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TREATISE

CONCERNING

Chriftian Prudence:

OR THE

PRINCIPLES

OF

Practical Wisdom,

FITTED

To the Ufe of Human Life,

AND DESIGN'D

For the Better Regulation of it.

By JOHN NORRIS, Rector of
Bemerton near Sarum.

LONDON:

ri

Printed for Samuel Manship, at the Ship against the
Royal-Exchange in Cornbil, 1710.

Norméri 12-18-46

5-7115

THE

PREFACE

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Prefume that my Reader will not think that the Subject of this Treatife (I do not say the Author) needs any Apology, being in it felf of as great Importance as any to be fure in all Chri ftian Morality, and the more neceffary to be confi der'd becaufe fo very little has been faid upon it. For indeed I cannot but reckon it among the Defiderata of the Prefs, not knowing any Profefs Difcourfe concerning it that we have extant. That which comes nearest to it is that of M. Charron, but whoever will be at the pains to read that Book, will find confidering the difference of the Subject, and the different way of handling it, that there is not much less need of fuch a Treatife as this, than there would be if the other had never been in the World.

I have fometimes thought with my self, that if the whole System of Chriftian Vertues were di ftinctly treated of, it would be a very great, useful, and noble Work. The first link of this Golden Chain I have attempted to finish in my. Treatife of Humility, and I could wish that fome other more A 3 able

able hand would go on with the reft, it being for one of my little Health, and lefs Abilities, too great an Undertaking. But however, though it be too much for me, to treat of all the Chriftian Vertues fingly, yet I have now done that which may in fome Measure answer the Defign of fuch an undertaking in the general, by treating of that Vertue which fits at the Helm, and governs all the reft, conducts the whole Movement of Life, and is as it were a kind of Univerfal Vertue. So that in treating of this, one treats of all, and gives as it were a Syftem of Chriftian Morality, which is what I design in this Work.

My Subject is of a Practical Nature, and I have endeavoured to handle it in as Practical and Useful a Manner as I could, fo as to ferve the great End of Chriftian Edification. Accordingly I have avoided Notion and Controversy as much as might well be with due Juftice to my Subject. For indeed though Subject be never fo Practical, yet if a Man will go to the bottom of it, and give a clear and thorough Account of things, he will find a neceffity of ingaging fometimes in Notional Confiderations, that be requifite to clear the Subject to the Capable, tho they do not much Inlighten or Edify the common Reader. Which is the Apology I make for Some few Paffages that will here be found of this kind, but which unless I would have treated of things with a fuperficial Smoothness rather than a rational Depth, I could not well avoid. Which I think is Reafon enough why they should not be avoided. For in short, the Belt Readers are to

may

be

be confid as well as the Moft; and if I have had regard to both, I hope neither will be much difpicas'd.

"Here I beg leave to explain my felf a little further in a word or two upon what I Say page 65. concerning Speculative and Practical Knowledge. By Speculative, meaning that which Contemplates Truth for it felf, and fo refts in the Contemplation of it without any further Reference. By Practical, that which Contemplates Truth for the fake of Action, or in order to it. Now what I have here to Remark is not concerning this Diftinction it felf, but the ground of it affigned by Baronius in the beginning of his Metaphyfics, who makes it to be the Neceflity and Contingency of things, telling us withal, that thofe Sciences which are about neceffary things have Contemplation for their laft End. For fince neceffary things do not depend upon us, and can neither be done nor alter'd by us, therefore we acquiefce in their Knowledge, without proceeding any further. But upon this my Obfervation was, that however Speculation may properly be of necessary Truth, yet that there is no neceffity that all Knowledge of neceffary Truth fhould be Speculative, or reft in the Contemplation of it as its laft End, but may have a further reference, and be in order to Practice, as is plain in Morality and Divinity, where there are many necessary Truths, which yet the Mind does not acquiefce in the Knowledge of, but which have in themselves an order to Practice, and are by us fo confider'd. But now to make this Propofition a little clearer, that we do not always acquiefce

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