poleon never looked so nobly as when first an army wor thy of his powers waited his commands, the calm assurance of absolute self-reliance giving a statue-like stillness to his brows and temples, on which still shone the brightness of youth, the light of a fame now to be all his own kindling that intense and steadfast eye, and his gaze turned toward the fields of Italy. Can not one fancy his glance going 3 along the ranks, lighting a gleam in every eye, as he presented himself to his troops? "Soldiers "-thus ran his proclamation-"you are almost naked, half starved. The Government owes you much and can give you nothing. Your patience, your courage, in the midst of these rocks, have been admirable, but they reflect no splendor on your arms. I am about to conduct you into the most fertile plains of the earth. Rich provinces, opulent cities, will soon be in your power; there you will find abundant harvests, honor, and glory. Soldiers of Italy, will you fail in courage?" In a moment he had established between himself and his soldiers that understanding by which, more than by cannon or bayonet, victories are won. vates and commanders at once felt that this was the man to follow.

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Then commenced that marvelous series of campaigns 4 which makes the year 1796 an era in the history of warfare, in the development of civilization; in which the fiery energies, unchained by the French Revolution, were first directed by supreme military genius against the standing institutions of Europe to their overthrow and subversion; in which the eye of the world was first fixed in wondering gaze on the fully unveiled face of Napoleon. Not merely to the soldier are these campaigns interesting 5 and profitable. It is for all men instructive to mark the achievements of pure capacity, to watch the wondrous spirit-element controlling and effecting, dazzling difficulty

from its steady march, causing lions to cower aside in its sovereign presence. We are so constituted, besides, that we can not behold energy, perseverance, courage, resolution, 6 without a thrill of emulous sympathy. As we note the progress of that intrepid, indomitable Corsican, from victory to victory, we kindle with those emotions which animated the troops of Napoleon; which sent the grenadiers through the grapeshot sweeping like snow-drift along the bridge of Lodi; which renewed and renewed the bloody struggle on the dykes of Arcola; which made the French columns scorn rest and delay, forget the limit placed to human endurance, rise over the faintness of fatigue and crush down the gnawing of hunger, march through mountain paths all night and spring exultant on the foe at break of dawn, if only the way was led by him.

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A review of these campaigns, even of the most cursory description, is here impossible, and would be superfluous. All men may be supposed to have a somewhat familiar acquaintance with one of the most brilliant passages of modern history, and to be capable of taking the same point of view which must be occupied in order to cast the eye along their course, as illustrating the character of Napoleon.

The Italian campaigns seem specially adapted to demonstrate a military capacity at once indubitable, manysided, and supreme. They exhibit not only the fiery spring that has so often caught the smile of fortune, but the cool calculation and patient resolution which seem to compel it. They show the victor crowned, not once, or twice, or thrice, not under this favorable circumstance of to-day or through that happy thought of to-morrow, but so often that the possibility of fortuitous success is eliminated, and under circumstances of disadvantage so manifold and so varied that even envy, unless aided by crotchet,

stupidity, or fixed idea, must own that this is, beyond all question, the inscrutable and irresistible power of mind. The first fierce onslaught by which Sardinia, bleeding and 9 prostrate, was snatched from the Austrian alliance, by which the gates of Italy were thrown open, and by which Europe was startled, as at three successive thunder-peals, by the victories of Montenotte, Millesimo, and Mondovi, all in the space of a month, might, at least possibly, have been the result of youthful daring and the valor of the Republican army. But the defeats of Colli, the Sardinian, were succeeded by those of Beaulieu, the Austrian; the defeats of Beaulieu were succeeded by the defeats in two campaigns of the well-supported and resolute Wurmser; the defeats of Wurmser were succeeded by the defeats, in two campaigns more, of Alvinzi, also furnished with overpowering numbers; and when Archduke Charles advanced to reconquer a thoroughly subjugated Lombardy, he too was met and driven back. There were six distinct campaigns; and when Napoleon, at their close, dictated, in 1797, the treaty of Campo Formio, he remained indisputably the first warrior in Europe.

A great deal has been said of the change introduced 10 by Napoleon in these campaigns into military tactics. He broke through, it is said, all the rules and etiquette of war, poured his forces always on single points, was now in his enemy's front, now in his rear, and, on the whole, introduced a new system of warfare. That he introduced a change in the mode of carrying on hostilities among the generals of Europe does not admit of doubt. The system of warfare by which Napoleon was overthrown, put in operation by men who had marched under his banner, was indeed a more rapid and fearful thing than that over which he won his first triumphs. But it seems 11 as little doubtful that the change was nothing more than

that natural one which is inevitable in any art or science where consummate genius displays itself. His generalship was essentially that of all the greatest generals. To form combinations with such invention and accuracy, and execute them with such celerity, as will bring an overpowering force to bear upon a single point, had been the objects of generals from Luxembourg to Dumouriez; and had been effected by the former against William of Orange, and by the latter against Brunswick, with a skill and celerity not unworthy of Napoleon. Wellington studied war among the Ghauts of Himalaya, yet the ablest combinations and the most impetuous attacks of the best marshals trained in the school of Bonaparte were unable 12 to baffle him. In our own time we have seen war settle back to that laggard habit into which it had fallen in the hands of the Austrians before the revolutionary campaigns. The advent of military genius of the first order might have introduced precisely such a change of tactics under the walls of Sebastopol as Napoleon introduced on the plains of Lombardy. He did not provide himself with a new horse, but he was the man to put Bucephalus to his speed.

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The quickness and clearness with which in these campaigns he apprehended the features of every position and the necessities of every situation are amazing. The reports of spies, the vague hints of rumor, became clear before him. As if by second sight, he saw in the far distance every disposition of his enemy. With the pieces before him on a chess-board, it would have required discrimination and decision to estimate or anticipate every move of his adversary, and instantly to adapt his own force to thwart it. But with armies overwhelming in number approaching over wide spaces of country, with only the reports of spies or traitors to depend upon

for intelligence, with a thousand openings for mishap in the very transmission of orders, with the certainty that a slip might be ruin, to have the whole spread out as clear as the starry spheres before his telescopic eye, and again and again, by swift perception and decision, to launch the bolt just where it was needed-this indeed demanded a master mind. And he effected these things so often and 14 so variously! First, as we said, D'Argenteau was overpowered in Piedmont, the French army concentrating itself into a wedge and breaking through the center of the allies. Then came the brilliant fighting of Lodi and the investment of Mantua. Wurmser and Quasdonowich were next to be overthrown. They were near each other at the bottom of the Lago di Garda, and, could they have united, resistance might have been vain. But swift as lightning Quasdonowich was shattered and flung back on this hand, and the whole flood, wheeling round like a heady current, turned to sweep Wurmser away on that. Wurmser, tough and valiant, retreated for a time, and then advanced again on Mantua, leaving Davidowich with a strong army to defend Trient and the passes of the Tyrol. Suddenly, while Wurmser was looking out for the French 15 along his front, he was startled by the intelligence that, far in the rear, Davidowich had been utterly routed. In a moment this spirit-like Napoleon was down, irresistible, upon himself. The eye of a civilian may not deserve much confidence; but this overthrow of Davidowich first, and advance thereupon on Wurmser with all his Austrian communications broken, and not improbably in some slight bewilderment, assuredly looks one of the finest bits of work to be met with in the annals of war. It is needless to multiply instances. Such was Napoleon's mode of carrying on hostilities.