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that body and himself. The Senate are, moreover, a branch of the war-making power, and it take the opinion and advice of that body in admay be eminently proper for the Executive to vance upon any great question which may involve in its decision the issue of peace or war. On the present occasion, the magnitude of the

stances, to desire the previous advice of the Senate; and that desire is increased by the recent debates and proceedings in Congress, which render it, in my judgment, not only respectful indispensable, to insure harmonious action beto the Senate, but necessary and proper, if not tween that body and the Executive. In conferring on the Executive the authority to give the notice for the abrogation of the convention of 1827, the Senate acted publicly so large a part, that a decision on the proposal now made by the British government, without a definite know

uneasy and uncertain state of mind, the President had many conferences with Mr. Benton, the point of which was to know, beyond the chance of mistake, how far he could rely upon the whig senators. Mr. Benton talked with them all-with Webster, Archer, Berrien, John M. Clayton, Crittenden, Corwin, Davis of Mas-subject would induce me, under any circumsachusetts, Dayton, Greene of Rhode Island, Huntington of Connecticut, Reverdy Johnson, Henry Johnson of Louisiana, Miller of New Jersey, Phelps, Simmons, Upham, Woodbridge, --and saw fully that they intended to act for their country, and not for their party: and reported to the President that he would be safe in trusting to them—that their united voice would be in favor of the advice, which, added to the minority of the democracy, would make the two-ledge of the views of that body in reference to thirds which were requisite. The most auspicious mode of applying for this advice was deemed to be the submission of a projet of a treaty, presented by the British minister, and to be laid before the Senate for their opinion upon its acceptance. The projet was accordingly received by Mr. Buchanan, a message drawn up, and the desired advice was to be asked the next day, 10th of June. A prey to anxiety as to the conduct of the whigs, the mere absence of part of whom would defeat the measure, the President sent for Mr. Benton the night before, to get himself re-assured on that point. Mr. Benton was clear and positive that they would be in their places, and would vote the advice, and that the measure would be carried. The next day the projet of the treaty was sent in, and with it a message from the President, asking the advice which he desired. It stated:

"In the early periods of the government, the opinion and advice of the Senate were often taken in advance upon important questions of our foreign policy. General Washington repeatedly consulted the Senate, and asked their previous advice upon pending negotiations with foreign powers; and the Senate in every instance responded to his call by giving their advice, to which he always conformed his action. This practice, though rarely resorted to in later times, was, in my judgment, eminently wise, and may, on occasions of great importance, be properly revived. The Senate are a branch of the treaty-making power; and, by consulting them in advance of his own action upon important measures of foreign policy which may ultimately come before them for their consideration, the President secures harmony of action between

it, might render the question still more complicated and difficult of adjustment. For these reasons I invite the consideration of the Senate to the proposal of the British government for the settlement of the Oregon question, and ask their advice on the subject."

This statement and expression of opinion were conformable to the early practice of the government and the theory of the constitution, which, in requiring the President to take the advice of the Senate in the formation of treaties, would certainly imply a consultation before they were made; and this interpretation had often been asserted by members of the Senate. As an interpretation deemed right in itself, and being deferential to the Senate, and being of good example for the future, and of great immediate practical good in taking the question of peace or war with Great Britain out of the hands of an administration standing upon the creed of the Baltimore convention, and putting it into the hands of the whigs to whom it did not apply, and that part of the democracy which disregarded it, this application of the President was most favorably received. Still, however, dominated by the idea of consistency, the President added a salvo for that sensitive point in the shape of a reservation in behalf of his previous opinions, thus:

"My opinions and my action on the Oregon question were fully made known to Congress in my annual message of the second of December last; and the opinions therein expressed remain unchanged."

With this reservation, and with a complete

devolution of the responsibility of the act upon the Senate, he proceeded to ask their advice in these terms:

"Should the Senate, by the constitutional majority required for the ratification of treaties, advise the acceptance of this proposition, or advise it with such modifications as they may, upon full deliberation, deem proper, I shall conform my action to their advice. Should the Senate, however, decline by such constitutional majority to give such advice, or to express an opinion on the subject, I shall consider it my duty to reject the offer."

It was clear, then, that the fact of treaty or no treaty depended upon the Senate-that the whole responsibility was placed upon it-that the issue of peace or war depended upon that body. Far from shunning this responsibility, that body was glad to take it, and gave the President a faithful support against himself, against his cabinet, and against his peculiar friends. These friends struggled hard, and exhausted parliamentary tactics to defeat the application, and though a small minority, were formidable in a vote where each one counted two against the opposite side. The first motion was to refer the message to the Committee on Foreign Relations, where the fifty-four forties were in the majority, and from whose action delay and embarrassment might ensue. Failing in that motion, it was moved to lay the message on the table. Failing again, it was moved to postpone the consideration of the subject to the next week. That motion being rejected, the consideration of the message was commenced, and then succeeded a series of motions to amend and alter the terms of the proposition as submitted. All these failed, and at the end of two days the vote was taken, and the advice given. The yeas were:

"Messrs. Archer, Ashley, Bagby, Benton, Berrien, Calhoun, Chalmers, Thomas Clayton, John M. Clayton, Colquitt, Davis, Dayton, Dix, Evans, Greene, Haywood, Houston, Huntington, Johnson of Maryland, Johnson of Louisiana, Lewis, McDuffie, Mangum, Miller, Morehead, Niles, Pearce, Penny backer, Phelps, Rusk, Sevier, Simmons, Speight, Turney, Upham, Webster, Woodbridge, Yulee."-38.

The nays:

"Messrs. Allen, Atherton, Breese, Cameron, Cass, Dickinson, Fairfield, Hannegan, Jarnagin, Jenness, Semple, Sturgeon."-12.

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Four days afterwards the treaty was sent in in due form, accompanied by a message which still left its responsibility on the advising Senate, thus:

"In accordance with the resolution of the Senate of the 12th instant, that the President of the United States be, and he is hereby, adernment, accompanying his message to the Senvised to accept the proposal of the British gov ate dated 10th June, 1846, for a convention to settle boundaries, &c., between the United States and Great Britain west of the Rocky or and signed on the 15th instant, by the Secretary Stony mountains,' a convention was concluded of State on the part of the United States, and the envoy extraordinary and minister plenipo tentiary of her Britannic Majesty on the part of Great Britain. This convention I now lay before the Senate for their consideration, with a view to its ratification."

Two days more were consumed in efforts to amend or alter the treaty in various of its provisions, all of which failing, the final vote on is ratification was taken, and carried by an increased vote on each side-41 to 14.

YEAS.-"Messrs. Archer, Ashley, Bagb Barrow, Benton, Berrien, Calhoun, Chalmers, Thomas Clayton, John M. Clayton, Colquit Corwin, Crittenden, Davis, Dayton, Dix, Eva Greene, Haywood, Houston, Huntington, Joh son of Maryland, Henry Johnson of Louisian Lewis, McDuffie, Mangum, Miller, Morehead Niles, Pearce, Pennybacker, Phelps, Rusk, vier, Simmons, Speight, Turney, Upham, Web ster, Woodbridge, Yulee.

NAYS. "Messrs. Allen, Atchison, Athert Breese, Bright, Cameron, Cass, Dickinson, Far field, Hannegan, Jenness, Semple, Sturge Westcott."

An anomaly was presented in the progress this question that of the daily attack, by a the government papers, upon the senators wh were accomplishing the wishes of the Preside The organ at Washington, conducted by Mr

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mously, and was worthily represented by her minister, Mr. (now Sir Richard) Pakenham. Her adoption and renewal of our own offer, settled the last remaining controversy between the countries-left them in a condition which they had not seen since the peace of 1783without any thing to quarrel about, and with a mutuality of interest in the preservation of peace which promised a long continuance of peace. But, alas, Great Britain is to the United States now what Spain was for centuries to her the raw-head and bloody-bones which inspires terror and rage. During these centuries a

at home, had only to raise a cry of some insult, aggression, or evil design on the part of Spain to have Great Britain in arms against her. And so it is in the United States at present, putting Great Britain in the place of Spain, and our

Ritchie, was incessant and unmeasured in these attacks, especially on Mr. Benton, whose place in the party, and his geographical position in the West, gave him the privilege of being conįsidered the leader of the forty-nines, and there#fore the most obnoxious. It was a new thing under the sun to see the senator daily assailed, in the government papers, for carrying into effect the wishes of the government-to see him attacked in the morning for what the President was hurrying him to do the night before. His course was equally independent of the wishes of the government, and the abuse of its papers. He had studied the Oregon question for twenty-ministry, or a public man that was losing ground five years—had his mind made up upon it-and should have acted according to his convictions without regard to support or resistance from any quarter. The issue was an instructive commentary upon the improvidence of these party platforms, adopted for an electioneering cam-selves in hers. We have periodical returns of paign, made into a party watch-word, often fraught with great mischief to the country, and often founded in ignorance or disregard of the public welfare. This Oregon platform was eminently of that character. It was a party platform for the campaign: its architects knew but little of the geography of the north-west coast, or of its diplomatic history. They had never heard of the line of the treaty of Utrecht, and denied its existence: they had never heard of the multiplied offers of our government to settle upon that line, and treated the offer now as a novelty and an abandonment of our rights: they had never heard that their 54-40 was no line on the continent, but only a point on an island on the coast, fixed by the Emperor Paul as the southern limit of the charter granted by

complaints against her, each to perish when it has served its turn, and to be succeeded by another, evanescent as itself. Thus far, no war has been made; but politicians have gained reputations; newspapers have taken fire; stocks have vacillated, to the profit of jobbers; great expense incurred for national defence in ships and forts, when there is nothing to defend against: and if there was, the electric telegraph and the steam car would do the work with little expense either of time or money.

CHAPTER CLX.

him to the Russian Fur Company: had never MEETING OF THE SECOND SESSION OF THE 29TH

heard of Frazer's River and New Caledonia, which lay between Oregon and their indisputable line, and ignored the existence of that river and province. The pride of consistency made them adhere to these errors; and a desire to destroy Mr. Benton for not joining in the hurrahs for the "whole of Oregon, or none," and for the "immediate annexation of Texas without regard to consequences," lent additional force to the attacks upon him. The conduct of the whigs was patriotic in preferring their country to their party-in preventing a war with Great Britain -and in saving the administration from itself and its friends. Great Britain acted magnani

CONGRESS: PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE: VIGOROUS
PROSECUTION OF THE WAR RECOMMENDED:
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL PROPOSED TO BE CRK-

ATED.

CONGRESS met at the regular annual period, the first Monday in December; and being the second session of the same body, there was nothing to be done, after the assembling of a quorum, before the commencement of business, but to receive the President's message. It was immediately communicated, and, of course, was greatly occupied with the Mexican war. The success of our arms, under the command of General Taylor, was a theme of exultation; and after

New Mexico and of the Californias, little, if any further resistance is apprehended from the inhave thus, from the necessity of the case, and habitants of the temporary governments which according to the laws of war, been established. It may be proper to provide for the security of these important conquests, by making an adequate appropriation for the purpose of erecting fortifications, and defraying the expenses necessarily incident to the maintenance of our pos

Having abandoned the idea of conquering by "a masterly inactivity," and adopted the idea of a vigorous prosecution of the war, the President also adopted Mr. Benton's plan for prosecuting it, which was to carry the war straight to the city of Mexico-General Taylor, for that purpose, to be supplied with 25,000 men, that, advancing along the table land by San Luis de Potosi, and overcoming all the obstacles in his way, and leaving some garrisons, he might arrive at the capital with some 10,000 men:— General Scott to be supplied with 15,000, that, landing at Vera Cruz, and leaving some battalions to invest (with the seamen) that town, he might run up the road to Mexico, arriving there

that, an elaborate argument to throw the blame of the war on Mexico. The war was assumed, and argued to have been made by her, and its existence only recognized by us after "American blood had been spilled upon American soil." History is bound to pronounce her judgment upon these assumptions, and to say that they are unfounded. In the first place, the legal state of war, the status belli, was produced by the in-session and authority over them." corporation of Texas, with which Mexico was at war. In the next place, the United States' government understood that act to be the assumption of the war in fact, as well as in law, by the immediate advance of the army to the frontier of Texas, and of the navy to the Gulf of Mexico, to take the war off the hands of the Texians. In the third place, the actual collision of arms was brought on by the further advance of the American troops to the left bank | of the Lower Rio Grande, then and always in the possession of Mexico, and erecting field works on the bank of the river, and pointing cannon at the town of Matamoras on the opposite side, the seat of a Mexican population, and the head-quarters of their army of observation. It was under these circumstances that the Mex-(after all casualties) with 10,000 men. Thus ican troops crossed the river, and commenced the attack. And this is what is called spilling American blood on American soil. The laws of nations and the law of self-defence, justify that spilling of blood; and such will be the judgment of history. The paragraph in the original message asking for a provisional territorial government to be established by Congress for the conquered provinces was superseded, and replaced by one asserting the right of the United States to govern them under the law of nations, according to the recommendation of Mr. Benton, and expressed in these words:

"By the laws of nations a conquered territory is subject to be governed by the conqueror during his military possession, and until there is either a treaty of peace, or he shall voluntarily withdraw from it. The old civil government being necessarily superseded, it is the right and duty of the conqueror to secure his conquest, and provide for the maintenance of civil order and the rights of the inhabitants. This right has been exercised and this duty performed by our military and naval commanders, by the establishment of temporary governments in some of the conquered provinces in Mexico, assimilating them as far as practicable to the free institutions of our country. In the provinces of

20,000 men were expected to arrive at the capital, but 10,000 were deemed enough to master any Mexican force which could meet it—no matter how numerous. This plan (and that without any reference to dissensions among generals) required a higher rank than that of major general. A lieutenant-general, representing the constitutional commander-in-chief, was the proper commander in the field: and as such, was a part of Colonel Benton's plan; to which negotiation was to be added, and much relied on, as it was known that the old republican partythat which had framed a constitution on the model of that of the United States, and sought its friendship-were all in favor of peace. All this plan was given to the President in writing. and having adopted all that part of it which depended on his own authority, he applied to Congress to give him authority to do what he could not without it, namely, to make the appointment of a lieutenant-general-the appointment, it be ing well known, intended for Senator Benton, who had been a colonel in the army before either of the present generals held that rank. The bill for the creation of this office readily passed the House of Representatives, but was

undermined and defeated in the Senate by three but the minister having gone, and not yet been of the President's cabinet ministers, Messrs. heard from, "he should forbear recommending Marcy, Walker, and Buchanan-done covertly, to Congress such ulterior measures of redress of course, for reasons unconnected with the pub- for the wrongs and injuries we have so long lic service. The plan went on, and was con- borne, as it would have been proper to make summated, although the office of lieutenant- had no such negotiation been instituted." This general was not created. A major-general, in was a declared postponement of war measures right of seniority, had to command other major- for a contingency which might quickly happen; generals; while every one accustomed to mili- and did. Mr. Slidell, the minister, returned tary, or naval service, knows that it is rank, without having been received, and denouncing and not seniority, which is essential to harmo-war in his retiring despatch. The contingency nious and efficient command. had therefore occurred on which the forbearance of the President was to cease, and the ulterior measures to be recommended which he had intimated. All this was independent of the spilt blood; but that event producing a state of hostilities in fact, fired the American blood, both in and out of Congress, and inflamed the country for immediate war. Without that event it would have been difficult-perhaps impossible -to have got Congress to vote it: with it, the vote was almost unanimous. Duresse was plead by many members-duresse in the necessity of aiding our own troops. In the Senate only two senators voted against the measure, Mr. Thomas Clayton of Delaware, and Mr. John Davis of Massachusetts. In the House there were 14 negative votes: Messrs. John Quincy Adams, George Ashmun, Henry Y. Cranston, Erastus D. Culver, Columbus Delano, Joshua R. Giddings, Joseph Grinnell, Charles Hudson, Daniel P. King, Joseph M. Root, Lu

CHAPTER CLXI.

WAR WITH MEXICO: THE WAR DECLARED, AND
AN INTRIGUE FOR PEACE COMMENCED THE
SAME DAY.

THE state of war had been produced between the United States and Mexico by the incorporation of Texas: hostilities between the two countries were brought on by the advance of the American troops to the left bank of the Lower Rio Grande-the Mexican troops being on the opposite side. The left bank of the river being disputed territory, and always in her possession, the Mexican government had a right to consider this advance an aggression-and the more so as field-works were thrown up, and cannon pointed at the Mexican town of Mata-ther Severance, John Strohm, Daniel R. Tilden moros on the opposite side of the river. The armies being thus in presence, with anger in their bosoms and arms in their hands, that took place which every body foresaw must take place: collisions and hostilities. They did so; and early in May the President sent in a message to the two Houses of Congress, informing them that American blood had been spilt upon American soil; and requesting Congress to recognize the existence of war, as a fact, and to provide for its prosecution. It was, however, an event determined upon before the spilling of that blood, and the advance of the troops was a way of bringing it on. The President in his message at the commencement of the session, after an enumeration of Mexican wrongs, had distinctly intimated that he should have recommended measures of redress if a minister had not been sent to effect a peaceable settlement;

and Joseph Vance. Mr. Calhoun spoke against the bill, but did not vote upon it. He was sincerely opposed to the war, although his conduct had produced it—always deluding himself, even while creating the status belli, with the belief that money, and her own weakness, would induce Mexico to submit, and yield to the incorporation of Texas without forcible resistance: which would certainly have been the case if the United States had proceeded gently by negotiation. He had despatched a messenger, to offer a douceur of ten millions of dollars at the time of signing the treaty of annexation two years before, and he expected the means, repulsed then, to be successful now when the incorporation should be effected under an act of Congress. Had he remained in the cabinet, to do which he had not concealed his wish, his labors would have been earnestly directed to that end;

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