THE VALUE AND SERVICE OF ZOOLOGICAL SCIENCE1

ESTHETICAL AND RECREATIONAL VALUES

WE are met together in a world convulsed by strife, resounding with the measured tramp of armies, with the clash of arms, and into the vortex of this world-wide conflict our own nation has been drawn. Back of the rising smoke of battle towers the gaunt figure of materialism. It is greed of material gain, it is lust of dominion, wherewith to reap this gain, that has precipitated this mighty struggle.

All nations have allowed themselves to fall in more or less degree under the sway of this materialism, and we ourselves are not without guilt in this respect, though not so guilty as our critics would fain have us believe. It was not to be wondered at that under these conditions many at first saw in this war only the rivalry of sordid interests, that they hesitated to take sides in a struggle in which they conceived the end not as the triumph of noble principles but as the supremacy of commercial advantage, that our critics charged us with seeking to serve only our own selfish interests and taxed us with hypocrisy when on entering the conflict we renounced material gain and raised the banner of truth and justice.

But exposed to the heat of this conflagration and in the crucible of suffering men's ambitions have been refined, the metal has been freed from the dross. As the struggle has progressed, another figure-the figure of idealism-has become defined, ris

1 Symposium before the American Society of Zoologists, Minneapolis, December 29, 1917.

ing youthful, strong and virile, and the meaning of the conflict stands plainly revealed. It is the age-long struggle between the multitude and the privileged few, between the rights of the people and the divine right of kings, between the conception of government which makes the state the servant of the people who have created it and that which reduces them to slaves and places not only their possessions but their lives, at the disposal of the divinely appointed rulers of the state, and even demands that their consciences be subservient to the will of the sovereign. Gradually as the issue has defined itself more and more clearly, the logic of events has forced nations whose entrance into the struggle may have been in a degree dictated by other and less noble motives to commit themselves definitely and unmistakably with respect to these fundamental principles and the sympathy of the individual must be bestowed for or against the democracy in which we who are truly Americans all believe.

But so confused and so clouded have been the issues, so bitter the struggle, waged both with the pen and the sword, that some have doubted the value of art, of literature, of science, of religion, and even of civilization itself. Ingenious logic has lent itself to so interpret and apply the principles of our own science as to justify the theory that might makes right, that the weak have no rights which the powerful can be bound to respect, that the strong nation is justified in taking possession of and administering the heritage of its weaker neighbors even though it be necessary to exterminate the weaker in so doing.

ance, and victory for the right is not yet assured. Therefore, there are those who, faint-hearted, have despaired and, blinded by the apparent success of might, have lost faith in right and have recanted, laying the blame upon the idealists for having led them astray. They now profess admiration for the strength of materialism and decry the weakness of an idealism which breeds a race of cowards and weaklings. But are they justified? While it is true that idealism, uncontrolled by reason, may build a house of cards which in time of stress collapses and buries both its followers and those associated with them, can this be affirmed of that idealism through which shines the clear light of reason? Though the believer in truth, justice and right hesitates to draw the sword, is he not the stronger, relatively, if when he does so, he enters the conflict with clear conscience and high resolve? One looks in vain through the history of the ages for a case where freemen have been lacking in the courage to uphold their convictions, even in the face of the most oppressive opposition, or to defend them, if necessary, by force of arms.

It is this spirit of idealism which led our nation at first to give generously and individuals to sacrifice much that the sufferings of war might be mitigated, and which, though we were long forbearing, led us, when reason had shown clearly the necessity of so doing, to enter the conflict, actuated by motives more altruistic than those which have impelled any nation in the previous history of this world. It is idealism that is leading our young men willingly into a crusade which takes them far across the sea, to endure privations, suffering and death itself, while their loved ones, who have bid them "God-speed" with tears in their eyes but with the pride of sacrifice in their hearts, pray for their success, and

hope for their return. Materialism is strong, but idealism, stronger still, is the most powerful force in the world to-day. We can not doubt the outcome of the struggle, with our tremendous resources added to those of the nations with whom we are associated, and with the consciousness of high moral purpose to animate our armies.

Not only is idealism a force to be reckcned with now but from it we draw our faith in the future. When the nations come around the conference table to adjust terms of peace, the promise of the future will rest in the degree to which idealism is able to sway the council. Should materialism,

perchance, assert itself, only a truce is possible. The evolution of justice as between man and man can be slowed and even stayed for a time, but can not be long arrested.

If then so much depends upon this force, if in it rests our faith in the present and our hope in the future, we should do well to investigate fully its nature and to determine as precisely as possible the factors that contribute to its development. Such a pursuit, however, does not lie within the limits of this discussion; it is appropriate only to raise the question whether a love for the beautiful and the cultivation of it— that is, esthetics and esthetic training-are not among such factors.

Idealism in last analysis rests upon a keen perception of truth, right and justice, and this involves that which is esthetic as well as that which is ethical. A recent writer on esthetics says that

esthetic and moral judgments are to be classed together in contrast to judgments intellectual. . . . Esthetic judgments are mainly positive, that is, perceptions of good, moral judgments are mainly and fundamentally negative, or perceptions of evil.

Esthetics deals with values which are imme

2 Santayana, "The Sense of Beauty" (1910), pp. 23et seq.

diate, moral values are always remote. . . . Not only are the various satisfactions which morals are meant to secure esthetic in the last analysis, but when the conscience is formed and right principles acquire an immediate authority, our attitude to these principles becomes esthetic also. Honor, truthfulness and cleanliness are obvious examples.

Esthetic perception should not be confused with artistic production, although esthetic desire is back of and tinges all art. Thus interpreted art is subjective, esthetics objective. The study of animal life has been a source of inspiration to artists of all time and apparently the earliest beginnings of decorative art consisted in the crude drawings of men and animals traced by cave men on the walls of the caverns which sheltered them. Many conventional designs when traced back through the successive steps which mark their evolution lead to representation of animals which because of some peculiarity of form excited the imaginations of aboriginal man. But we are not concerned directly with the value of animal study or the services of such study to art, great as they have been. It is the appeal which the study of animal forms makes to our sense of the beautiful that interests us here.

In order to appreciate beauty, estheticians tell us, we must put ourselves in the place of that which excites the sensation, in a certain sense project ourselves into it. And as we do so "our motor activities rehearse the tensions, pressures, thrusts, resistances, efforts, the volition, in fact the life, with its accompanying emotions, which we project into the form and attribute to it.' Thus the sensation of beauty is a motor as well as a sensory phenomenon. If this sensation is one of pleasure we ascribe to the object the possession of beauty, if the opposite, of ugliness. But all sensations of

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3 Lee and Anstruther-Thompson, "Beauty and Ugliness" (1912), p. 28.

pleasure are not accompanied by the perception of beauty. Pleasant as our recollections of a certain dinner may be we would hardly refer to it as beautiful, even to compliment the most gracious hostess. The frequent repetition of esthetic experience gradually develops in the individual a greater susceptibility to such stimulation, in which regard esthetic pleasure differs from other pleasures the frequent indulgence in which leads to satiety and even repulsion.

This ability to project ourselves, which with respect to other creatures, leads to that we call sympathy, is a most valuable acquirement. It needs no argument to prove that it tends to develop unselfishness, humanitarianism, and ultimately a love of truth, right and justice, which is idealism. The cultivation of esthetics, therefore, is clearly not only one factor in the production of idealism, but perhaps the most important factor of all.

If one compare his impression with regard to a beautiful object with that of others he soon learns that the impression of each person is different, depending on previous experience, training and point of view, and that perceptions of beauty are always individualistic. The perceptions of two individuals may approximate one another if the basis of the one approximate that of the other, but as each has his own personality so each has his own perceptions of beauty. If one be honest with himself and others this tends to develop a respect for others' opinions and his sense of fellowship with the rest of mankind.

To quote again from a text referred to above:4

It would be an error to suppose that esthetic principles apply only to our judgments of works of art or of those natural objects which we attend to chiefly on account of their beauty. . . . In the 4 Santayana, l. c., p. 110.

leading political and moral idea of our time, in the idea of democracy, I think there is a strong esthetic ingredient, and the power of the idea of democracy over the imagination is an illustration of the effect of multiplicity in uniformity. . . . Of course, nothing could be more absurd than to suggest that the French Revolution . . . had an esthetic preference for its basis; it sprang, as we know, from the hatred of oppression, the rivalry of classes, and the aspiration after a freer social and strictly moral organization. But when these moral forces were suggesting and partly realizing the democratic idea, this idea was necessarily vividly present to men's thoughts; the picture of human life which it presented was becoming familiar, and was being made the sanction and goal of constant endeavor. . . . The consequence was that democracy, prized at first as a means to happiness and as an instrument of good government, was acquiring an intrinsic value; it was beginning to seem good in itself, in fact the only intrinsically right and perfect arrangement. A utilitarian scheme was receiving an esthetic consecration. The practical value of the arrangement on which, of course, it is entirely dependent for its origin and authority, was forgotten, and men were ready to sacrifice their welfare to their sense of propriety; that is they allowed an esthetic good to outweigh a practical one.

It was becoming an ideal.

Esthetic love of uniformity, however, is usually disguised under some moral label; we call it the love of justice, perhaps because we have not considered that the value of justice also, in so far as it is not derivative and utilitarian, must be intrinsic, or what is practically the same thing, esthetic.

The same author emphasizes the idea that beauty is a species of value and the philosophy of beauty a theory of values. If this be true then another value of esthetic training is that it educates the judgment. One is inevitably led to compare beautiful objects one with another not only to determine degrees of beauty, but also to discover the new beauty which such comparison may disclose.

The pursuit of beauty, furthermore, involves continued attention; a certain object may attract us at first glance because it exerts a powerful stimulus and commands

our attention, but no casual glance will reveal beauty in it, and to appreciate that beauty to the utmost we must become absorbed in contemplation, must, as we often say, "enter fully into the spirit of the thing." This is another value attached to the study of esthetics, that it develops the power of concentrated observation.

It thus appears that the cultivation of esthetics not only tends to develop sympathy and from that as a starting-point, becomes a prominent factor in the development of idealism, but also develops judgment, power of concentrated observation, and respect for the opinions of others, being thus also a factor in the production and spread of democratic ideals. The multiplication of objects of beauty in our cities -parks, with all that usually goes with them, fine buildings, and works of art-is rot extravagance, nor is it of little consequence that we seek to secure beauty in all the details of our surroundings. The effect. of these things, acting gradually and exerted unconsciously upon the citizens, produces in time results which no one can measure but of the value of which there can be not the slightest doubt.

In this connection we should be reminded

of the fact that esthetics is but rarely taught as such, and indeed, the daily contact with beautiful things, working silently but none the less surely, is more effective than conscious efforts to secure results, which too often defeat themselves by the opposition of the persons whom it is desired to affect. Esthetic training may be secured from the study of literature, of science, or of the arts, if care be used to take advantage of the opportunities constantly offered.

The study of animal life is peculiarly suited to form the basis of esthetic training, and, indeed, no one can acquire even a rudimentary knowledge of zoology without be

ing influenced esthetically. There is in the case of the animal, not only the beauty of form and of color which belongs to so many natural objects, but also the beauty of motion, in the case of birds the beauty of song, and in all higher animals even greater esthetic possibilities are revealed in the degree to which their natures are akin to that of man. Animal nature study develops sympathy, judgment and the power of observation, and always excites the closest attention, thus possessing exactly the esthetical values referred to above. It is clearly opposed to all that is dogmatic, and properly presented or acquired contributes to liberality of thought and respect for the points of view of others.

In another way animal nature study is supreme among the subjects which may form the basis of training in esthetics. Just as the earliest artistic efforts of primitive man seem to show that of all the objects about him animals appear to have most attracted his attention and stimulated first his imagination, so in childhood we today are first most strongly impressed by the living animals about us. While children may be to a degree interested in trees, and flowers, and the inanimate things around them, the most effective approach to nature study in the case of younger children is through the study of animals and this is the logical beginning of esthetic training.

It thus appears, if the points which have been referred to are well taken, that the cultivation of esthetics is highly valuable to us as individuals, to the communities in which we live, to the nation of which we are a part, and to mankind as a whole, and since the study of animal life is preeminently fitted to serve as the beginning of such cultivation and is peculiarly appropriate as material for its continued prosecu