Suppose you could effect a resurrection-not of the saints we are in no want of them-but of what you call christianity. People would know no more of it than of the ghosts of Ossian, and every man would dispute its identity. Your "Christian Warrior" would be a most fitting organ for the new views, and plenty of battling it would have. Then would come to pass the saying of christianity, that the father will be against the son and the daughter against the mother." That is, old father theologue against his son, modern christianity, and Miss Evangelical Piety against gnomologue, her venerable

mother.

But to be more serious. To controvert the phases of your views in a manner suitable to your taste, is not within my power. I have neither your learning, your experience, nor your sagacity. Probably we might begin to dispute about Hebrew, and there I should be no equal antagonist, for I candidly confess that the character of god's chosen people, as given in his blessed book, has long relieved me from any anxiety to know much of their language.

I learn that you remark, "that nothing we say leads to any settlement of the dispute we conduct." How do you know? The dispute has been all on one side eighteen centuries. And if we are not settling christianity, we may be shaking the dry bones of reason, who, upon his resurrection, will civilly offer and help her to his grave.

The "warfare we are to indure" will be heartily welcome, since you are almost sure not to imprison us. With regard to anything else, we can console ourself as Dr. Johnson did Addison, when the doctor said, "if contrariety of opinion could poison a man, a politician would die in a day." And as Addison lived after he was opposed, so may the Oracle.

I will conclude with one more remark. If it be true, that " I do regulate my amount of wisdom by a critical contrast with other people's folly," I certainly take a most melancholy standard of excel lence. If I only advance in intelligence, as my neighbours recede in foolishness, allow me to say, that my progression will gratify my vanity less than it will mortify my love of mankind.

G. JACOB HOLYOAKE.

To the Editor of the Oracle of Reason. DEAR SIR.-I have observed in No. 39 of the Oracle, a mistake which I think it It is there stated that necessary to correct. Mr. Buchanan, in a public lecture room, contended that the being of a god was not a legitimate subject for discussion, neither the negative nor the affirmative being susceptible of proof. This is, I think, an allusion to a letter of mine addressed to Mr. Nicholls of Birmingham, and published without my previous knowledge. I stated in that letter, that on the occasion of Mr. B.'s visit to Derby, I entered into conversation with him, with the view of inducing him to say something at the close of his lectures in favour of Southwell and Holyoake, and if possible to obtain a subscription on their behalf. I stated that Mr. B. expressed himself with as much rancour and ill-feeling as could have been expected from the most bigotted christian, he asserted that the being of a god was not a legitimate subject for discussion, &c. This all passed in private, and not in a public lecture room, with only myself, Mr. B., and two others present. Finding Mr. B. no friend to blasphemers, I let the matter drop.

NOTICES.

Received, a letter signed "Thos. Instone, Long Island, New York," containing a copy of one from "Abner Kneeland," describing an instance of gross intolerance on the part of the citizens of Jowa Territory, in burning the writer in effigy on account of religious dissent. The case of Mr. Kneeland's trial at Boston, wohld be acceptable. Could Mr. Instone forward the particulars?

Publications received-Signs of the Times, part 2; The Unknoten, part 1.

W. R., Glasgow, writes that a cargo has been reported composed of "half christian missionaries," half" wooden deities." What of it ? .. Birds of a feather "we know. A ship load of blockheads were best to go out on a blockish mission. The wooden-headed gods will be about as influential as the wooden-headed missionaries, if the latter make no better progress than they have hitherto done. Besides, why should the "nation of shop keepers," deal in one sort of gods only? If Jehovah-god, and christ-god, and ghost-god, and devil-god are at a discount, then our most christian leiges must deal in Christna-god, and Vishnu-god, and Sira-god, and the rest, the transition is easy. R. W. says "they would sell the lord Jesus Christ, if they could make anything by it, and give the holy ghost into the bargain"-they must live by their trade, must

n't they?

، A Reformed Israelite " is requested to commn nicate with the editor-perhaps an interview would clear up the difficulties. He should join the theolo gical association.

dead people alive again-he, I say, who could do all or any of these strange things, would be unquestionably considered a worker of miracles. Scientific men say that it is impossible a feather should float in a vacuum, impossible a heavy substance should not sink in a lighter, and quite impossible that a human being once thoroughly dead, should by any kind of art be restored to life: by which impossibles they must be understood to mean effects very unusual, effects of which experience has furnished none beyond suspicion, so that no rational intellect will credit that any one can produce such.

state.

It will be seen, from the foregoing, that the writer does not agree exactly either with the orthodox or the heterodox, in this miraculous matter. David Hume defines a miracle, as a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent. Dr. Johnson says, a miracle is an effect above human or natural power, performed in attestation of some truth. Now both these definitions are vague, unsatisfactory, nay, absurd, at least, so to me they seem, and my reasons for so bold a rebellion against the highest literary and philosophical authority I will briefly Johnson's definition is open to the obvious objection, that what is an effect above human or natural power cannot safely be decided until we are acquainted with the whole arcana of nature. We may know the present boundaries of human power, but he must be a wise or a bold man who would pretend to say how much nature is capable of performing. That wonder is the child of ignorance, has passed into a proverb, for ignorance, knowing not causes, takes refuge in the marvellous, and calls all effects miraculous the causes of which are a secret. This arises in great part from the slothful and fearful character of uncivilised human intellect. Those called savage, and those, by themselves, styled civilised, display no essential difference in this respect. From pole to pole the great outlines of human character are the same, the moral as the physical differences being by no means radical. We find everywhere, to give an example in point, the same fatal mistake of explaining ignorance by the gratuitous hypothesis of supernatural powers. This very Dr. Johnson, the leviathan of literature, renowned for his learning and talents, always reasoned with regard to effects the causes of which he could not dive into, upon precisely the same principle as a New Zealand savage, or moon-worshipping Hottentot. Not being able to determine why plants grew, men were born and died, our earth and other planets moved with regularity in their several orbits, why, in short, anything that is, is as it is, he cried, "Oh most stupendous miracle, far, far above all natural, as we know it infinitely exceeds

as

all human power!' Nay, Dr. Johnson and philosophers of his stamp, proceed a step further, and cry a miracle before they know whether that at which they marvel is really an effect or no. Thus the universe has been called a miracle, that none but an almighty hand could work, yet no sort of evidence can be adduced to prove that the universe is an effect--on the contrary, it is manifestly impossible that all could be the effect of any thing or power external to itself. Men have been searching for a cause of all things, or first cause as they call it, from time immemorial, and now, with all their science, they are as wise about that "grand secret ever they were, aye, and as ever they will be. But to return-if it were allowed that our knowledge of natural power was so complete, that we could decide what nature is, and what it is not, capable of effecting, still a supernatural agency might, for aught any one can know to the contrary, be performed in attestation of a falsehood as well as of a truth. A miracle, the doctor tells us, is an effect above human or natural power, performed in attestation of some truth, but it is difficult to understand how, if we grant the former, we can also grant the latter part of his definition. If it be admitted that miracles are performed, I do not see why it should follow, that they are performed only in attestation of some truth.

Mr. R. Dale Owen remarked in his discussion with Mr. O. Bacheler, on the authenticity of the bible, that "If we imagine an occurrence clearly and distinctly out of nature, and above human agency, we may suppose it to attest to us supernatural agency--but how are we to decide whether that agency be divine or satanic ?" This is undoubtedly a difficulty for miracle defenders to grapple with. I am at a loss to understand, how an effect above human or natural power, supposing such an effect to be produced, can be known to us as divine or satanic, performed for a good or for a bad purpose. Mr. R. D. Owen denies that a miracle can prove to man the divine origin of any precept, or the truth of any assertion, and so do I. Waiving, at present, the question, how are we to decide what is miraculous? I deny, that if a miracle were actually worked, the truth or falsehood of any assertion would be proved thereby-therefore Dr. Johnson's definition of a miracle is quite unsatisfactory. David Hume's is no less so. In truth, to talk about the transgression of a law of nature is downright nonsense. It may be very consistent in those who have settled to their own satisfaction, that there is a god who governs the universe as a king governs his kingdom, and prescribes laws for each atom as an eastern despot does for his slaves-it may be very consistent, I say, for people who thus think, to tell us with

great complacency about the laws of nature, but there ought to be a wide difference between the language of philosophers and the language of fanatics. I contend that we know nothing whatever about laws of nature, but we do know a little about its phenomena and general mode of operation. Experience teaches that water constantly tends to find its level, that flame constantly consumes dry wood, that sparks constantly, when in contact, cause gunpowder to explode, and so with numberless other things, the conjuction of which constantly produces certain well known effects. People constantly die when their heads are off, and if people were to run or walk through our streets, as St. Dennis did (so we are told) in the good old times, why we should conclude, and rightly conclude, a miracle had been performed. A miracle is, indeed, neither more nor less than an unusual phenomenon. Any effect contrary to universal or even general experience is accounted miraculous. If the Thames, some fine morning, were to throw itself into heaps, and leave a dry path for foot passengers, from the Middlesex to the Surrey shore, the waters forming a wall on either side, as we are told the waters of the Red Sea did, for the convenience of Moses and his fugitive Israelites-if such a phenomenon were now seen, and at the same time it were clearly seen there had been no sacerdotal or political maneuvring in the matter, why all who saw would be convinced it was miraculous, that is to say, be convinced it was an effect such as they never had beheld before-but even then they could not be sure it was an effect above all natural power. That there are powers in nature none have yet had experience of, at all events, that there may be such powers, none can dispute, then what folly it is to measure nature's power by our puny and imperfect standard of experience. In justice to Hume I must observe, that when he said a miracle might be accurately defined as a transgression of a law of nature, by a particular volition of the deity, or by the interposition of invisible agents, he did not intend to convey the idea that miracles are worthy of credit, or that any evidence hitherto adduced in their support should shake our faith in the regularity and uniformity of nature's operations. I quarrel with the definition, because I flatter myself that I can furnish, or, rather, have furnished, a far better one. It is certain, that by experience we become acquainted with what we call the laws of nature. By experience we learn that a certain degree of coldness converts water into ice, which by a known quantity of heat may be reconverted into water, and subsequently into steam. By experience we learn that a stone thrown into the air will return to the ground. By experience, in short, we learn all that can

be learned, and miracles, as already explained, are those effects produced, or.said to have been produced, by supernatural agency, which is quite unusual, and therefore cautiously believed in by wise men, because, though not impossible, yet quite out of all harmony with the general operations of nature.

IS THERE A GOD?

XXV.

BENEDICT SPINOZA was au acute thinker, Perand in all respects a remarkable man. haps no other philosopher, ancient or modern, could be named, whose opinions have been so thoroughly and grossly abused, without being at all understood. The christian clergy are everywhere a privileged class, and of course cannot be expected to understand any opinions hostile to their peculiar craft; or if they do understand, it is not their interest or business to give any countenance to them. If philosophers themselves, it is no part of their duty to make others so. It is not wonderful, therefore, that they should either from ignorance or cunning have systematically misrepresented the opinions of Spinoza. That philosophers, so called, such as Voltaire, Dugald Stewart, Sir James Mackintosh, and others of the

But

deistical school, condescended to join the common cry of clerical curs, is more surprising and less pardonable. Even the clever sceptic Bayle, describes the scheme of Spinoza as "the most monstrous imaginable, and the most diametrically opposite to the clearest notions of the mind." He also affirmed that" it has been fully overthrown by the weakest of its adversaries. Bayle was more showy than solid, and far from an infallible critic. Whether the most monstrous imaginable" scheme of Spinoza has "been fully overthrown" by any of its adversaries, the reader will presently have an opportunity of fairly judging. All constant readers of the Oracle will need only to be told that the philosophy of Spinoza, and the philosophy of atheism, are one and the same thing. "In no part of his work (says Dugald Stewart) has he (Spinoza) arowed himself an Atheist; but it will not be disputed, by those who comprehend the drift of his reasonings, that in point of practical tendency, atheism and Spinozism are one and the same." I entirely agree with Mr. Stewart, nay, I go farther, and say that, without any regard whatever to practical tendency," atheism and Spinozism are en tirely the same. Shallow-pated squabblers about words and phrases, may like better the Spionzism than atheism, or find it more convenient to call themselves Spionzists than

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