XVI.

as they practifed them more Majorum, as a Law CHAP. and Fashion of a Roman, i. e. with a Thirft of publick Glory, join'd to a Contempt of private Wealth and Luxury, they increased in Empire; kept that, and Liberty *: But as faft as Corruption enter'd, loft both with the fame Pace, they advanced in each. But the Virtue of Great Britain and its Rulers is much more glorious in placing itself in the reverse; who, having it in their Power, according to that certain Maxim of Tully, Qui mare tenet, eum neceffe eft RERUM potiri, (And is there any other Empire upon this Globe fo large as the Ocean? Or fo fitted to hold the Balance of at leaft Europe, Africa, and America?) Yet religiously abftain from encroaching upon any of the Rights and Liberties of any of their Neighbours; placing the very Honour and Confcience of their Dominion, in preferving the Peace, and preventing any dangerous Encroachment, one upon another, among neighbouring and respectful Nations.

Ir is commonly faid, that Compassion, Gratitude, Friendship, are difinterested, and have not their Motives from Self-advantage; which is true in a comparative Sense; that there is lefs Confideration of immediate Self in them, than in other fociable Efforts: But ftill Self moves in each of them, and not at all to their Difparagement. These Benevolences are originally founded in Instinct, or that Affection to Society planted in us, as their Source; and are cultivated by Reafon and Confideration: For as much as fome

*Patriæ rem unufquifque, non fuam, augeri properabat, pauperque in divite, quam dives in paupere imperio verfari malebat. Val. Max. Lib. IV. cap. 4.

VOL. II.

F

Perfons

CHAP. Perfons degenerated from Humanity and Reafon XVI: are found void of them. Notwithstanding thefe Inftincts and Affections for Society are as neceffary to folicit Reason to do good to the Publick, as Hunger, and Thirft, and Weariness, are effential to put Reafon, otherwife forgetful, in mind of providing for the Nourishment and Support of the Individual.

THE first very naturally and inftantaneously fhoots up from the univerfal Root of Inftinct, for refcuing from thofe Evils our common Nature is liable to; nor can any refuse it to a proper Object, but fuch as are loft to Humanity. The affifting fuch unhappy Objects is so far from oppofing Self-affection, that it is an actual relief to its Commotions; a probable Security moreover of the like Ufage under our Misfortunes; and without doubt a well-pleafing Sacrifice of Thanksgiving to God, that we have hitherto escaped.

GRATITUDE has its Foundation likewife in Nature, and in fuch a vehement Attraction to Benevolence, and reciprocal Returns to the Benefactor, according to our Ability; and so strong an Impulse upon the Will, that it is in a manner irresistible; if any thing can be said to constrain and compel it, it is that, and that is faid of the Love of Chrift conferr'd upon Man. And are not those Returns both in Nature, and Grace, the most generative and productive of fresh Benefits and can Self forget that?

FRIENDSHIP is very often grounded in a natural Affinity and Cognation of Souls, from a perceiv'd Similitude of Manners and Difpofi

tions: We cannot chufe the Nearnefs of our CHAP. Blood, whilst an Union as near, and dear, and XVI. faithful, is frequently chofen; and that lives and fubfifts upon mutual Kindneffes and a Reciprocation of good Offices, which fuppofes Self on both fides. But what an incoherent recoiling Objection does Characteristicks bring against Christianity, because it does not expressly allot extraordinary Reward hereafter for extraordinary Friendship between two particular Perfons here? Does not that reftrain and confine his own boasted Benevolence, which he makes fo generally obligatory? And can he confiftently declare that to be fo particularly rewardable, which is a manifest and sometimes vicious Limitation of, and Exception to his own Principle? It is a fign he was hard put to it for Objections, when he makes ufe of fuch. Do not those Friendships mutually reward themselves, when that peculiar Relation happens to be form'd by a Confent and Harmony of Minds, mutual Efteem, and reciprocal Tenderness and Affection, by blazoning Fame and making two Heroes? Does Christianity, which in all things improves Nature, forbid it? Does it not leave Nature to its own Attraction in Similitudes, when they happen to concur? And are there not accordingly Inftances of fuch particular dear Friendship among Chriftians; whilft that Religion nobly enlarges the Affection, and would bring all Mankind into the Sphere of its Attrac tion? And is not the Inftance of the greatest Friend to Mankind our Saviour's dying for Enemies, illuftrated from that very Exception he brings against the Apoftle? Rom. v. 7.

* Charact. Vol. I. pag. 102.

F 2

.7..

DID

CHAP.

XVI.

DID not their very Enemies, with great Admiration, give that Character of the primitive Chriftians, See how they love one another? And does not Simplicius, who has wrote so very well upon Friendship, declare, "That a few Inftances would be fome Comfort in this mife"rable Age; when the Vices and Vilenefs of "Mankind feem to have banished it almoft quite out of the World: " Confequently, that fix or feven Pair of Friends in fo many Ages are mention'd as an extraordinary Thing. Whereas it was fo common and fo much better enlarg'd among Chriftians, it has fcarce been thought worth mentioning.

So much, in all thefe Refpects, is private Good and Advantage affianc'd with, and connected to the Good we do unto others.

II. SUPPOSE the Motive drawn from the Relation, and Reasonableness of Things. This in fome Respect coincides with the former. In one, the Agent is confider'd as he stands affected, in the other, as he is related to Society. But this takes in the Fitness and Congruity of the Action, and derives the Motive and Obligation upon the Agent from the Confideration of his being fo and fo ftation'd and circumftanced in Life, equally excluding, with the former, SelfAdvantage or Happiness as a faulty Principle. This is true, like the former, but not the whole Truth of the Cafe, that gives Force to the Motive, Spring to the Action, and a Tie to the Obligation, according to the STANDARD of Nature.

*Com. on Epia. Chap. xxxvii,

FOR

CHAP.

FOR what is Fitness and Congruity as applied XVI. to Action, but a relative Name and Confideration of that Action, as it has a Tendency, and is adapted to fome End and Purpofe? All Action has fome End, and every Agent is fuppofed to propose that in the firft Place, as his Mark, to give a Scope and View to what he is doing. Fitness then must be in the Nature of a Means to attain, or a Qualification to enjoy that End.

Now the End is actually fix'd and stated by the WILL of God, who is likewife fuppofed to have proposed it, as the Scope of his Works and the Purpose of his Acting. The End being fix'd, the Means and Qualifications refpecting that End are likewife fix'd, and connected together infeparably in the Nature of Things he has made; nor can any Agent make any Alteration either in the End, or the Means. If therefore he chufes and defigns the End, he is neceffarily and invariably obliged to chufe and pursue the Means in order to it.

To have Respect unto the Recompence of Reward, is to confider the ultimate End of our Actions, and intend the Glory, Fruition, or Vifion of God; and if the Virtue of Righteousness and true Holiness, or Holiness of Truth, Eph. iv. 24. is the preparative Qualification and improveable Image of God for that Enjoyment, that End must be the fupreme Measure and Obligation of all our moral Actions; as the Conformity of our particular fubordinate Actions to the feveral Laws and Rules of Virtue (all being fo many Directions and Cautions to that End) conftitutes their particular and fpecial Morality,

F 3

THAT