up the Rhine by Coblentz and Cassel, opposite Mayence, he crossed the Necker near Ladenbourg on the 3d of June. From thence he pursued his march without intermission by Mundelshene, where he had, on the 10th of June, his first interview with Prince Eugene, who had been called from Italy to command the Imperial forces, in the hope he might succeed in stemming the torrent of disaster in Germany. From thence he advanced by Great Heppach to Langenau, and first came in contact with the enemy on the 2d of July, on the Schullenberg, near Donawert. Marlborough, at the head of the advanced guard of nine thousand men, there attacked the French and Bavarians, twelve thousand strong, in their intrenched camp, which was extremely strong, and, after a desperate resistance, aided by an opportune attack by the Prince of Baden, who commanded the emperor's forces, carried the intrenchments, with the whole artillery which they mounted, and the loss of seven thousand men and thirteen standards to the vanquished. He was inclined to venture upon this hazardous attempt by having received intelligence on the same day from Prince Eugene, that Marshal Tallard, at the head of fifty battalions and sixty squadrons of the best French troops, had arrived at Strasburg, and was using the utmost diligence to reach the Bavarian forces through the defiles of the Black Forest. But this advantage was not purchased without a severe loss; the allies lost one thousand five hundred killed and four thousand wounded; and Marlborough himself, who headed the decisive attack, and was among the first to enter the trenches, was in the greatest danger. successes This brilliant opening of the German campaign was soon 35. followed by substantial results. A few days after Subsequent Rain surrendered; Aicha was carried by assault; in Bavaria. and, following up his career of success, Marlborough advanced to within a league of Augsburg, under the cannon of which the Elector of Bavaria was placed with the remnant of his forces, in a situation too strong to admit of its being forced. He here made several attempts to detach the elector, who was now reduced to the greatest straits, from the French alliance; but that prince, relying on the great army, forty-five thousand strong, which Marshal Tallard was bringing up to his support from the Rhine, adhered with honorable fidelity to his engagements. Upon this Marlborough took post near Friburg, in such a situation as to cut him off from all communication with his dominions, and ravaged the country with his light troops, levying contributions wherever they went, and burning the villages with savage ferocity as far as the gates of Munich. Thus was avenged the barbarous desolation of the Palatinate, thirty years before, by the French army under the orders of Marshal Turenne. Overcome by the cries of his suffering subjects, the elector at length consented to enter into a negotiation, which made some progress; but the rapid approach of Marshal Tallard with the French army through the Black Forest caused him to break it off, and hazard all on the fortune of war. 36. Marshal Tal lard joins the Elector of Ba termines to Unable to induce the elector, by the barbarities unhappily, at that time, too frequent on all sides in war, either to quit his intrenched camp under the cannon of Augsburg, or abandon the French alliance, the varia, who deEnglish general undertook the siege of Ingolstadt; fight. he himself, with the main body of the army, covering the siege, and Prince Louis of Baden conducting the operations in the trenches. Upon this, the Elector of Bavaria broke up from his strong position, and abandoning, with heroic resolution, his own country, marched to Biberach, where he effected his junction with Marshal Tallard, who now threatened Prince Eugene with an immediate attack. No sooner had he received intelligence of this, than Marlborough, on the 10th of August, sent the Duke of Wirtemburg, with twenty-seven squadrons of horse, to re-enforce the prince; and early next morning detached General Churchill, with twenty battalions, across the Danube, to be in a situation to support him in case of need. He himself immediately after followed, and joined the prince with his whole army on the 11th. Every thing now presaged decisive events. The elector had boldly quitted Bavaria, leaving his whole dominions at the mercy of the enemy, except the fortified cities of Munich and Augsburg, and periled his crown upon the issue of war at the French head-quarters ; while Marlborough and Eugene had united their forces, with a determination to give battle in the heart of Germany, in the enemy's territory, with their communications exposed to the utmost hazard, under circumstances where defeat could be attended with nothing short of total ruin. Vendôme is his attempt By the rapidity of his march, which had altogether out37. stripped the slower movements of Marshal Villeroy, defeated in who was still in the neighborhood of the Moselle, to penetrate Marlborough had defeated one important part of the through the Tyrol. combinations of the French king. But if Vendôme had succeeded in penetrating through the Tyrol, and joining the French and Bavarian armies to the north of the Alps, their united forces would have greatly preponderated over those of Marlborough and Eugene, and given them a decisive superiority for the whole remainder of the campaign. On this occasion, however, as subsequently in the wars of 1805 and 1809, the courage and loyalty of the Tyrolese proved the salvation of the Austrian monarchy. These sturdy mountaineers flew to arms; every defile was disputed; every castle required a separate siege. Accustomed to the use of arms from their earliest years, admirable marksmen, indefatigable in bearing fatigue, perfectly acquainted with the intricacies of their rugged country, they opposed so formidable a resistance to the advance of the French troops, that all the skill and perseverance of Vendôme were unable to overcome them. He got as far as Brixen, but could not succeed in forcing the passage above that town, or surmounting the crest of the Brenner. Thus Marshal Tallard and the Elector of Bavaria were left alone to make head against Prince Eugene and the Duke of Marlborough.* In numerical amount, however, they were decidedly supe *CAPEFIGUE, Louis XIV., v., 211, 212. Forces on compara rior to the allies. The French and Bavarian army 38. consisted of sixty thousand men, of whom nearly both sides, forty-five thousand were French troops, the very best and their which the monarchy could produce, and they had tive merits. sixty-one guns. Marlborough and Eugene had sixty-six battalions and one hundred and sixty squadrons, which, with the artillery, might be about fifty-six thousand combatants, with fifty-one guns. The forces on the opposite sides were thus nearly equal in point of numerical amount, but there was a wide difference in their composition. Four fifths of the French army were national troops, speaking the same language, animated by the same feelings, accustomed to the same discipline, and the most of whom had been accustomed to act together. The allies, on the other hand, were a motley assemblage, like Hannibal's at Cannæ, or Wellington's at Waterloo, composed of the troops of many different nations, speaking different languages, trained to different discipline, but recently assembled together, and under the orders of a stranger general, one of those haughty islanders, little in general inured to war, but whose cold or supercilious manners had so often caused jealousies to arise in the best-cemented confederacies. English, Prussians, Danes, Wirtemburgers, Dutch, Hanoverians, and Hessians were blended in such nearly equal proportions, that the arms of no one state could be said by its numerical preponderance to be entitled to the precedence. But the consummate address, splendid talents, and conciliatory manners of Marlborough, as well as the brilliant valor which the English auxiliary force had displayed on many occasions, had won for them the lead, as they had formerly done when in no greater force among the confederates of Richard Cœur de Lion in the Holy War. It was universally felt that upon them, as on the Tenth Legion of Cæsar, or the Old Guard of Napoleon, the. weight of the contest at the decisive moment would fall. The army was divided into two corps d'armée; the first commanded by the duke in person, being by far the strongest, destined to bear the weight of the contest, and carry in front 39. Division of between Marlborough the enemy's position. These two corps, though the command co-operating, were at such a distance from each other, that they were much in the situation of the and Eugene. English and Prussians at Waterloo, or Napoleon and Ney's corps at Bautzen. The second, under Prince Eugene, which consisted chiefly of cavalry, was much weaker in point of numerical amount, and was intended for a subordinate attack, to distract the enemy's attention from the principal onset in front under Marlborough. With ordinary officers, or even eminent generals of a second order, a dangerous rivalry for the supreme command would unquestionably have arisen, and added to the many seeds of division and causes of weakness which already existed in so multifarious an array. But these great men were superior to all such petty jealousies. Each, conscious of powers to do great things, and proud of fame already acquired, was willing to yield what was necessary for the common good to the other. They had no rivalry, save a noble emulation who should do most for the common cause in which they were jointly engaged. From the moment of their junction it was agreed that they should take the command of the whole army day about; and so perfectly did their views on all points coincide, and so entirely did their noble hearts beat in unison, that during eight subsequent campaigns *The allied and French armies stood thus: |