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XVI.

THAT Reference to the End therefore feems to be the Standard to the Agent, both of the Reasonableness, and Morality of his Action: And not the Agreement of his Action to the Relation or Circumftance he is plac'd in. That indeed founds the Reafon of relative Duties; but what makes those Duties moral is the Fitness and Reference of them, chofen as fuch, to the End God appointed them, Happiness. The bare Knowledge and Apprehenfion of the Relation of Things does not induce the Agent to act, unless the faid End of Happinefs to himself, and others, is propofed from his acting according to that Relation. And when the Action has attain'd that End, or truly intended it, it is morally good; and is, at the fame time, a Conformity to the fupreme Reafon, which has appointed thofe beft Actions to thofe beft Ends: And the divine Will and Commandments are fo many Directions of our Actions to the Happiness of ourselves and others, in both Worlds.

WHAT other, or what better End could the Fountain of all Self-goodnefs and Happinefs propofe, in making Man, than to communicate Happiness to him, according to the Nature and Faculties he had given him? The very Glory of Goodness confifts in communicating itself, nor could it otherwife ever have been known. Man then being made a free Agent, and a fociable Creature ; to make his Happiness confiftent with, and fuitable to his Nature, it must be the Refult of his Choice; and enjoyable alfo in Society Imperfectly enjoyable in this Life, more compleatly in the next. And what wifer or better Choice can he poffibly make, than of that

End

End and that Happiness which his Maker has CHAP. chofen for him, and laid before him for his Ac- XVI. ceptance or Refufal? But what greater Enforcement of, or Obligation to his Good, can be laid upon him, for determining and obliging his Will to Acceptance, than fuch a Choice laid before him?

BE there never fo many different Opinions about Happiness (as what it is in the prefent Life, where it is neceffarily mix'd and imperfect, there must ever be different Sentiments, and as many Judgments as Taftes of Pleasure, and but one Truth to unite in, viz. that Happiness which is fubordinate and leads to the total or ultimate Happiness hereafter) if the Author of our Being and Faculties, who best knows what is best for us in both Worlds, has fhew'd us our Good and Happiness in each, all Believers of his Revelation must fubfcribe to his Truths and Rules concerning it: And all others will for ever be at a Lofs without it.

IF Happiness then is the natural, ultimate End of Man, and that End is chofen, that governs and obliges to the Choice of the Means; and the Reference to and Confideration of the End must be the Motive in chufing and purfuing the Means: the Means will accordingly be chofen not fo much for their own Sake, as for the Sake of the End. And as God, the Patron of our particular Happiness, and of Society, or general Happiness, has tied and connected fuch and fuch Actions in Society to general, and particular Happiness in it here, and hereafter; and that Happiness depends upon the Performance of fuch Actions by natural Confequence, or by

F 4

his

CHAP. his Appointment; then the Performance of them XVI. is a necessary Means or Qualification for the End; and in Regard to that, the Agent is induced and obliged to obferve and do them, because he can't obtain his End without it.

AND because necessary to attain that End, that fhews the Fitness, Congruity, Reasonableness, Order, and Beauty of the Action; as Beauty confifts in a due Proportion of the Means to the End, and likewife the Agreement of the Action to fuch a Relation or Circumftance of Life. If the Action had not been neceffary to the End, it had neither been beautiful, nor orderly, nor reasonable, nor fit: But as it is indifpenfably neceffary, that renders it fit to be done, because it fo exactly fits the End; reasonable, because it would be abfurd to think of the End without it; orderly as fubordinate; beautiful, as proportion'd

to it.

TAKE away Happiness, the End to which it tends, it produces nothing: What then becomes of thofe fine Characters Fitness, Reasonableness, &c. Do they refide in the Means without the End? Then the Action is fit and reafonable, because it is fit and reasonable, &c. i. e. for no Reafon; if no End is applied, no Reason is offer'd, no Inftance alledg'd of its Fitnefs; what is this but a fpeculative refting in the Means without the End, and a Recommendation of them without any Respect unto it? The Obligation therefore, or Inducement to the Action, does not derive from dry Truth, Relation of the Agent, Fitness; but in relative Truth, called Holinefs of Truth, Eph. iv. 24. as it is in the Margin; holy Manners are expected from holy

Faith, as a pure Effect is from a pure Caufe, CHAP. that one should enlighten and enliven the other XVI. before Men. Fitnefs, as it agrees with and is fuited to the End, makes the Means to be embraced, and pursued into Action.

God has made the Relation and Tendency between the Means and the End; and therefore commanded moral Good because it is naturally good, tends to, and qualifies for Happiness: And has prohibited moral Evil as it leads to Mifery; and as Mifery and Happiness are effentially different, fo there is an effential Difference between the other. And thofe natural and immutable Tendencies, make the natural and immutable Law of purfuing the one, and avoiding the other. The Agent therefore chufing the Action not as an End, but a Means in Reference to Happiness, makes the moral Good; he co-operates with God in chufing the fame End with him, and chufing and adapting the fame Means. His Mores to God, and Society, are regulated as they ought to be, and therefore his Action is morally Good. The Action of itself is a natural Good productive of natural Happiness; but as it is chofen for the Sake of the Happiness, it becomes a moral Good, productive of Happiness fuitable to, and chofen by a moral Agent. The Tie of the Obligation is faften'd from the End, to the Choice of the Agent's Will, moving to and embracing the Means in respect to the End, whether the Obligation is confider'd with fome externally, as proceeding from the Law or Command of those that require the Action; or in-ternally with others, as inherent in the Agent.

WHY

СНАР.

XVI.

WHY then fhould that be laft, or leaft in the Action, which God and Nature has made first and greatest in it; firft in the Intention, and greatest in the Execution? He that duly confiders the End will never do amifs. The propofing the external Motives of Happiness or Mifery, Life or Death, is fetting the End of the Action before the Agent, that he may condu& himself accordingly.

OR, if the Action is confider'd as a Qualification for enjoying the End, Happiness; which Qualification is as neceffary in the Nature of Things, as Tafte is to a Palate: That introduces the moral Tafte, which feems to be a Tafting our own Happiness in Society, and at the fame Time tafting the Happiness of Society.

IT remains therefore that Happiness is the Eftimate and Criterion of the moral Tafte, Fitnefs, Relation, Truth, Beauty, Goodness, Obligation, Approbation, Reasonableness. And confequently

Happiness as an End is the Choice of the Will, and that End must have Means fuitable to it; and those Means being fix'd, and immoveably fettled by the God of our Nature in the Refpects or Relations of Perfons to Perfons, or Perfons to Things, in their Circumftances, as his Providence orders them, that makes the Truth of Things: Which the Author of the Religion of Nature delin. has made the Foundation of his valuable Book. Tho' in making Morality confift in refpecting Truth, as Truth, he plainly carries the Matter too far. Because all Truth as fuch being equal, all Truth would be equally important; and every Action regarding any fort of Truth would be moral;, and no Difference in moral Actions. It must therefore be thofe Truths, which one way or other refpect the Good and Happiness of ourselves, or others, that concern a moral Agent, or can come under a moral Confideration,

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