entirely allaying the storm that had threatened his rear. He accordingly left the Saxon capital, after a residence of ten days, perfectly confident in the pacific intentions of the Swedish monarch, and having fully divined the intended direction of his forces toward Moscow.*

The brilliant success with which this delicate tant negotiation had been concluded, naturally induced a hope that vigorous operations would be undertaken by the allied powers, and that the

and impor

12.

Renewed jealcrastinations

ousies and pro

of the allied

great successes of the preceding campaign would powers. be so far improved as to compel the court of France to submit to such terms as the peace of Europe, and the independence of the adjoining states, required. The result, however, was quite the reverse, and Marlborough had again the indescribable mortification of seeing month after month of the summer of 1707 glide away, without a single measure conducive to the success of the common cause, or worthy of the real strength of the allied powers, having been attempted. They had all relapsed into their former and fatal jealousies and procrastination. The Dutch, notwithstanding the inestimable services which Marlborough had rendered to their republic, had again become distrustful, and authorized their field-deputies to thwart and mar all his operations. They made no secret of their resolution, that their interests being now secured, the blood and treasure of the United Provinces should no longer be expended on enterprises in which the emperor or Queen of England was alone concerned.

They never failed, accordingly, to interfere when any aggressive movement was in contemplation. Even when the duke, in the course of his skillful march

13.

The Dutch deputies thwart Marlborough near Nivelles,

es and countermarches, had gained the opportunity for which he longed, of bringing the enemy to 27th May. an engagement on terms approaching to an equality, they never failed to interpose with their fatal negative, and prevent any thing being attempted. They did this, in particu

* CoXE, iii., 174–182.

lar, under the most vexatious circumstances, on the 27th of May, near Nivelles, where Marlborough had brought his troops into the presence of the enemy with every prospect of signalizing the place by a glorious victory. A council of war was held, which forbade the engagement in spite of Marlborough's most earnest entreaties, and compelled him, in consequence, to fall back on Branheim, to protect Louvain and Brussels. The indignation of the English general at this unworthy treatment, and at the universal selfishness of the allied powers, exhaled in bitter terms in his private correspondence. *

Which causes

to be wasted in useless maneuvers.

The consequence of this determination on the part of the 14. Dutch field-deputies to prevent the undertaking of the campaign any serious operation was, that the whole summer passed away in a species of armed truce, or a series of maneuvers too insignificant to entitle them to the name of a campaign. Vendôme, who commanded the French, though at the head of a gallant army above eighty thousand strong, had too much respect for his formidable antagonist to hazard any offensive operations, or run the risk of a pitched battle, unless in defense of his own territory. On the other hand, Marlborough, harassed by the incessant opposition of the Dutch deputies, and yet not strong enough to undertake any operation of importance without the support of their troops, was reduced to merely nominal or defensive efforts. The secret of this ruinous system, which was, at the time, the subject of loud complaints, and appeared wholly inexplicable, is now fully revealed by the published dispatches. The Dutch were absolutely set on getting an accession of territory, and a strong line of barrier towns to be set apart for

* "I can not venture unless I am certain of success; for the inclinations in Holland are so strong for peace, that, if we had the least disadvantage, it would make them act very extravagant. I must own every country we have to do with acts, in my opinion, so contrary to the general good, that it makes me quite weary of serving. The emperor is in the wrong in almost every thing he does."-Marlborough to Godolphin, June 27, 1707. Coxe, iii., 261.

them out of the Austrian Netherlands; and as the emperor, not unnaturally, objected to being thus shorn of his territories, as the return for his efforts in favor of European independence, they resolved to thwart all the measures of the allied generals, in the hope that, in the end, they would in this manner prevail in their demands with the allied cabinets.*

15. Disasters of

the allies in Spain and on the Rhine.

It was not, however, in the Low Countries alone that the selfish views and jealousies of the allies prevented any operation of importance from being undertaken, and blasted all the fair prospects which the brilliant victories of the preceding campaign had afforded. In Spain, the allies had suffered a fearful reverse by the battle of Almanza, which in a manner ruined the Austrian prospects in the Peninsula, and rendered some operation indispensable to relieve the pressure experienced in that quarter. Peterbor ough, whose great military abilities had hitherto sustained, nearly alone, their sinking cause in Spain, had been deprived of his command in Catalonia, from that absurd jealousy of foreigners which in every age has formed so marked a feature in the Spanish character. His successor, Lord Galway, was far from possessing his military abilities; and every thing presaged that, unless a great effort was immediately made, the crown of Spain, the prize for which all contended in the war, would be lost to the allied powers. Nor was the aspect of affairs more promising on the Rhine. The Margrave of Baden had died there; and his army, before a successor could be appointed, sustained a signal defeat at Stodhoffen. This disaster having opened the gates of Germany, Marshal Villars,

* Dispatches, iii., 142-207. So much were the Dutch alienated from the common cause at this time, and set on acquisitions of their own, that they beheld with undisguised satisfaction the battle of Almanza, and the other disasters in Spain, as likely to render the emperor more tractable in considering their proceedings in Flanders. "The States," says Marlborough, "received the news of this fatal stroke with less concern than I expected. This blow has made so little impression in the great towns in this country, that the generality of the people have shown satisfaction at it rather than otherwise, which I attribute mainly to the aversion to the present government,”—Marlborough to Godolphin, May 13, 1707. COXE, iii., 204.

P

at the head of a powerful French army, burst into the Palatinate, which he ravaged with fire and sword. To complete the catalogue of disasters, the disputes between the King of Sweden and the emperor were again renewed, and conducted with such acrimony, that it required all the weight and address of Marlborough to prevent a rupture between these powers, which would have been attended with the most fatal consequences.

in conse

quence,

an invasion of the south of

France.

Surrounded by so many difficulties, Marlborough wisely 16. judged that the most pressing danger was that in Marlborough, Spain, and that the first thing to be done was to strongly urges stop the progress of the Bourbon armies in that quarter. As the forces of the Peninsula afforded no hopes of effecting that object, he conceived, with reason, that the only way to make an effectual diversion in that quarter was to take advantage of the superiority the allies had enjoyed in Piedmont, since the decisive victory of Turin in the preceding year, and to threaten Provence with a serious irruption. For this purpose, Marlborough no sooner heard of the disasters in Spain, than he urged in the strongest manner upon the allied courts to push Prince Eugene with his victorious army across the Maritime Alps, and lay siege to Toulon. Such an offensive movement, which might be powerfully aided by the English fleet in the Mediterranean, would at once remove the war from the Italian plains, fix it in the south of France, and lead to the recall of a considerable part of the French forces now employed beyond the Pyrenees.

But, though the reasons for this expedition were thus press

Selfish con

tria, which

17. ing, and Marlborough's project afforded the only duct of Aus- feasible prospect of bringing affairs round in the ruins the ex- Peninsula, yet the usual jealousies of the coalesced pedition. powers, the moment it was proposed, opposed insurmountable objections to its being carried into effect with the force adequate to insure its success. It was objected to the siege of Toulon that it was a maritime operation, of value to England alone: the emperor insisted on the allied forces being

exclusively employed in the reduction of the fortresses yet remaining in the hands of the French in the Milanese; while Victor Amadeus, duke of Savoy, between whom and the Imperialists the most violent jealousy had arisen, threatened to withdraw altogether from the alliance unless Eugene's army was directed to the protection and consolidation of his dominions. The real object of the emperor, in throwing such obstacles in the way of these operations, was, that he had ambitious designs of his own on Naples, and he had, to facilitate their accomplishment, concluded a secret convention with Louis for a sort of neutrality in Italy, which enabled that monarch to direct the forces employed, or destined to be employed there, to the Spanish peninsula. Marlborough's energetic representations, however, at length prevailed over all these difficulties; and the reduction of the Milanese having been completed, the emperor, in the end of June, consented to Prince Eugene invading Provence, at the head of thirty-five thousand men.* But twelve thousand men, which the emperor had at his disposal in Italy, were, despite the utmost remonstrances of Marlborough and Eugene, withheld from the Toulon expedition, in order to being employed in the reduction of Naples: a dispersion of forces worse than useless, since, as Bolingbroke justly observes, if Toulon fell, Naples could not have held out a month, while, by attacking both at the same time, the force directed against each was so weakened as to render success more than doubtful.†

18.

The invasion of the territory of the Grand Monarque accordingly took place, and was supported by a pow- Invasion of erful English squadron, which, as Eugene's army Provence by Eugene, 27th advanced into Provence by the Col di Tende, kept July. the seacoast in a constant state of alarm. No resistance, as Marlborough had predicted, was attempted; and the allies, almost without firing a shot, arrived at the heights of Vilate, in the neighborhood of Toulon, on the 27th of July. Had

* COXE, iii., 196–205.

† BOLINGBROKE's State of Parties. Works, iii., 42.