that of the other is the hamlet of Rhetelhouk, imbosomed in a wooded nook. These streams unite at the hamlet of Schaerken, and their united current flows in a marshy bed to the Scheldt, which it reaches near Eynes. The Norken, another river traversing the field, runs for a considerable distance parallel to the Scheldt, until, passing by Asper, it terminates in a stagnant canal, which joins the Scheldt below Gavre. Its borders, like those of the other streams, are skirted with coppicewood thickets; behind are the inclosures surrounding the little plain. Generally speaking, this part of Flanders is even not merely of picturesque beauty and high cultivation, but great military strength; and it is hard to say whether its numerous streams, hanging banks, and umbrageous woods, add most to its interest in the eye of a painter, or to its intricacy and defensive character in warlike operations."*

39.

movements

and capture

advanced

guard.

As fast as the allies got across the Scheldt, Marlborough formed them along the high grounds stretching Preliminary from Bevere to Mooreghem Mill, with their right on both sides, resting on the Scheldt. Vendôme's men extendof the French ed across the plain, from the hill of Asper on the left, to Warreghem on the right. A considerable body of cavalry and infantry lay in front of their position in Eynes, of which they had retained possession after repulsing Cadogan's horse. No sooner had the English general got a sufficient number of troops up, than he ordered that gallant officer to advance and retake the village. The infantry attacked in front, crossing the rivulet near Eynes; while the horse, making a circuit higher up, descended on the enemy's rear, while the conflict was warmly going on in front. consequence was, that the village was carried with great loss to the enemy; three entire battalions were surrounded and made prisoners, and eight squadrons were cut to pieces in. striving to make their way across the steep and tangled banks

The

*The above description of the field of Oudenarde is mainly taken from COXE, iv., 134, 135; but the author, from personal inspection of the field, can attest its accuracy.

of the Norken.

This sharp blow convinced the French leaders that a general action was unavoidable; and though, from the vigor with which it had been struck, there remained but little hope of overpowering the allied advanced guard before the main body came up, yet they resolved, contrary to the opinion of Vendôme, who had become seriously alarmed, to persist in the attack, and risk all on the issue of a general engagement.*

40. Forces on both

mencement of

It was four in the afternoon when the French commenced the action in good earnest. The forces of the contending parties were nearly equal, with a slight sides, and comsuperiority on the part of the French; they had the battle. eighty-five thousand, Marlborough eighty thousand men.† The Duke of Burgundy, who had a joint command with Vendôme, ordered General Grimaldi to lead Sistern's squadron across the Norken, apparently with the view of feeling his way preparatory to a general attack. That general set out to do so; but when, after passing the Norken, and arriving on the margin of the rivulet of Diepenbeck, he saw the Prussian cavalry already formed on the other side, he fell back to the small plain near the mill of Royeghem. Vendôme, meanwhile, directed his left to advance, deeming that the most favorable side for an attack; but the Duke of Burgundy, who nominally had the supreme command, and who was jealous of Vendôme's reputation, countermanded this order, alleging that an impassable morass separated the two armies in that quarter. These contradictory orders produced indecision in the French lines; and Marlborough, divining its cause, instantly took advantage of it. Judging with reason that the real attack of the enemy would be made on his left by their right, on his own left wing, in front of the castle of Bevere, he

ordered up the twelve battalions of foot under Cadogan from Heurne and Eynes, which they occupied, to re-enforce the left. In the mean time, he placed a strong guard on the bridges of the Norken, and disposed musketeers in the woods on its sides. Marlborough himself, at the head of the Prussian horse, advanced by Heurne, and took post on the right flank of the little plain of Diepenbeck, where it was evident that the heat of the action would ensue. A reserve of twenty British battalions, with a few guns, was stationed under Argyle, near Schaerken, which proved of the most essential service in the ensuing struggle. Few pieces of artillery were brought up on either side, the rapidity of the movements of both having outstripped the slow pace at which those ponderous implements of destruction were then conveyed.*

cess of the

Hardly were these defensive arrangements completed when 41. the tempest was upon them. The whole French Brilliant suc- right wing, consisting of thirty battalions, embracFrench right. ing the French and Swiss guards, and the flower of their army, debouched from the woods and hedges near Groenvelde, and attacking four battalions stationed there, quickly compelled them to retreat. Advancing then in the open plain by echelon, the right in front, along the downward bed of the Norken, they followed up their advantage with the utmost vigor. The action ran like a running fire along the course of this stream; the French constantly pressing on and outflanking the allies, till they completely turned their left, and made themselves masters of the hamlets of Barwaen and Barlancy. Their advance entirely uncovered the allied left. Already the cries of victory were heard in the French right, which advanced in good order through the tangled and broken ground around those villages, with a rapid and well-sustained fire issuing from its ranks. This success exposed the allies to imminent danger; for in their rear was the Scheldt, flowing lazily in a deep and impassable current, through

* Marlborough to Count Piper, 15th of July, 1708. Disp., iv., 115. COXE, iv., 144, 145. KAUSLER, 713.

marshy meadows, crossed only by a few bridges, over which retreat would be impossible in presence of a victorious enemy; and the defeat already sustained by the left exposed them to the danger of being cut off from the friendly ramparts of Oudenarde, their only resource in that direction.*

42.

Operations

on the right.

This alarming success of the French attracted the immediate attention of the vigilant English general. He instantly hastened in person to the scene of danger of Eugene on the left, where the Dutch and Hanoverians were, dispatching Eugene to take the command on the right, where the British troops, whose valor the prince had often observed and praised, were posted. Marlborough then directed Count Lottnow, with his twenty battalions, to extend his right to support Eugene; so that the Imperial general had now sixty battalions under his orders, while Marlborough had only twenty left. This re-enforcement came up just in time; for the prince was at first assailed by such superior numbers that he was wellnigh overwhelmed. Cadogan's men, under his orders, had been driven, after a stout resistance, out of the wooded coverts which they occupied near Herlelem, and were retiring somewhat in disorder over the plain in its front. Re-enforced, however, by the twenty battalions under Lottnow, Eugene again advanced in good order, and broke the first line of the enemy. General Natzmer, at the head of the Prussian cuirassiers, took advantage of their disorder, and charged headlong through the second line of the enemy's left, so as to reach the little plain near the chapel of Royeghem. But here their career was stopped by a line of the French Horse-guards in reserve, while a dreadful fire of musketry streamed out of every hedgerow and copse with which the plain was environed. Half his men were speedily stretched on the plain; the remainder recoiled in disorder, and Natzmer himself with difficulty escaped by leaping over a broad ditch, while the French household troops were thundering in pursuit.†

* KAUSLER, 714. CoxE, iv., 140-145.

t CoXE, iv., 146, 147. KAUSLER, 717, 718.

43.

borough on

the left.

While Eugene was thus combating with various success on the right, Marlborough had a more arduous conAnd of Marl flict to maintain on the left. Placing himself at the head of the Dutch and Hanoverian battalions, which were with difficulty maintaining their ground against the advancing line and increasing vehemence of the enemy, the English general led them again to the attack. But it is no easy matter to make the French recede from the enthusiasm of victory to the hesitation which precedes defeat. They opposed a most desperate resistance to this onset. The ground on which the hostile lines met was so broken, that the battle in that quarter turned almost into a series of partial conflicts, and even personal encounters. Every bridge, every ditch, every wood, every hamlet, every inclosure, was obstinately contested; and so incessant was the roll of musketry, and so intermingled did the hostile lines become, that the field, seen from a distance, appeared an unbroken line of fire. If the resistance, however, was obstinate, the attack was no less vigorous; and at length the enthusiastic ardor of the French yielded to the steady valor of the Germans. Gradually they were driven back, literally at the bayonet's point; and at length, recoiling at every point, they yielded all the ground they had won at the commencement of the action.*

Barlancy and Barwaen were soon regained, but not with44. out the most desperate resistance; for not only did Decisive the movement by enemy obstinately contest every field and inMarlborough against the closure, but, in their fury, they set fire to such of French left. the houses as could no longer be maintained. Despite all these obstacles, however, the English fairly drove them back, at the musket's point, from one inclosure to another, till they reached the hamlet of Diepenbeck, where the resistance proved so violent that he was compelled to pause. His vigilant eye, however, ere long observed that the hill of Oycke, which flanked the enemy's extreme right, was unoccupied. Conceiving that their right might be turned by this

.* CoXE, iv., 146, 147. KAUSLER, 718.