The addition of thofe of others; and to have them discounted at the bank as for himself. bank of Er gland, though frequently unapprifed of the extent to which this practice is pushed, knows that it prevails, and acquiesces in it. A banker therefore ought never to strive to conceal from the knowledge of the bank when or how far he thus avails himself of its aid; but rather should be glad fpontaneously to communicate both particulars. It has alfo been deemed by fome people unfavourable to the credit of a banker, to be concerned in loans to government; as large payments are to be made, and the tranfaction is always attended with a risk of lofs. Yet there appears nothing morally reprehenfible in such an undertaking, provided that the banker does not engage on imprudent terms; that he does not contract to furnish a fum too great in proportion for the customers to whom he is agent; and that he does not retain or become refponfible for too large a fhare of it himself. He feems to be peculiarly qualified for the undertaking, by the infight which his profeffion will have given him into the circumftances both of his own employers and of the monied world. world. It is his duty not to affign to any one, either from motives of intereft or of regard, a fhare exceeding his probable refponsibility. And it is defirable that he should avow the real holders of the fhares, as by concealing their names he referves to himself the opportunity of taking the whole, or a very large part of the loan; thus bringing himself into temptation, and tending to establish a custom of keeping the names of the real holders fecret; a cuftom which may be turned by future agents for loans greatly to the injury of the public. In the next place it is to be observed on the fubject of a banker's credit, that there are fome proceedings in themselves perfectly confiftent with integrity, from which however it may in common be right for his credit's fake, as well as on account of the ftrong temptations to improper conduct to which they may expose him, that he should abftain. Thus it is not advisable that a banker whose dealings are extensive should embark in any other business, which may eventually be injurious to his credit. Not that it is by any means univerfally wrong in a banker to engage in an additional employment. A bank in a country town, though X 2 though of effential benefit to the neighbourhood, may neither furnish fufficient occupation, nor a comfortable livelihood to its proprietor. Under thofe circumftances he may ferve not himself only, but the public, by uniting with it fome other employment confined within proper bounds, and not attended with any material risk. It feems however generally defirable, that a banker whofe depofits are large should not also be a merchant (x). The foundation of this rule may be traced in the different nature of the two profeffions. The banker is in a confiderable degree able to afcertain beforehand the fecurity on which he lends out his money, and to keep a watchful eye afterwards over the proceedings both of his debtors and of his competitors. His rifk (x) There are fome places where the practice of uniting the two profeffions is fo fully established, and the profits of each of the numerous partners in the banking-house are perhaps fo moderate, that this obfervation may not apply to them. There may also be other poffible grounds of exception. If there are many partners in the bank, and if the fuperintending partner is not in trade, nor devoted to the interefts of any trading partner; thefe circumftances may afford effectual fecurity against that diversion of the banking funds to the purposes of trade, the danger of which forms the chief objection to the union of the two profeffions. therefore, therefore, if he is prudent, is fmall; and it ought to be, for he deals with the money of others. His profits, being certain, are individually small likewife. The merchant on the contrary invests his capital in remote and comparatively hazardous concerns; he gives long credit, and on fingle fecurity; he depends fometimes on the conduct of perfons refident in diftant countries; is liable to the rife and fall of markets, which are often very great ; and is, more or less, at the mercy of seas and tempefts. On all these accounts his risks are neceffarily great: he trafficks however chiefly with his own money. His profits, being precarious, must be proportionally large. Now experience has evinced that men are usually but too prone to grafp at greater advantages though with greater risk, rather than to acquiefce in fure, but moderate gains. If a banker therefore is also a merchant, there is much danger of his making trade his principal object, and rendering his bank too far fubfervient to purposes of commerce; of his turning the great deposit in his hands into fuch a channel as to render his fortune an inadequate fecurity against the risks which he encounters; and of his placing the money vefted in his hands on banking principles fo far out of his reach, that even the fluctuations common in the trading world may bring him into diftrefs; not to mention the danger there is, left, when a great banker becomes a trader with the capital of his customers, he may prejudice the general interefts of trade by entering into monopolifing fpeculations. This obfervation, which has been meant to refer hitherto to London banks, may be applied with at leaft equal force to a country banker, who has raised a great deposit by giving intereft for money, or by a large circulation of notes. He may easily be led to push his circulation, and raife his rate of intereft, for the fake of acquiring the means of fupporting some trading scheme or maintaining some vast (y) monopoly. If his mercantile projects are unfuc (1) The great and extenfive diftrefs occafioned by the downfal of a banking house, which was ruined by an attempt of the leading partner to establish a monopoly of alum, is not yet forgotten. And we have recently witneffed the calamities which attended the failure of another bank, fet up and carried on by its proprietors merely to create a fund, by the moft difingenuous means, for the purpose of supporting their wild and unlimited fpeculations in the cotton trade. Whenever a mercantile house whofe credit 1 |