sequence of a letter addressed to Sir David Ochterlony by a Goorkha vakeel, named Burtawar Sing, stating that he was in possession of the ratification of the treaty formerly concluded, and intended to depute a person, whom he named, to convey it to the British Government. This individual accordingly repaired to the British camp, with the treaty duly ratified, and after some discussion, Sir David Ochterlony agreed to accept it, on the execution, by the vakeel, of a declaration that the Rajah of Nepaul relinquished all expectation of that relaxation of the conditions of the treaty which Colonel Bradshaw had been instructed to hold out to him. This stipulation was readily agreed to; the required declaration was given by the vakeel, and afterwards explicitly confirmed by the Rajah himself. After so prosperous a commencement of the second campaign, better terms might, perhaps, have been insisted on; but the sickly season was approaching the British commissariat was in an impaired state, and the difficulty of getting supplies would have been considerable. These considerations suggested the inexpediency of perseverance in hostilities, and if the claims of justice were satisfied by the treaty, as originally ratified by the British authorities, it would have been neither right nor reputable to have demanded It may be concluded, therefore, that Sir David Ochterlony exercised a sound discretion in determining in favour of peace upon the original basis.

more.

In looking back to the origin and operations of the war with Nepaul, it is impossible to avoid being struck by the very remarkable features which it discloses. The aggressive spirit of the Nepaulese, the jealousy entertained by the Goorkhas of British ascendancy, and their aversion to the establishment of any relations of amity with the British Government, though manifested through a long series of years, seem to have failed of exciting that vigilance which the exhibition of such feelings by a powerful neighbour ought to have called forth. It has been said, that the attention of the rulers of India was so entirely occupied by other and more pressing matters, that no portion of it could be spared to our relations with the Nepaulese. This is a very insufficient apology; if the rulers of a state have not time to secure their frontier, there must be some great defect either in the constitution or the administration of the Government. It is creditable to the Earl of Moira that he not only found time to assert the rights of the state which he represented, but that he had the spirit to maintain them in the only way likely to be effectual with such a neighbour as the Goorkha. It has been seen that the frontier was, for a long period, the theatre of a course of encroachment on the one hand, and of almost passive submission on the other. Had this been suffered to continue, it is impossible to say how large a portion of the British territory might have become absorbed in the Goorkha dominions. The war then was necessary, unless we are to abandon our Indian possessions to any encroaching neighbour who may choose to demand them; and Lord Moira consulted his country's honour and his own, in determining on an appeal to arms. Personal ambition might mix in the determination, but it has entered too largely into all the great transactions of

states and empires, to make it a reproach to Lord Moira, that he was influenced by a passion from which an active mind is rarely free. If public measures are wise and beneficial, we must not too nicely scrutinize the motives of the actors in them, or we shall be in danger of divesting even the brightest deeds of the greater part of their splendour. The conduct of Lord Moira was variously judged at the time, but it must now be apparent to every impartial mind, that a perseverance in the supine policy of his predecessors must have gradually frittered away our Indian empire until we had been reduced to the condition in which we first appeared in that country-that of humble traders, enjoying by the permission of the native princes a few obscure factories, if, indeed, we should have been so fortunate as to retain even this privilege.

In speaking of the manner in which Lord Moira conducted the war, the praise must be far more qualified than that which is awarded to his policy in commencing it. The plan of the campaign, though it might present a very imposing appearance in the office of the adjutant-general, was evidently formed in almost entire ignorance of the nature of the country and the character of the enemy. The force was, in every instance, inadequate to the duties assigned to it; and the arrangements altogether were such as might have been supposed to emanate from the rashness of impetuous youth, rather than from the well-matured experience of a veteran soldier. His lordship's sanguine temperament led him into expectations which could not be sanctioned by a cool view of the difficulties with which he had to contend; and on one occasion he hazarded an opinion, in which, perhaps, no other military man could be found to agree: he affirmed, that a mountainous country is more readily attacked than defended. If this were his serious opinion, it is impossible to acquit him of want of judgment. The reverses, however, which he experienced in the contest with the Goorkhas, must, at a very early period, have convinced him of this error, as well as of some others into which his sanguine mind had been led. The fatal mistakes which characterized the commencement of the war, and the very imperfect preparation which had been made for carrying it on successfully, were fertile in embarrassment and mortification; and it must be admitted even by his friends, that Lord Moira bore his disappointments with little either of equanimity or of dignity. The blame of failure, a large portion of which was due to his own arrangements, was cast altogether upon the officers who commanded the unfortunate divisions of the army; and the expression of his feelings was marked by much both of pettiness and ill-temper. The commanders who incurred his censure, might not always have displayed as much activity and decision as was desirable; but they were embarrassed by the vast disproportion between their means and the expectations of the GovernorGeneral, and consequently, as often occurs where men know not how to do any thing effectually, they attempted little or nothing. General Gillespie had taken a more daring course, and he perished, with no inconsiderable portion of his troops; thus furnishing a warning, rather than an example for imitation.

In Sir David Ochterlony, indeed, the Governor-General found

a man, whose profound military talents almost enabled him to effect his objects without regard to the amount of his means; but such men are, and ever must be, rare. To expect to find in any army, however large, four such men, would be absurd; yet, four such men were necessary to carry out Lord Moira's plans; and even had they been found, success could not have been calculated upon in each of the four courses of operation, since accident may defeat the best and wisest arrangements; and where the force employed is greatly inadequate to its purpose, a general and his army are more especially at the mercy of accident. The brilliant success of Sir David Ochterlony saved the credit of Lord Moira's plans, and relieved him from the censure which he would undoubtedly have incurred had the campaign ended in total failure; but that success was altogether extraordinary, and even Sir David Ochterlony himself did not venture to anticipate it.

In the conduct of the negociations, the same deficiency of sound judgment seems to have been displayed. The eager confidence in which Lord Moira commenced the war, was succeeded by a nervous anxiety for the conclusion of peace. His previous lofty bearing gave way to a demeanour scarcely consistent with the character of the representative of Great Britain; and if the Goorkha prince could have prevailed upon himself to make so precious a sacrifice as that of his duplicity to his interest, he might, to all appearance, have obtained even more favourable terms. Lord Moira was not a man to contend with difficulties; and when they arose, he neither met them firmly, nor yielded to them gracefully. The failure of some of his diplomatic agents in bringing the Goorkha negociators to terms as easily as he wished, produced explosions of irritated feeling, similar to those which had been called forth by the ill success of some of his military commanders. His numerous attempts to corrupt the servants of his opponent indicate a deficiency in his moral constitution; and another failing is too prominent to be passed over. Without wishing to deal severely with a character gifted with many estimable qualities, it cannot fail to be observed, that Lord Moira wooed reputation somewhat more fervently than was consistent with its lasting adherence to him. He was not a man who reposed in proud tranquillity upon his own consciousness of desert, and suffered fame to follow him or not, according to the pleasure of the multitude, He was anxious to leave behind him in India a high military reputation. He was as anxious to shew that, with the sterner qualities of the warrior, he united the more graceful attribute of clemency. Hence his proposal voluntarily to give up the districts which had given rise to the war, and to recover which so much expense had been incurred, and so much European and native blood poured out. Vanity, in private life, may be a comparatively harmless quality, but in a statesman, it can scarcely fail of being at once injurious to his country and discreditable to himself. It was the original source of all the errors of Lord Moira, in connection with the Nepaul war; for it caused him to rush heedlessly into it, without considering the cost; and it most characteristically re-appeared at the close of the campaign, in his notable project of giving the disputed lands back to the Nepaulese; by which, though it set

at nought all the principles of common sense, and converted the war into an idle but dismal farce, he hoped to secure the reputation of being magna

nimous and liberal.

Amiable and good-natured as Lord Moira undoubtedly was in private life, his public career was marked by much of a contrary character. His overweening confidence in his own plans, and over-sanguine anticipations of their success, led him not only to endanger the safety of that which he had at heart, but also frequently to act unjustly towards those entrusted with military and diplomatic duties. It is always painful to advert to the errors of an eminent man; but, in the present instance, it would be unfair to others to pass them over in silence.

The errors of Lord Moira must not, however, render us insensible to the propriety of the great principle of his policy with regard to Nepaul. The war was undertaken without sufficient preparation, but it was not only justifiable, but positively necessary. Its progress was clouded by reverses, but its termination did not dishonour the British name, while it conferred security on the British frontier. Nor were the effects of its satisfactory termination thus limited. We should take a very imperfect view of the subject, were we to overlook the political state of India generally at that period. The early successes of the Nepaulese aroused in various quarters the slumbering spirit of hostility to the British Government. That spirit pervaded the Mahratta states, then ostensibly our allies; and the Burmese Sovereign acquired confidence to insult us. Hence may be traced the subsequent wars with those powers, which happily terminated in establishing the complete supremacy of the British dominion in India. Much of the forbearance which was displayed by the British may probably be referred to considerations of policy, originating in the circumstances of the times.

E.

ORIENTAL ANECDOTES.

A person, who had contracted an intimacy with a miser, said to him one day: "I am about to make a journey; give me your ring; I will preserve it carefully, and when I look at it, I shall think of you." The miser replied: "If you wish to think of me, you had better look at your finger, and then you will remember having asked me for the ring, and I refused to give it you."

A person having received marks of honour from the king, one of his intimate friends, hearing of his good fortune, came to congratulate him. The other, puffed up with pride, affected not to know his visitor, and inquired who he was, and why he came there. "Then you do not recognize me?" said the man, mortified; "I am your old friend; I heard you had become blind, and I came to ascertain if it was true; I see it is so, and I am sorry for it."*

Journ. As. for March.

THE TEA OF THE SINGPHO COUNTRY.

In an account of the mountain tribes on the extreme north-east frontier of Bengal, compiled by Mr. McCosh, civil assistant-surgeon, Goálpára, from original MSS. by Capt. Jenkins, agent to the Governor-general on that frontier, are the following particulars respecting the tea-plant of the Singphos, the most numerous and formidable of those tribes. The paper was read before the Asiatic Society of Bengal, and is printed in their Journal for April :

"The tea-tree grows wild all over the Singpho country, as also upon all the hills in that part of the country, and is in general use by the natives as a wholesome beverage. The tea-tree, according to Mr. Bruce, was known to be indigenous to these climates about ten years ago; and during the Burmese war, large quantities of it were sent into Saddia by the Busa Gaum. How long the subject might have lain dormant is doubtful, had not the affair been again brought to the serious notice of Government, at a time the most favourable for doing so, by the scientific investigations of Capt. Jenkins and Lieut. Churlton, of the Assaminfantry, to whom we must acknowledge ourselves indebted for a revival of its existence, and for the boon it must necessarily confer upon our country.*

"Mr. Bruce has lately been on a tour to the Singphos, and mixed in social intercourse with them. He saw many thousands of the trees growing in their native soils, and brought away some plants and specimens of the leaves and seeds. The trees were of a very considerable size, so as to merit a higher rate of classification than a plant or a shrub: he measured one of the largest, and found it twenty-nine cubits long, and about four spans in circumference at the base. Mr. Bruce mentions the following as the native process of making tea, though he does not seem to have witnessed it. First, the leaves are collected from the tree, and put into large boilers containing water. As soon as the water boils, the decoction is drawn off, and thrown away, and the leaves, being taken out of the boiler, are put into a pit dug into the ground, and lined with some sort of leaves, to prevent the tea coming in contact with the earth. When the pit is filled with tea-leaves, it is then spread well over with a thick layer of the other leaves, and, after all, covered over with earth, so as to exclude all air. In this state it is allowed to remain for two or three months, when the pit is opened, and the tea sold on the spot to traders, who pack it closely up in the joints of bambus, earthen pots, &c., and transport it to other parts of the country, on mules, for sale. He also mentions, that many thousand maunds of tea are manufactured at a place called Polong, and exported to China. Where Polong is situated, I have not been able to determine.

"In addition to the tea-tree, the Singpho country has lately been discovered to abound in many valuable gums well adapted for varnishes."

* This paper was written before the appointment of the scientific deputation to the tea districts, whose report may be now shortly expected.-Ed.