he has all along been endeavouring to prove-namely, that the present war is neither a just nor a necessary war. True it is, he has condemned the policy of the war, he has condemned the manner in which the war has been conducted, and he has condemned the negotiations and the manner in which they have been carried on. He has thrown great blame on the Plenipotentiaries of the allied Powers, he has applauded the moderation of the Russian Plenipotentiaries, and has affirmed that the offer which was made by them ought to have been accepted. For three hours and a half my noble Friend proceeded in one unbroken strain of admiration of the spotless policy and the admirable course which had been pursued by the Emperor of Russia; but not a word did he say in favour of Her Majesty's Government. But it should be remem bered that all that the noble Earl has said in regard to the policy of Her Majesty's Government applied with equal force to the policy of the Government of France. Nothing has been done or undertaken, I may almost say, nor said nor written, since the commencement of the war, or even before its commencement, by the English Government which has not been in entire concurrence with the Government of France. The speech of my noble Friend, with all the authority of the name which he bears and with all the weight of his own character and position in this country, will be read with delight by all the partisans of Russia throughout Europe; and at the same time, not without regret by those who are allied with us in opposing that Power. I say that my noble Friend has, as far as in him lies, this night rendered signal service to the Emperor of Russia in aiding him in his war with the allies. He has done his utmost to encourage the Emperor of Russia to resist a compliance with those demands which England, France, and Austria consider just, and which it would have been honourable for him to accept; and, as far as in him lies, he would represent us to the world as being in a state of division and of weakness. But, I think, my noble Friend will be disappointed, and all those possible mischiefs which his speech might otherwise have done will be avoided by the result of this night's debate; for I trust your Lordships will this evening show by a large majority that you agree with me in that negative with which I propose to meet the Motion of my noble Friend, and that you will thereby prove to Russia that the opinions you have so often expressed in this House on the justice of the war have undergone no change and are not now wavering. which Her Majesty's Government have quite as much at heart as my noble Friend himself; it is for the interest of peace itself that I deprecate entering into a premature discussion. If we are to be called upon to enter into all the details of negotiations that are pending, to defend all our proceedings as we advance step by step, and to be required to state what are the grounds upon which alone we think peace should be made, I say that your Lordships may find yourselves, and the country may become pledged in a manner which may render all future negotiations still more difficult to be conducted to a satisfactory conclusion; and, as negotiations must necessarily precede peace, you may ultimately find that even peace itself may be rendered more difficult of attainment from such discussions. I think, therefore, it will be satisfactory to your Lordships if I now state that I intend to avail myself of the privilege which the noble Earl in the beginning of his speech conceded to me, and which was not to answer any part of my noble Friend's speech having reference to the Blue-book of last year. My noble Friend has, from all appearance, been studying that Blue-book. He has that advantage over me; for I am not sufficiently accurate in my recollection of its contents even to speak to some of the passages which were brought forward by my noble Friend, although they at the time appeared to me to admit of some explanation. But what I will enter into, and what I think of much more importance to the country, are the deductions which my noble Friend has made from that Bluebook, and by which he has attempted to prove that we are engaged in an unjust and an unnecessary war. To a question of war, as to all questions, there are two sides. The noble Earl has left us to infer I will not cavil with my noble Friend that, as we in this war are entirely wrong, as to the somewhat inopportune moment so Russia is entirely right. He has deat which he has thought proper to bring fended the demands of Prince Menchikoff, on his motion. Not that I object to dis- and has even defended Russia in her occucussion on the subject of the war. On the pation of the Principalities, although he contrary, I think it most safe and right thought she acted rightly when she left that your Lordships should have the earliest them. Well, my Lords, my noble Friend opportunity, consistent with the public con- drew a very affecting picture of the cala. venience, of expressing your opinions upon mities of war, and he subsequently said what has taken place. It is not that I that war was only to be justified in the expect any particular advantage to arise very last extremity. I think it may be from those proposals that are at this mo- satisfactory to my noble Friend, and not ment under consideration, and which I altogether uninteresting to your Lordships, have not considered of sufficient import- if I quote an authority, with a view to ance to ask my noble Friend to postpone show that the war in which we are engaged his Motion; but it is for those objects is in strict conformity with the law of nations. I will quote a passage from one of the clearest writers and ablest expounders of the law of nations-Vattel : "By the law of nations it is laid down as a principle that war is just and lawful which is to avenge or prevent injury."-" When once a State has given proofs of injustice, rapacity, pride, ambition, or any imperious thirst of rule, she becomes an object of suspicion to her neighbours, whose duty it is to stand on their guard against her. They may come upon her when she is at the moment of acquiring a formidable accession of power-may demand securities, and if she hesitates to give them, may prevent her designs by force of arms. Must we delay to avert our ruin until it becomes inevitable? If the appearances are so easily credited, it is the fault of that neighbour who has betrayed his ambition by several indications. Should that formidable Power betray an unjust and ambitious disposition by doing the least injustice to another, all nations may avail themselves of the occasion, and, by joining the injured party, thus form a coalition of strength, in order to humble that ambitious potentate, and disable him from so easily oppressing his neigh. bours, or keeping them in continual awe and fear -for an injury gives us a right to provide for our future safety by depriving the unjust oppressor of the means of injuring us; and it is lawful, and even praiseworthy, to assist those who are oppressed or unjustly attacked. When a neighbour in midst of a profound peace erects fortresses on our frontiers, equips a fleet, augments his troops, assembles a powerful army, fills his magazines—in a word, when he makes preparations for war, are we allowed to attack him with a view to prevent the danger with which we think ourselves threatened? The answer greatly depends on the manner and character of that neighbour. We must inquire into the reasons of those preparations, and bring him to an explanation. Such is the mode of proceeding in Europe, and if his sincerity be justly suspected, securities may be demanded of him; his refusal in that case would furnish ample indication of sinister designs, and a sufficient reason to justify us in anticipating them." My Lords, I think that those words of Vattel are as applicable to the war we are now waging against Russia as if they had been written last week. But my noble Friend, in his eulogies upon Russia, and upon the forbearance which Russia has shown towards Turkey, has entirely omitted to refer to what has been the constant course of aggressive policy pursued by Russia towards Turkey. I will ask your Lordships' attention to a statement of the acquisitions of territory which Russia has wrung from Turkey since 1774: " In 1774 the fortresses of Kertch and Yenicale, with their districts in the Crimea, Kinburn and its district, the desert between the Bug and the Dnieper, the town and district of Azoff, and the two Kabadins in Circassia, were ceded by Turkey to Russia by treaty. In 1783, the Crimea, the Island of Taman, and Cuban Tartary were annexed to the Russian Empire by a manifesto of the Empress Catherine. In 1784 Turkey acknowledged, by treaty, the River Cuban as the boundary of Russia. In 1792 the Fortress of Oczakow and the country between the Bug and the Dniester were ceded by Turkey to Russia by treaty. In 1812 a part of Moldavia; the fortresses of Chotchim and Benber, Bessarabia, with Ismail and Kilia; and the left bank of the Pruth, from its entrance into Moldavia, were ceded by Turkey to Russia by treaty. In 1829 a part of the pashalic of Akhaltzick, and all the littoral of the Black Sea, from the mouth of the Cuban to Port St. Nicholas, and the islands at the mouths of the Danube, were ceded by Turkey to Russia by treaty. In 1834 the Russian territories, from the port of St. Nicholas to the province of Georgia, were extended by treaty with Turkey." This, then, is the Power which my noble Friend represents as having acted with so much forbearance towards Turkey. We all know, from the papers which have been laid before Paliament, what was the opinion of the late Emperor Nicholas with respect to the state of Turkey. We know that he considered nothing could save the "sick man ;' and we also know that Prince Menchikoff's mission was to give the coup de grace to the " sick man," not by violence, as my noble Friend seems to suppose, but by slow poison. There can be no doubt the object of that mission was, by a misinterpretation of the Treaty of Kainardji, to secure another treaty, or an instrument of equally binding force, by which a right of interference between the Sultan and his Christian subjects would be secured to Russia; whereby the Emperor of Russia would obtain virtual sovereignty over 10,000,000 or 12,000,000 of the most enterprising, active, and industrious inhabitants of the Turkish dominions. Then came the seizure of the Principalities, the only step on the part of Russia to which my noble Friend saw reason to object; but since that time we have learnt a great deal of the intentions of Russia, and the means she possessed of giving effect to those intentions. We now know what were the vast military resources of Russia, how stealthily they had been accumulated, and how readily they could be made available. We now know something of the almost incredible amount of warlike stores which had been accumulated in Sebastopol, where Russia had no commerce to protect, and we are also aware of the gigantic fortifications which were contemplated at Bomarsund. Why, Europe was really standing upon a mine without being aware of it, while the influence of Russia was so skilfully exercised as to paralyze both Governments and people, to render them uncon scious of the danger to which they were | cisely what it was twenty-five years ago, exposed, and to diminish their ability to when it was most eloquently described by meet that danger. For this state of things a noble Member of your Lordships' House, every Government in Europe has been the father of the noble Earl who has partly to blame; for, during the last thirty- brought forward this Motion, in these five years, an amount of deference has been words :paid to Russia to which she has no claim, and she has been allowed to interfere, to meddle, and to bribe, in different countries, without check. The encroachments of Russia were unheeded, although her designs had been suspected and denounced; but it was nobody's business to interfere effectually, and no one wished to disturb the general peace until the mine which had been silently and slowly prepared was exploded by the rashness of Prince Menchi koff. Long before this war began, the Russian Government ordered a large increase of their steam fleet, to the number of sixteen or seventeen ships of the largest size. Orders had been given for converting all the Russian men-of-war and ships of the line into screw steamers, and the Russian Government were also actively employed, and had been for a considerablee time before the commencement of the war, in completing a system of railways. It is, I think, no exaggeration to say that the army of Russia-be it 800,000 men or upwards -would thus have been doubled in respect of efficiency by the rapidity with which it could have been removed to any point within or without the Russian territory, and with Constantinople and the Bosphorus in the hands of Russia, what would have been the fate of Europe-to say nothing of the countries bordering on the Black Sea, whether in Asia Minor or Europe, which, with the European provinces of Turkey, must have become as much dependencies of Russia as the Crimea itself? What, I say, would have been the fate of Europe when the Russian fleet was no longer locked up in the Black Sea-when Russia was in full possession of the Sound, and her northern fleets were no longer icebound for six months of the year? Why, all Europe would have fallen into the arms of this colossus. I may remind your Lordships that the very first act of the present Emperor of Russia was to declare his determination to raise Russia to the highest pinnacle of glory and power, and fully to carry out all the plans of Paul, of Catharine, and of Nicholas; and it is no very agreeable reflection that we were nearly on the point of seeing this scheme of universal dominion realised. The policy of Russia has undergone no change. It is now pre "Let it be remembered, that the Emperor of Russia only the other day proposed to place himhimself at the head of 800,000 men to give peace to Europe. Peace! What peace? The peace of the grave-the silence of death." That was the language of the late Earl Grey; and I think, if he could this night have heard the speech of my noble Friend, it would have caused him deep and sincere pain. Looking, then, at what were the projects of Russia, I think, if ever there was a war which was just and necessary and unavoidable, it is that in which England and France have now deliberately engaged, and it is all the more just and necessary, because every effort has been made by negotiation to preserve peace and to avoid having recourse to hostilities. Your Lordships will remember that my noble Friend at the head of the late Government, with the full concurrence of his colleagues, was determined to exhaust every effort to secure peace; and I believe it is because such efforts were made that, on the declaration of war Her Majesty's Government received the unanimous support of the country. The country knew that every facility had been afforded to Russia for retracing her steps, and that every means had been adopted to induce her to abandon a policy which was fatal to Turkey and dangerous to Europe. The declared intention of Russia to occupy the Principalities until every demand she had made upon Turkey was satisfied, and the fact was humbly announced by a special ambassador from Constantinople to St. Petersburg, was not merely the only reply England and France could obtain, but was the only answer given to the entreaties and remonstrances of Austria and Prussia. I say, then, that the unbending pride of Russia was the real cause of the war. It was that which made war inevitable, and I say that the people of this country have not repented the course they took. I believe the people of England are as fully sensible of the inestimable blessings of peace, and as anxious to be restored to the enjoyment of those blessings, as my noble Friend who brought forward this subject. I believe there is no man in this country who would advocate war for mere aggrandisement or for military glory for its own sake; but if there is one thing which more than another characterises the English people, it is a keen sense of national honour, and a stern determination not to submit to anything that can be regarded in the light of national disgrace. I say that the people of England do not repent of this war, and would not tolerate a hollow peace. Nor do I think that there is among the people of this country that want of information with reference to the war which my noble Friend supposes to exist. The papers laid upon the tables of both Houses of Parliament, the debates that have frequently taken place in both Houses, the documents that have been published by foreign Governments, and the very able and persevering manner in which the subject, in all its phases, has been treated by the press, really leave no excuse to any reflecting man not to have formed an opinion upon the causes and objects of the war. To those objects we have steadily adhered. To those objects we mean to adhere. We entertain no intention of reviving extinct nationalities, or of resorting to the measures my noble Friend has shadowed forth. The object of the war was to maintain the independence and integrity of Turkey, and that not alone for the protection of Turkey, but in order to guard Europe against the dangers by which she was threatened by the ambitious designs of Russia. We thought, and we continue to think, that these objects would be secured by annulling all those treaties which have been so often the pretext for new encroachments on the part of Russia; by causing the protectorate of Russia over the Principalities to cease; by removing all the impediments and obstacles which have obstructed the free navigation of the Danube; by connecting Turkey with the system of European equilibrium; by causing the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea to cease; and by preventing Russia from possessing an exclusive right of interference between the Turkish Government and its subjects. I believe, if these bases of negotiation had been honestly accepted and acted upon, they would, as far as possible, have secured the objects we had in view in entering upon this great struggle. My noble Friend dwelt upon their being humiliating to Russia; but, my Lords, Russia accepted them in principle, and they were recommended by the Austrian Plenipotentiary as well as by those of England and France. To my mind, there was nothing in the principle contrary to the honour of Russia, and nothing in the application of that principle contrary to the dignity of Russia. My noble Friend says, and says truly, that the attainment of all this would offer no security to Turkey. The value of a treaty must always depend upon the spirit in which it is agreed to and the good faith with which it is entered into. No treaty can make a weak Power like Turkey perfectly safe against a powerful neighbour immediately in contact with her, if that neighbour is determined to act the aggressive towards her. That, however, is no reason why you should not make the securities you accept as effectual as possible. My Lords, I will take the defence of Sebastopol, which, I am willing to admit, reflects high honour on the arms of Russia. The stores accumulated there could only have been accumulated for purposes of aggression; and the manner in which Russia, without being enabled to bring a single man or a single gun by sea, has relied solely on the defences of the place to defend Sebastopol for many months, shows the danger to which Turkey was exposed, and the menacing position which Russia had taken up. Everywhere throughout Russia, from Archangel to Sebastopol, from Bomarsund to Petropaulovski, in Kamtschatka, there were the same means of defence, the same proof that Russia was aware that by the line of policy she was pursuing, she would sooner or later excite the arms and the united efforts of all Europe against her. Therefore, my Lords, we were justified in seeking to limit the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea. All we desired was to make such a limitation of the forces of Russia as would be consistent with the safety of Turkey, and afford no danger to the liberties of Europe. We meant nothing more; and I must say, when my noble Friend criticises the comparison made by my noble Friend Lord John Russell with respect to Dunkirk, and admires the answer given by Prince Gortchakoff, that that was at the end of a disastrous campaign, which is not the case in the present instance that my noble Friend ought to bear in mind that the preponderance which we wish to limit effectually does not really exist in the Black Sea at the present moment. In that sea, where, two years ago, Russia told us it would be a casus belli if a French or English ship entered it, the flag of Russia has entirely disappeared, and has been swept from those waters. Surely, then, before Eng |