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stration,-far from being given up was com- of these occasions. I felt it due to the people to mended for the good effects it had produced; apprise them distinctly, that, in the event of my and the determination expressed not to inter-election, I would not be able to co-operate in

fere with its operation. In relation to that decried measure the message said:

Of my own duties under the existing laws, when the banks suspended specie payments, I could not doubt. Directions were immediately given to prevent the reception into the Treasury of any thing but gold and silver, or its equivalent; and every practicable arrangement was made to preserve the public faith, by similar or equivalent payments to the public creditors. The revenue from lands had been for some time substantially so collected, under the order issued by the directions of my predecessor. The effects of that order had been so salutary, and its forecast in regard to the increasing insecurity of bank paper had become so apparent, that, even before the catastrophe, I had resolved not to interfere with its operation. Congress is now to decide whether the revenue shall continue to be so collected, or not."

This was explicit, and showed that all attempts to operate upon the President at that point, and to coerce the revocation of a measure which he deemed salutary, had totally failed. The next great object of the party which had contrived the suspension and organized the distress, was to extort the re-establishment of the Bank of the United States; and here again was an equal failure to operate upon the firmness of the President. He reiterated his former objections to such an institution-not merely to the particular one which had been tried-but to any one in any form, and declared his former convictions to be strengthened by recent events. Thus:

To

the re-establishment of a national bank.
these sentiments, I have now only to add the
expression of an increased conviction, that the
re-establishment of such a bank, in any form,
whilst it would not accomplish the beneficial
purpose promised by its advocates, would
impair the rightful supremacy of the popular
will; injure the character and diminish the in-
fluence of our political system; and bring once
more into existence a concentrated moneyed
power, hostile to the spirit, and threatening the
permanency, of our republican institutions."

Having noticed these two great points of pressure upon him, and thrown them off with equal strength and decorum, he went forward to a new point-the connection of the federal government with any bank of issue in any form, either as a depository of its moneys, or in the use of its notes; and recommended a total and perpetual dissolution of the connection. This was a new point of policy, long meditated by some, but now first brought forward for legislative action, and cogently recommended to Congress for its adoption. The message, referring to the recent failure of the banks, took advantage of it to say:

"Unforeseen in the organization of the government, and forced on the Treasury by early necessities, the practice of employing banks, was, in truth, from the beginning, more a measure of emergency than of sound policy. When we started into existence as a nation, in addition to all the large, but honorable load, of debt which the burdens of the new government, we assumed was the price of our liberty; but we hesitated to weigh down the infant industry of the country by resorting to adequate taxation for the "We have seen for nearly half a century, that necessary revenue. The facilities of banks, in those who advocate a national bank, by what- return for the privileges they acquired, were ever motive they may be influenced, constitute promptly offered, and perhaps too readily rea portion of our community too numerous to ceived, by an embarrassed treasury. During allow us to hope for an early abandonment of the long continuance of a national debt, and the their favorite plan. On the other hand, they intervening difficulties of a foreign war, the conmust indeed form an erroneous estimate of the nection was continued from motives of conveniintelligence and temper of the American people, ence; but these causes have long since passed who suppose that they have continued, on slight away. We have no emergencies that make banks or insufficient grounds, their persevering opposi- necessary to aid the wants of the Treasury; we tion to such an institution; or that they can be have no load of national debt to provide for, and induced by pecuniary pressure, or by any other we have on actual deposit a large surplus. No combination of circumstances, to surrender prin- public interest, therefore, now requires the ciples they have so long and so inflexibly maintain-renewal of a connection that circumstances have ed. My own views of the subjeet are unchanged. They have been repeatedly and unreservedly announced to my fellow-citizens, who, with full knowledge of them, conferred upon me the two highest offices of the government. On the last

dissolved. The complete organization of our government, the abundance of our resources, the general harmony which prevails between the different States, and with foreign powers, all enable us now to select the system most consistent

with the constitution, and most conducive to the refractory bank would choose the former, if public welfare." able to do so.

The banks of the District of Columbia, and their currency, being under the jurisdiction of Congress, admitted a direct remedy in its own legislation, both for the fact of their suspension and the evil of the small notes which they issued. The forfeiture of the charter, where the resumption did not take place in a limited time, and penalties on the issue of the small notes, were the appropriate remedies;—and, as such, were recommended to Congress.

There the President not only met and confronted the evils of the actual suspension as they stood, but went further, and provided against the recurrence of such evils thereafter, in four cardinal recommendations: 1, never to have another national bank; 2, never to receive bank notes again in payment of federal dues ;

This wise recommendation laid the foundation for the Independent Treasury-a measure opposed with unwonted violence at the time, but vindicated as well by experience as recommended by wisdom; and now universally concurred in—constituting an era in our financial history, and reflecting distinctive credit on Mr. Van Buren's administration. But he did not stop at proposing a dissolution of governmental connection with these institutions; he went further, and proposed to make them safer for the community, and more amenable to the laws of the land. These institutions exercised the privilege of stopping payment, qualified by the gentle name of suspension, when they judged a condition of the country existed making it expedient to do so. Three of these general suspensions 3, never to use the banks again for depositories had taken place in the last quarter of a century: of the public moneys; 4, to apply the process presenting an evil entirely too large for the of bankruptcy to all future defaulting banks. remedy of individual suits against the delinquent These were strong recommendations, all founded banks; and requiring the strong arm of a gen- in a sense of justice to the public, and called for eral and authoritative proceeding. This could by the supremacy of the government, if it only be found in subjecting them to the process meant to maintain its supremacy; but recomof bankruptcy; and this the message boldly re-mendations running deep into the pride and incommended. It was the first recommendation terests of a powerful class, and well calculated of the kind, and deserves to be commemorated to inflame still higher the formidable combinafor its novelty and boldness, and its undoubted tion already arrayed against the President, and efficiency, if adopted. This is the recommenda- to extend it to all that should support him.

tion:

"In the mean time, it is our duty to provide all the remedies against a depreciated paper currency which the constitution enables us to afford. The Treasury Department, on several former occasions, has suggested the propriety and importance of a uniform law concerning bankruptcies of corporations, and other bankers. Through the instrumentality of such a law, a salutary check may doubtless be imposed on the issues of paper money, and an effectual remedy given to the citizen, in a way at once equal in all parts of the Union, and fully authorized by the constitution."

A bankrupt law for banks! That was the remedy. Besides its efficacy in preventing future suspensions, it would be a remedy for the actual one. The day fixed for the act to take effect would be the day for resuming payments, or going into liquidation. It would be the day of honesty or death to these corporations; and between these two alternatives even the most

The immediate cause for convoking the extraordinary session—the approaching deficit in the revenue-was frankly stated, and the remedy as frankly proposed. Six millions of dollars was the estimated amount; and to provide it neither loans nor taxes were proposed, but the retention of the fourth instalment of the deposit to be made with the States, and a temporary issue of treasury notes to supply the deficiency until the incoming revenue should replenish the treasury. The following was that recommenda

tion:

"It is not proposed to procure the required amount by loans or increased taxation. There are now in the treasury nine millions three hundred and sixty-seven thousand two hundred and fourteen dollars, directed by the Act of the 23d of June, 1836, to be deposited with the ited, will be subject, under the law, to be reStates in October next. This sum, if so deposcalled, if needed, to defray existing appropriations; and, as it is now evident that the whole,

or the principal part of it, will be wanted for that purpose, it appears most proper that the deposits should be withheld. Until the amount can be collected from the banks, treasury notes may be temporarily issued, to be gradually redeemed as it is received."

Six millions of treasury notes only were required, and from this small amount required, it is easy to see how readily an adequate amount could have been secured from the deposit banks, if the administration had foreseen a month or two beforehand that the suspension was to take place. An issue of treasury notes, being an imitation of the exchequer bill issues of the British government, which had been the facile and noiseless way of swamping that government in bottomless debt, was repugnant to the policy of this writer, and opposed by him: but of this hereafter. The third instalment of the deposit, as it was called, had been received by the States-received in depreciated paper,

CHAPTER IX.

ATTACKS ON THE MESSAGE: TREASURY NOTES.

UNDER the first two of our Presidents, Washington, and the first Mr. Adams, the course of the British Parliament was followed

in answering the address of the President, as the

course of the sovereign was followed in deliver-
ing it. The Sovereign delivered his address in
person to the two assembled Houses, and each
answered it: our two first Presidents did the
of the answer was always to express a concur-
same, and the Houses answered. The purport
rence, or non-concurrence with the general
policy of the government as thus authentically
exposed; and the privilege of answering the
address laid open the policy of the government
to the fullest discussion.
practice was to lay open the state of the
country, and the public policy, to the fullest dis-
cussion; and, in the character of the answer,

The effect of the

and the fourth demanded in the same. A deposit demanded! and claimed as a debt!-that is to say the word "deposit" used in the act admitted to be both by Congress and the States to decide the question of accord or disaccord— a fraud and a trick, and distribution the of support or opposition-between the reprething intended and done. Seldom has it hap-sentative and the executive branches of the pened that so gross a fraud, and one, too, intended to cheat the constitution, has been so promptly acknowledged by the high parties perpetrating it. But of this also hereafter.

The decorum and reserve of a State paper would not allow the President to expatiate upon the enormity of the suspension which had been contrived, nor to discriminate between the honest and solvent banks which had been taken by surprise and swept off in a current which they could not resist, and the insolvent or criminal class, which contrived the catastrophe and exulted in its success. He could only hint at the discrimination, and, while recommending the bankrupt process for one class, to express his belief that with all the honest and solvent institutions the suspension would be temporary, and that they would seize the earliest moment which the conduct of others would permit, to vindicate their integrity and ability by returning to specie payments.

government.

delivered in person, with its answer, to the
The change from the address
message sent by the private secretary, and no
considered a reform; but it was questioned at
answer, was introduced by Mr. Jefferson, and
the time, whether any good would come of it,
and whether that would not be done irregularly,
in the course of the debates, which otherwise
would have been done regularly in the discussion
of the address. The administration policy would
be sure to be attacked, and irregularly, in the
course of business, if the spirit of opposition
should not be allowed full indulgence in a
general and regular discussion.
The attacks
would come, and many of Mr. Jefferson's
friends thought it better they should come at
once, and Occupy the first week or two of the ses-
sion, than to be scattered through the whole ses-
sion and mixed up with all its business. But the
change was made, and has stood, and now any
bill or motion is laid hold of, to hang a speech
upon, against the measures or policy of an
administration. This was signally the case at
this extra session, in relation to Mr. Van
Buren's policy. He had staked himself too

decisively against too large a combination of interests to expect moderation or justice from his opponents; and he received none. Seldom has any President been visited with more violent and general assaults than he received, almost every opposition speaker assailing some part of the message. One of the number, Mr. Caleb Cushing, of Massachusetts, made it a business to reply to the whole document, formally and elaborately, under two and thirty distinct heads-the number of points in the mariner's compass: each head bearing a caption to indicate its point: and in that speech any one that chooses, can find in a condensed form, and convenient for reading, all the points of accusation against the democratic policy from the beginning of the government down to that day. Mr. Clay and Mr. Webster assailed it for what it contained, and for what it did not-for its specific recommendations, and for its omission to recommend measures which they deemed necessary. The specie payments-the disconnection with banks-the retention of the fourth instalment—the bankrupt act against banksthe brief issue of treasury notes; all were condemned as measures improper in themselves and inadequate to the relief of the country: while, on the other hand, a national bank appeared to them to be the proper and adequate remedy for the public evils. With them acted many able men :-in the Senate, Bayard, of Delaware, Crittenden, of Kentucky, John Davis, of Massachusetts, Preston, of South Carolina, Southard, of New Jersey, Rives, of Virginia: in the House of Representatives, Mr. John Quincy Adams, Bell, of Tennessee, Richard Biddle, of Pennsylvania, Cushing, of Massachusetts, Fillmore, of New York, Henry Johnson, of Louisiana, Hunter and Mercer, of Virginia, John Pope, of Kentucky, John Sargeant, Underwood of Kentucky, Lewis Williams, Wise. All these were speaking members, and in their diversity of talent displayed all the varieties of effective speaking-close reasoning, sharp invective, impassioned declamation, rhetoric, logic.

ford Brown, of North Carolina, William Allen, of Ohio, John P. King, of Georgia, Walker, of Mississippi :-in the House of Representatives, Cambreleng, of New York, Hamer, of Ohio, Howard and Francis Thomas, of Maryland, McKay, of North Carolina, John M. Patton, Francis Pickens.

The treasury note bill was one of the first measures on which the struggle took place. It was not a favorite with the whole body of the democracy, but the majority preferred a small issue of that paper, intended to operate, not as a currency, but as a ready means of borrowing money, and especially from small capitalists; and, therefore, preferable to a direct loan. It was opposed as a paper money bill in disguise, as germinating a new national debt, and as the easy mode of raising money, so ready to run into abuse from its very facility of use. The President had recommended the issue in general terms: the Secretary of the Treasury had descended into detail, and proposed notes as low as twenty dollars, and without interest. The Senate's committee rejected that proposition, and reported a bill only for large notesnone less than 100 dollars, and bearing interest; so as to be used for investment, not circulation. Mr. Webster assailed the Secretary's plan, saying

"He

proposes, sir, to issue treasury notes of small denominations, down even as low as twenty dollars, not bearing interest, and redeemable at no fixed period; they are to be received in debts due to government, but are not otherwise to be paid until at some indefinite time there shall be a certain surplus in the treasury beyond what the Secretary may think its wants require. Now, sir, this is plain, authentic, statutable paper money; it is exactly a new emission of old continental. If the genius of the old confederation were now to rise up in the midst of us, he could not furnish us, from the abundant stores of his recollection, with a more perfect model of paper money. It carries no interest; it has no fixed time of payment; it is to circulate as currency, and it is to circulate on the credit of government alone, with no fixed period of redemption! If this be not On the other hand was an equal array, both paper money, pray, sir, what is it? And, sir, who expected this? Who expected that in the in number and speaking talent, on the other fifth year of the experiment for reforming the side, defending and supporting the recommenda- currency, and bringing it to an absolute gold tions of the President:-in the Senate, Silas and silver circulation, the Treasury Department Wright, Grundy, John M. Niles, King, of would be found recommending to us a regular Alabama, Strange, of North Carolina, Buchan- new in the history of this government; it beemission of paper money? This, sir, is quite an, Calhoun, Linn, of Missouri, Benton, Bed-longs to that of the confederation which has VOL. II.-3

passed away. Since 1789, although we have issued treasury notes on sundry occasions, we have issued none like these; that is to say, we have issued none not bearing interest, intended for circulation, and with no fixed mode of redemption. I am glad, however, Mr. President, that the committee have not adopted the Secretary's recommendation, and that they have recommended the issue of treasury notes of a description more conformable to the practice of the government.'

fact, paper money, and possess all the qualities which forbid investment, and invite to circulation. The treasury notes of 1815 were of that character, except for the optional clause to enable the holder to fund them at the interest which commanded loans-at seven per cent.

"These are the distinctive features of the two classes of notes. Now try the committee's bill by the test of these qualities. It will be found that the notes which it authorizes belong to the first-named class; that they are to bear an interest, which may be six per cent.; that they are transferable only by indorsement; that they are not re-issuable; that they are to be

Mr. Benton, though opposed to the policy of issuing these notes, and preferring himself a direct loan in this case, yet defended the partic-paid at a day certain-to wit, within one year; ular bill which had been brought in from the character and effects ascribed to it, and said:

"He should not have risen in this debate, had it not been for the misapprehensions which seemed to pervade the minds of some senators as to the character of the bill. It is called by some a paper-money bill, and by others a bill to germinate a new national debt. These are serious imputations, and require to be answered, not by declamation and recrimination, but by facts and reasons, addressed to the candor and to the intelligence of an enlightened and patriotic community.

"I dissent from the imputations on the character of the bill. I maintain that it is neither a paper-money bill, nor a bill to lay the foundation for a new national debt; and will briefly give my reasons for believing as I do on both points.

"There are certainly two classes of treasury notes-one for investment, and one for circulation; and both classes are known to our laws, and possess distinctive features, which define their respective characters, and confine them to their respective uses.

"The notes for investment bear an interest sufficient to induce capitalists to exchange gold and silver for them, and to lay them by as a productive fund. This is their distinctive feature, but not the only one; they possess other subsidiary qualities, such as transferability only by indorsement-payable at a fixed time-not re-issuable-nor of small denomination-and to be cancelled when paid. Notes of this class are, in fact, loan notes-notes to raise loans on, by selling them for hard money-either immediately by the Secretary of the Treasury, or, secondarily, by the creditor of the government to whom they have been paid. In a word, they possess all the qualities which invite investment, and forbid and impede circulation.

"The treasury notes for currency are distinguished by features and qualities the reverse of those which have been mentioned. They bear little or no interest. They are payable to bearer -transferable by delivery-re-issuable-of low denominations and frequently reimbursable at the pleasure of the government. They are, in

tion than one hundred dollars; are to be canthat they are not to be issued of less denominacelled when taken up; and that the Secretary of the Treasury is expressly authorized to raise money upon them by loaning them.

"These are the features and qualities of the notes to be issued, and they define and fix their character as notes to raise loans, and to be laid by as investments, and not as notes for currency, to be pushed into circulation by the power of the government; and to add to the curse of the day by increasing the quantity of unconvertible paper money."

Though yielding to an issue of these notes in this particular form, limited in size of the notes to one hundred dollars, yet Mr. Benton deemed it due to himself and the subject to enter a protest against the policy of such issues, and to expose their dangerous tendency, both to slide into a paper currency, and to steal by a noiseless march into the creation of public debt, and thus expressed himself:

"I trust I have vindicated the bill from the stigma of being a paper currency bill, and from the imputation of being the first step towards the creation of a new national debt. I hope it is fully cleared from the odium of both these imputations. I will now say a few words on the policy of issuing treasury notes in time of peace, or even in time of war, until the ordinary resources of loans and taxes had been tried and exhausted. I am no friend to the issue of treasury notes of any kind. As loans, they are a disguised mode of borrowing, and easy to slide into a currency: as a currency, it is the most seductive, the most dangerous, and the most liable to abuse of all the descriptions of paper money. 'The stamping of paper (by government) is an operation so much easier than the laying of taxes, or of borrowing money, that a government in the habit of paper emissions would rarely fail, in any emergency, to indulge itself too far in the employment of that resource, to avoid as much as possible one less auspicious to present popularity.' So said General Hamilton; and Jefferson, Madison

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