MEN have now become so familiar with the paradox, that it scarcely gives rise to a remark, when we find, is we commonly do, the greatest overs of democracy also the greatest admirers of tyrants. The solution of his apparent mystery is found in the natural division of the human race nto two great classes-the lovers of order, of subordination, of legitimacy; ind the admirers of ultra-freedom, of an unrestrained popular will,- in hort, of illegitimacy. The adherents of this latter opinion often shew hemselves ready to defend almost ny crime, if only it were committed gainst a lawful sovereign; and, hough professed champions of liberty, hey universally idolise the vain and elfish despot, Buonaparte, BECAUSE e became a monarch in defiance of all 'irine and all human laws. Hence, while virtuous and honourable men re found alike among monarchists, ristocrats, and republicans; we may enerally feel sure that we are dealng with a man of blunted moral erceptions and unsafe propensities, then we come in contact with an dmirer of the Corsican usurper.

One of these writers is now before ts. We have sufficiently described is work in the last few sentences; nd shall take no further notice of it, han to single out for serious discusion a few passages which bear upon

a topic on which we consider that full justice has never been done to the greatest man of modern times. That topic is, THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO.

A succession of writers, some French, some English, have come before the public within the last twenty years, all contributing more or less of misrepresentation to this page in modern history; and we regret to say that the few competent historians, such as Sir Walter Scott and Mr. Lockhart, who have in general done justice to the main narrative, have in this particular point fallen lamentably short. Hence it is, probably, that the Buonapartist now before us is emboldened to go somewhat farther than others had usually done; and to represent in a work which, from its numerous and valuable pictorial illustrations, must command a considerable sale, that little or no honour was reaped by either England or her great commander on that well-fought field!

The three points which are adroitly put forward by Mr. Horne, and which, if admitted by the reader, must lead to this conclusion, are these:

1. That the two opposing armies on the 18th of June-the French, and the Anglo-Belgian, irrespective of the Prussians- were of equal strength; or, that if any preponderance ex

VOL. XXIV. NO. CXLIII.

LL

A detachment of 6000 men, apart from the above, was posted on the Halle road, to prevent any irruption on Brussels by that route; but this corps of observation never came even in sight of the field of Waterloo.

The British or Anglo- Belgian army, then, consisted of 28,995 British and 6779 of the German Legion, together, 35,774, all of whom might be considered good troops; and 32,000 Belgian, Hanoverian, &c., who were not to be relied on in a contest with an equal number of the French army.

The importance of keeping this classification of the army in view is fully admitted by Buonaparte himself in his Historical Memoirs, Book IX. He says at page 127

"The French army was only sixty-nine thousand strong, but still victory appeared to be certain. These sixty-nine thousand were good troops; whereas, in the enemy's army, the English only, amounting to forty thousand at most, could be reckoned as such."

And at page 61 he says

"The force of these armies should not be estimated by a mere comparison of the numbers; because the allied army was composed of troops more or less efficient; so that an Englishman might be counted for one Frenchman; but two Dutchmen, or soldiers of the confederation, for one Frenchman."

And this estimate was fully borne out by the facts. A large proportion of the Belgians and Hanoverians, &c. in the Duke of Wellington's army were of scarcely any use. Several regiments ran away, or got into the rear, and the battle was fought in the main by the five-and-thirty thousand men of the British army and the German legion. Taking, therefore, Buonaparte's own method of estimating the Duke's army, we should say that

it was formed of 35,000 British and other good troops, and of 32,000 Belgians, &c., estimated by Buonaparte as being equal to only 16,000 of his own army. Viewed in this light, the army under the Duke of Wellington, estimated on Buonaparte's own mode of reckoning, would be said to be 68,000 men apparently, but having only an efficient strength equal to 51,000.

We now turn to the other side of the question, and proceed to inquire what was the force brought into the field by Buonaparte against the allied army on the 18th of June? And at the onset we must remark, that not only have the leading English writers shewn an inertness in seek

ing out the truth on this point, but they have committed the further and egregious blunder, of admitting as a credible document, the work declared by Marshal Grouchy himself to be a collection of falsehoods-the audacious Historical Memoirs, Book IX.

This volume was compiled at St. Helena by the defeated commander, years after the event, and at a distance from all authentic records. Its main object is, to claim for himself the whole glory of Waterloo, and to deny to the English general the least share of credit on the score of his defeat. It labours to effect this by means of two series of false representations: first, that the French army at Waterloo was merely overpowered by vastly superior numbers; and secondly, that even this misfortune arose from the blunders of Grouchy and other generals.

The first point-the making it appear that the French force was greatly inferior to that by which it was opposed-is contrived by inventing, at a great distance from all the records, a totally new representation of the force under Buonaparte on June 18. The whole of the elaborate statements appended to that volume for the above purpose are at entire variance with all the French accounts previously published. Is it reasonable then to give credit to a fabrication like this, got up with great art, but no honesty, years afterwards, for an obvious purpose; against the admissions and declarations of various French generals, and even of Buonaparte himself, made and published at the very time of the event?

For instance-1. Coster, the guide employed by Buonaparte, testifies that those in the French army with whom he conversed, stated, without hesitation, that they crossed the frontier 150,000 strong. This of itself is slight evidence, but

2. The most authentic and most respectable French account of the campaign, the Relation of an Eyewitness, published in Paris shortly after the battle, states the force of the entire French army as being "150,000 effective men." This production was the leading French account of the battle, and it went through many editions; but never heard that any one of the generals who commanded in the French army challenged the truth of his statement, or ventured to say, "You have reckoned our army at 150,000, men whereas we had only 122,000."

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3. Marshal Ney, in his letter to Fouché, dated June 26, 1815, in vindication of his own conduct, distinctly states the first corps of the French army to have been " from 25,000 to 30,000 strong."

4. Lacroix, chief of the staff of the second corps, in a letter read in the Chamber of Representatives, July 3, 1815, speaks of that corps, also, as having been 25,000 strong.*

5. But chiefly Buonaparte himself, in his own bulletin of the battle of the 18th, says, "The enemy's force was upwards of 90,000 men; ours, less numerous - an expression so exceedingly cautious, as evidently to mean only that the French army did not exceed 90,000-that it was inferior, but barely inferior, to the allied army, which he had just before reckoned at 95,000.

All these French declarations being on record, what are we to think of an account of the campaign, compiled, years afterwards, by the defeated general, with a view to palliate his defeat; and in which every one of these statements, though made at the time, and by parties who were all concerned in the affair, are at once put aside; and an altogether new and greatly reduced estimate of the French army is for the first time produced?

The whole army, as it passed the

.

frontier, is set down as 122,000 only, instead of 150,000, as heretofore.

The first corps, declared by Marshal Ney to have been "from 25,000 to 30,000 strong," is coolly set down as being only 16,500 foot, and 1400 cavalry.

The second corps, declared by the chief of its own staff to have been 25,000, is sometimes given as 17,900, and sometimes as 21,200.

The whole French army at Waterloo, which Buonaparte himself, when dictating his bulletin, could only venture to reckon at "less than 90,000," is now, in "Book IX.” unhesitatingly alleged to have consisted of no more than 68,650 men!

In every particular, then, Buonaparte's revised and reduced estimate, made at St. Helena years after the event, contradicts the evidence given at the time by the best-informed French witnesses. But it does more; it contradicts itself.

This is a very common failing with fabricators of elaborate falsehoods. It would require a mind of extraordinary caution, and of almost superhuman skill in dressing up a statement, to go into a variety of detailed accounts, extending over a whole volume, and all radically untrue, without being betrayed into frequent inconsistencies. It is only truth which is naturally and necessarily consistent with itself.

The inconsistencies of " Book IX.” are numerous and manifest. We will mention one or two of them.

1. In one of Buonaparte's reduced statements of his aggregate force at Waterloo (Book IX. p. 128), by which he contrives to reduce his numbers to 68,650 men, he sets down

Buonaparte speaks of these same three corps in action, at p. 158, he says, "These twelve thousand select horse performed prodigies of valour."

2. The first corps of his army, which Ney declares to have been from 25,000 to 30,000 strong, is put down in this reduced statement, at p. 128, as having 16,500 infantry. In the more elaborate table (Table F.), it appears to have had 19,200; and this is borne out by a positive statement at pp. 31-35,-" The first corps was composed of four divisions of infantry, consisting each of four regiments. *The regiments had in general but two battalions; each battalion consisting of 600 men, present and under arms.

3. The second corps, which its chief, Lacroix, declares to have had 25,000 men, is set down at p. 71 of the Memoir, as having only 19,800 infantry. At pp. 95 and 97, it is quietly augmented to 21,000! Having thirtysix battalions, it must, according to the declarations twice or thrice made, that the battalions sent into the field had been completed to 600 men each, have had an infantry of 21,600.

Nor are these discrepancies to be accounted for by the losses sustained at Ligny or Quatre Bras, for these losses are deducted from the foot of the account. Still less do they arise from deficiencies in the ranks, for it is expressly declared that all the battalions had been completed up to 600 men each, and that an addition of 240 men to each battalion was preparing, and would have joined by the 1st of July.

The statements, then, of the "Historical Memoir, Book IX." are inconsistent and self-contradictory; and they are at variance with all former French accounts. The various statements of French authorities, which we have already cited, mutually agree with each other, and establish the strongest probability of the facts in which they all coincide. The Eye-witness, who published the chief French account, estimates the whole army at 150,000. This would have given Grouchy a force of from 40,000 to 45,000, and have left Buonaparte from 85,000 to 90,000, after deducting 15,000 for the losses sustained on the 16th. Count Fla

haut's estimate of Grouchy's force, as being 40,000 after the engagement of the 18th,* strictly agrees with this; and so does Ney's declaration that the 1st corps was 25,000 to 30,000 strong; and Lacroix's that the 2d was 25,000. But the main proof lies in Buonaparte's own bulletin. Instantly on his return from the field, he sits down and dictates this statement, and thus does he describe the two armies:

"We estimated the force of the English army at 80,000 men. We supposed that the Prussian corps which might be in line towards the right, might be 15,000. The enemy's force, then, was upwards of 90,000 men; ours, less numerous."

This was the language of a defeated general, as desirous as it was possible for man to be of palliating his own defeat. If he could have dared to have represented his own army as decidedly inferior to that by which he had been defeated, would he not have done so? Assuredly he would. If he could have asserted a difference of 10,000 in their respective amounts, would he not have very explicitly stated it? Beyond all question. But what is the fair and obvious meaning of his words? He gives the Duke of Wellington 95,000 men,-he repeats, that "the enemy's force was upwards of 90,000;" and then, in the softest tone possible, adds, "Ours, less numerous." The plain meaning of which is," Ours, not upwards of 90,000." A more explicit admission that his own force approached 90,000

was scarcely less than that number- it would be difficult to imagine, as emanating from a beaten general.

The whole of these various statements, then, Buonaparte's own, Ney's, Flahaut's, Lacroix's, and the chief French narrator's, all given at the time, and by parties fully aware of the facts, all these statements entirely agree with each other; and their united testimony entirely overthrows the fiction invented at St. Helena in 1818. The French army, at Waterloo, there is no room to doubt, consisted of very nearly, and probably quite, 90,000 men, of the best troops that France ever sent into the field. More than 12,000 infantry