blush to have communicated to the world. Let him fix in his mind this fundamental rule; never to grant a favour to perfons who employ another banker, with a view to induce them to deal with himself, which he would not have granted them, had they dealt with him already. And never let him seek for custom by encouraging or conniving at fraud; as by freely permitting perfons to keep cash with him, whom another banker has difcarded for criminal practices. Nor ever let him feek to retain custom at the expence of veracity; as by affigning fome false reason for refufing loans of that he may money, not give offence to those who wish to borrow. A banker often feels ftrongly tempted to repel fuch applications, by alleging that he cannot accede to them without present inconvenience to himself; when in reality the fole cause of his reluctance is the apprehension that the persons who make them are either not punctual, or not safe.

It was faid that, in pursuing profit, a banker ought never to make any advantage in the course of his business privately or furrepY titiously,

VOL. II.

An

titiously, which he ought to be ashamed of avowing. Let this rule be confidered by the banker who artfully endeavours to prevent a dividend from being made on the property of bankrupts lying in his hands; or who hires á fecret agent to collect the notes of a rival country bank for the purpose of creating a run upon it; or who forwards his own notes into circulation by any unfair means. other inftance to which it may be applied, though originating perhaps more frequently in culpable neglect than in deliberate bad intention, is the cafe of profit made on what are called dead accounts; that is, on fums of money remaining in a banker's hands after the death of the owner, in confequence of their being unknown to his reprefentatives. Speedy intelligence of the existence of these fums ought to be given by the banker to the perfons entitled to the difpofal of them. These remarks are also applicable to the case of sums forgotten, as may fometimes happen, by the owner. The vaft depofits lately remaining in the bank of England, under the name of unclaimed dividends, may afford fome ground for concluding, that money to a large amount

may

may chance to remain for a confiderable space of time unclaimed in the hands of a great and long-established banker; whofe duty it therefore is occafionally to examine into this matter, and perhaps at fixed periods, left it fhould escape his attention.

The banker ought with equal care to refrain from taking advantages prohibited by the laws of his country. It is fometimes a matter of difficulty to ascertain, in banking transactions, whether a particular proceeding is or is not ufurious (cc); and a banker may suspect himself in every case when he feels a defire to keep the matter fecret. The laws refpecting usury, which perhaps might have been more beneficial had they allowed somewhat more latitude in the rate of interest according to the degree of the borrower's credit, seem to require

(cc) The laws concerning ufury are now justly regarded as referring only to political expediency, and not to any thing naturally finful in the custom of taking interest. There is indeed usury in a moral sense; namely, when unwarrantable advantages are extorted from others; and it may exist when the bounds prescribed by law are not exceeded. This however is not the fubject at present under confideration.

as liberal a construction as they fairly admit; and they are generally interpreted with liberality by a jury. When it is previously settled that a banker fhall receive, merely for advancing a fum of money, a compensation, in any shape whatever, amounting to more than legal intereft, the transaction is ufurious. Thus it is ufury to give a premium to a banker to induce him to lend money at 51. per cent. But if he lends a sum of money at the highest rate of legal intereft, and with a direct view to fecure, by lending it, the advantage of the borrower's custom, which he knows he should not otherwife enjoy; the tranfaction, though reprehenfible if meant to decoy the borrower from his former banker, does not feem to be ufurious, unless it be rendered fo by fomething which amounts to a ftipulation respecting the additional profit. A country trader, for example, requests of a London banker a loan of fome thousand pounds, and offers him 51. per cent. as the annual interest. The banker, hoping that the trader may be led by a fenfe of the obligation to do business at his office, and influenced by the expectation of the additional advantages of the commiffion on the

bills which he may have to discount, and of profit from depofits which may be placed in his hands by the other, confents. Yet he is no ufurer. For these advantages, though obtained by granting the loan, are held by him merely during the pleasure of the borrower; and are no other than those which he receives from every person who draws upon him, as a fair and equitable compenfation for his trouble. And why is it not as irreproachable in a banker to recommend himself profeffionally to another man by lending him money in his diftrefs, as by fhewing him any other mark of kindness or attention? But had it been covenanted that the borrower should deal with the banker for a certain time, and never draw upon him within a certain amount of the original loan, fo that the latter might be fure of always having a fum in his hands to employ for his own emolument; this contract would have rendered the whole proceeding an act of ufury.

It has been already obferved that, as the banker trades with the money of others, prudence in lending it out is particularly his duty.