of the Education Department of the Privy Council. The precise mode in which the successful candidates are to be allotted to the several departments is left for consideration, though several modes are suggested. The limits of the age of candidates for superior situations, it is recommended should, as a general rule, be nineteen and twenty-five; for inferior offices, seventeen and twenty-one.

The competing literary examination, it is evident, could scarcely work satisfactorily with the present system of patronage. The Commissioners accordingly propose to get rid of the practice of nomination altogether. The examinations they think should be "open to all persons of a given age," subject only to their bringing satisfactory references as to their moral character. This is the boldest innovation proposed by the Commissioners; and, indeed, is so bold a one, that we cannot be surprised that it has encountered from all quarters a very keen opposition. The Commissioners and their opponents alike regard it as the key to their position.

The examination is to be in every instance followed before appointment, as at present, by a certain period of probation; but the probation is to be rendered more efficient by precise reports of the conduct of the probationers.

These are the chief suggestions as to the best mode of obtaining a proper supply of public servants: "the best mode of regulating their employment, and their promotion, so as to maintain the efficiency of the office at the highest point," is the other branch of the inquiry.

The first suggestion is one of great importance, and it is regarded as quite practicable by other heads of offices as well as by the Commissioners; to us it seems the point on which the whole question of an improved system of promotion, and a more efficient performance of official duties turns. It is, that there be established"" a proper distinction between intellectual and mechanical labour." The proper maintenance of such a distinction, it is observed, "depends more upon the discretion and management of the chiefs of offices, and those immediately below them, than upon any general regulations that could be made by a central authority." But it is suggested that a step already taken the appointment of a class of supplementary clerksmight be so extended as, with the superior standard of examination for the higher class, to have the effect of attaining the object sought in a satisfactory manner. To these supplementary clerks the copying, registering, posting diaries, and other mechanical work, might be entirely assigned, and, as they would receive uniform salaries in each department, they would be capable of being transferred without inconvenience from one to another, as the demand for their services might render necessary.

A second suggestion is that there should be a proper system of transfer of clerks of the superior class from one branch of an office to another within it, not as the Chancellor of the Exchequer states, from one office to another-to-day at the Treasury, to-morrow at the Foreign Office. Each clerk would thus have an opportunity of making himself master of the whole of the business before he is called upon, in due course of time, to take a leading position. In connexion with this system of transfer, periodical reports upon the

manner in which each clerk has been employed, should be made to the chief clerk of the office.

The system of promotion by merit, it is suggested, should be fully recognised and acted upon; and elaborate regulations are laid down for its due exercise, as well as to secure it against abuse. It is also proposed that instead of an annual increase of salary being given to cach clerk, as a matter of course, he should only become entitled to it upon obtaining a certificate of regular and punctual attendance, and satisfactory conduct from his immediate superior. Superannuation allowances, good-service pensions, and honorary distinctions, should be arranged upon a well-considered and uniform system; and various suggestions are thrown out for effecting this. By thus introducing certainty and consistency into the whole scheme of promotion by merit, the Commissioners think its success would be ensured.

And finally, it is recommended that "in future if any staff appointment falls vacant in an office in which there is a deserving clerk well qualified to fill it, his claims shall not be passed over in favour of a stranger. But this principle," it is urged, "might advantageously be carried further, by filling the appointment with a person from another office, if there is no one in the department itself qualified to take it." This recommendation, it will be seen, goes a long step forward in the way of abolishing patronage. The plan of open competitive examinations would destroy the practice of nominations; this would do away with the power of rewarding parliamentary supporters, political partizans, and younger sons, with those high and well-paid situations which have always been regarded as among the prizes of ministerial life. This, however, safe as the rule, must obviously admit of many exceptions. It would be absurd, for instance, to render the offices such close corporations that no appointment could be made to one of the higher situations of a person whose peculiar qualifications were evident in his " acknowledged eminence in one of the liberal professions, or in some other walk of life." Such a rule would prevent the public from obtaining the services of such men as Sir C. Trevelyan, Rowland Hill, Drummond, Porter, Chadwick, Stephens, or others who like them have been called to the public service on account of special qualifications, and whose names are among the highest and most honourable of which that service can boast. The Commissioners, however, contemplate no such wild scheme. But they would place a check upon all appointments from outside the office. They recommend, in fact, elsewhere, that "the circumstances under which any person is appointed to such an office should always be placed on record; and suggest for consideration the expediency of making an annual return to Parliament of the names of persons who may be so appointed."

Any change of the importance recommended in this Report can only, in the opinion of the Commissioners, be carried successfully into effect by an Act of Parliament, which need consist of only a few clauses. As they urge with unanswerable force-" the existing system is supported by long usage and powerful interests; and were any Government to introduce material alterations into it, in consequence of their own convictions, without taking the precaution to give

those alterations the force of law, it is almost certain that they would be imperceptibly, or perhaps avowedly, abandoned by their successors, if they were not even allowed to fall into disuse by the very Government which had originated them."

The Report, after being printed, was forwarded to the several permanent heads of offices, with a request that they would favour the Government with their views of its general principles, and state whether they considered the existing arrangements for making the first appointments in the Civil Service, and for promoting the subsequent efficiency of the persons appointed, open to any, and if any to what, improvement. The Report was also sent, with a request for their opinion as to its principles and practicability, to various gentlemen connected with the universities, masters of the leading grammarschools, and others connected with public education, or otherwise regarded as likely to afford assistance in arriving at a right judgment. The answers received from these gentlemen, as has been already stated, were printed, and presented, along with the Report, to Parliament. As was to be expected, the opinions elicited were of the most opposite kinds: and it will be admitted by every one who has studied the volume, that the opposite views are explained and enforced with remarkable ability. The leading point is at once recognised to be the admission by open competitive examination in place of admission by nomination. By all persons connected with education, by almost every one, in fact, unconnected with the service or with government, the prospect of admittance to the Civil Service by an open competitive examination is hailed as a great boon, and as likely to produce a vast and most beneficial influence upon the education of the country. One of the highest authorities on social science, Mr. John Stuart Mill, does not indeed hesitate to rank it as one of those great public improvements the adoption of which would form an era in history. The effects which it is calculated to produce," he thinks, and his opinion will always command respectful audience, "in raising the character both of the public adminstration and of the people, can scarcely be over-estimated." On the other hand, recent or present members of the public service are more divided in opinion. A minority, numbering Messrs. Lefevre, Wood, Larcom, and Power in their ranks, warmly adopt the recommendations of the Report, and anticipate the most important results from the change; while the majority, headed by Sir G. C. Lewis, Sir James Stephen, Messrs. Addington, Merivale, and Hawes, regard the plan as impracticable and mischievous. Some, like Mr. Rowland Hill, without expressly approving or rejecting the recommendation of the Commissioners, throw out various suggestions and modifications (often very valuable ones) of their own for the improvement of the service; and others again, of whom Mr. Romilly may be regarded as the type, yield a partial and guarded approval. One or two, like Sir A. Y. Spearman and Mr. Arbuthnot, chiefly concern themselves with the vindication of the present Civil Service; and finally, Mr. Waddington, himself a host, applies to the Report the test of unsparing ridicule, and finds the whole deserving of nothing but utter scorn. One paper is, however, so different from all the rest, both in length

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(about 90 pages) and elaborateness, as to call for special notice. It is by Mr. Chadwick, and displays so entire a mastery of the whole subject-indeed, is so exhaustive in its character, that it may be regarded as in itself almost a treatise on administration and administrative reform. It strongly advocates admission by open competition, and generally supports the recommendations of the Report, though taking a wider range, and an entirely independent course.

The carefully-weighed opinions of such a body of men, of highly cultivated powers, great experience, and practically acquainted with the subject in most of its bearings-opinions written for the guidance of the Government, and at its special request—it is manifest deserves to be well considered by any who seek to thoroughly comprehend the point in question. Of course, in estimating their opinions, the suspicion of innovations, so commonly felt by men in their position and of their standing, will be kept in mind. By far the greater number of these gentlemen, as we have said, object to the great change proposed by the Commissioners; and while admitting the insufficiency of the departmental examination of nominees then in practice, think that a proper examination by an independent central board of examiners would secure a sufficiently high standard of intellectual qualification for the junior officers. The system of nomination they would retain in its present hands, or render more strictly departmental. An open competitive examination, however much they may otherwise differ, they for the most part agree in repudiating.

This is really the turning-point of the whole question of administrative reformation-whether or not "ascertained fitness and superior merit shall be the indispensable and sole condition of appointments and promotions." Before us it lies, however, for consideration, as the debateable ground with reference to the Civil Service only; with its wider applications we have here no immediate concern. But having before us the various objections urged against this great innovation by the officers of the Civil Service, which include all that we have seen elsewhere stated, we will place them in order, and endeavour to estimate their weight. The question at issue is-Does admission by a competing examination, to which every one of a certain age is at liberty to present himself, without regard to rank, interest, politics, or religious opinions, appear to be the best method of providing the public service with a supply of efficient men: or will that end be equally well attained by the parties being nominated, as at present, by the Treasury or the heads of departments, but subjected to a stricter qualifying examination, conducted by a central board of examiners?

The apparent advantages of admission by free competitive examination are sufficiently obvious. It may, however, be convenient to state what occur to us as the more evident, before repeating the objections which have been urged against it. If we accept as a truth the dictum of Mr. Gladstone, that "the country has a right to be served by the best men who can be got for the money it offers," it would seem to follow as a necessary consequence that the country has a right to get them wherever it can. Now, a plan which invites all qualified persons to offer themselves for the service of the country, and assures

them that, so far as can be ascertained by an honest comparison of their merits, the best-qualified shall be chosen, come whence they may, certainly seems better adapted to provide good men than a plan which selects its nominees from the comparatively narrow circle of family and political connexions. And in thus securing a much larger number of candidates to select from, it almost necessarily ensures that among them shall be a greater variety of qualifications, and a higher standard of attainments, since it has held out the strongest possible inducement to young men throughout the country who wish to obtain such appointments, to prepare themselves specifically for the work. But it not only promises to secure a larger number of competent candidates, but to increase the efficiency of those who are appointed by rendering promotion by merit more practicable. The great obstacle which has heretofore prevented the free adoption of this method of advancement, has been the prevalent belief that promotion otherwise than by seniority is usually promotion by favour. Men who are appointed by favour expect to rise by favour. Men who owe their appointment to their superior fitness will expect to rise, or be passed by, according to their ascertained merit. They will feel that capacity being the qualification for appointment, efficient discharge of duty must be the title to preferment; while they will expect that neglect of duty will prevent their promotion, if it do not ensure their dismissal. This greater efficiency of the service again would, in its turn, tend greatly to lessen its expensiveness; as in numerous instances has been found to be the case, even where there has been an advanced outlay for higher qualifications.

It further commends itself by its manifest justice. What is open to all will be recognised for the good of all. Government which is meant for the general benefit will not then be suspected of favouring particular classes. Freedom from all exclusiveness in appointing to the public service; entire absence of patronage and bribery, will be acknowledged as evidences of honest intentions, and of the absence of a desire to obtain support by corrupt influences; and go far towards ensuring the general good-will. As Mr. Chadwick has expressed it "In so far as the principles of this reform are allowed to have place, they will substitute a state of things in the best sense popular, and will require another designation; were it not that the one in use will be made essentially and transparently a truth, i. e., a bonâ fide PUBLIC SERVICE.

Appointment by free competition would necessarily cut off one branch of political patronage or bribery; and this would seem at first glance to be one of its most unquestionable advantages. That patronage may have its conveniences to the Government there can be little doubt, though it is not so clear that these advantages are not bought somewhat too dearly. At any rate that it has been an obstruction to the efficiency of the public service, hurtful to the character of both legislators and constituencies, and that it is, to some extent at least, immoral in itself and injurious in its influence, has been pretty generally admitted. Sir James Stephen, howeverand he is always great on moral questions-doubts whether the exclusion of patronage is "so sound in principle as at first sight it