up, said that it appeared to be admitted that the unfortunate deceased had met her death at the hands of the unhappy man at the bar, and the learned counsel who appeared for the prisoner appeared to have directed his efforts in his behalf solely to endeavour to induce them to acquit him of the crime of wilful and deliberate murder, and find him guilty of the crime of manslaughter. He also appealed to their mercy; but it was his duty to tell them that they had no right to give effect to any such considerations, and that the oath they had taken as jurors bound them to return a verdict according to the evidence, irrespective of any consequences that might ensue. If the jury could see any circumstances in the case which they considered justified them in coming to the conclusion that the act of the prisoner did not amount to the crime of wilful murder, they would acquit him of that crime and find him guilty only of the minor offence;

but if, on the other hand, they should feel that the evidence left no reasonable doubt that the prisoner had wilfully destroyed the life of his wife, in that case their duty to the country and the sanctity of their oaths demanded that they should say so by their verdict.

The jury, after some consideration, returned a verdict finding the prisoner "Guilty of manslaughter;" and the learned Judge sentenced him to be transported for life.

From the circumstance that cases of wife-murder had lately become shockingly numerous; that in some cases of brutal assaults the Judges had passed sentences apparently inadequate to the offence; and that there had been some remarkable inequalities in the severity of the punishments awarded to different classes of crime, this case excited much comment. It was a general opinion that crimes of a homicidal nature were not at this time sufficiently dealt with.