Discussion of the principle laid down in that case. Bloxam v. Elsee (a), is no doubt to the contrary: but § 508. The authority of Slatterie v. Pooley has been recognized and acted on in several subsequent cases (b), but has been severely attacked in Ireland (c), and also (a) Ry. & M. 187; 1 C. & P. 558. (b) Howard v. Smith, 3 Scott, N. R. 574; Boulter v. Peplow, 9 C. B. 493; Pritchard v. Bagshawe, 11 Id. 459; Boileau v. Rutlin, 2 Exch. 665; Toll v. Lee, 4 Id. 230; Murray v. Gregory, 5 Exch. 468; R. v. The Inhabitants of Basingstoke, 14 Jur. 246 ; R. v. Welch, 2 Car. & K. 296; Ansell v. Baker, 3 Car. & K. 145. (c) Lawless v. Queale, 8 Ir. Law R. 382. in this country (d). In Lawless v. Queale (e), Lord Chief Justice Pennefather, speaking of that case, says, "The doctrine there laid down is a most dangerous proposition; by it a man might be deprived of an estate of 10,000l. per annum, derived from his ancestors by regular family deeds and conveyances, by producing a witness, or by one or two conspirators who might be got to swear they heard the defendant say he had conveyed away his interest therein by deed, or had mortgaged or otherwise incumbered it; and thus by the facility so given, the most open door would be given to fraud, and a man might be stripped of his estate through this invitation to fraud and dishonesty." Now we must protest in toto against trying the admissibility of evidence by such a test as this. The most respectable man in the community may be hanged for murder or arson on the unsupported testimony of a soi-disant accomplice, or transported for rape on the unsupported oath of an avowed prostitute; but is this a reason for altering the law with reference to the admissibility of the evidence of accomplices or prostitutes, or does any innocent man ever feel himself in danger from it? The weight of the species of proof under consideration varies ad infinitum. Look at the different forms in which it may present itself -plenary confession in judicio; non plenary confession in judicio; plenary quasi judicial confession before a justice of the peace; non plenary quasi judicial confession before a justice of the peace; plenary extra-judicial confession to several respectable witnesses; plenary extrajudicial confession to one such witness; implied confession to several respectable witnesses; implied confession to one such; supposed plenary confession to several suspected witnesses; supposed plenary confession to one (d) Tayl. Ev. § 302, et seq. (e) Lawless v. Queale, 8 Ir. Law R. 382, T. T. 1845. See the observations of Crampton, J., in that case; and also Thunder v. Warren, Id. 181. Self-disserving evidence not receivable to tion of a deed. such; implied confession to several suspected witnesses; implied confession to one such and under the terms "non plenary" and "implied" are included every possible degree of casual observation, or even sign, from which the existence of the principal fact may be collected. The shade between the probative force of any two of these degrees is so slight as to be almost imperceptible, and yet of all forms of evidence the highest is perhaps the most satisfactory, and the lowest the most dangerous. The value of self-disserving evidence, like that of every other sort of evidence, is for the jury; its admissibility is a question of law-the test of which is to see if the offered evidence is in its nature original and proximate (f), and it will scarcely be contended that self-disserving statements of all kinds do not fulfil both those conditions. It may, indeed, be objected that they usually come in a parol or verbal shape, and that parol evidence is inferior to written, but that is a maxim which has been much misunderstood (g). The contents of a document could most unquestionably be proved by a chain of circumstantial evidence composed of acts, every link in which might be established by parol or verbal testimony. § 509. But although by the existing law, a party may admit the contents of a document, he cannot (except prove the execu- when made for the purpose of a cause in court) admit the execution of a deed, so as to dispense with proof of it by the attesting witness. The rule "omnia præsumuntur ritè esse acta" is here reversed; the courts holding that, although a party admits the execution of a deed, the attesting witnesses may be acquainted with circumstances relative to its execution which are unknown to him, and which might have the effect of (f) See Part 1, ch. 1. (g) See Part 2, ch. 3, § 217. invalidating it altogether (h). The decisions establishing this dogma were previous to Slatterie v. Pooley, and seem a remnant of the old practice of trying deeds by the witnesses to them (i). And the rule is unaf fected by the alteration made in the law by 14 & 15/7/18 bict: c/25.126. Vict. c. 99, which renders the parties to a suit compe tent witnesses (k). made. § 510. So far as admissibility in evidence is con- To whom selfdisserving statecerned, it is in general immaterial to whom a self-dis- ment may be serving statement is made (1). But if coming under the head of what the law recognizes as confidential communication, it will not be received in evidence (m); neither will it if embodied in a communication expressed to be made" without prejudice," the object of such being to buy peace, and settle disputes by compromise instead of legal proceedings (n). It has indeed been held that, in order to render an account stated binding on a party, the admission of liability must be made to the opposite party or his agent (0), but this only refers to the effect of the admission, not to its admissibility. A distinction was formerly sought to be drawn, where a confession was made by a prisoner in consequence of (h) Call v. Dunning, 4 East, 53; Abbot v. Plumbe, 1 Dougl. 216; Johnson v. Mason, 1 Esp. 89; Cunliffe v. Sefton, 2 East, 183; Barnes v. Trompowsky, 7 T. R. 265. (i) Supra, chap. 2, § 460. (k) Whyman v. Guth, 17 Jur. 559. See the Second Report of the Common Law Commissioners, p. 23, who recommend an alteration of the law in this respect. (1) The old French lawyers drew some nice distinctions as to (m) See infra, chap. 8. (0) Breckon v. Smith, 1 A. & State of mind of party making self-disserving statement. an inducement to confess held out by a party who had no authority over him or the charge against him;— although such an inducement does not exclude confessions made to others (p), it was doubted whether it would not exclude any made to the person holding out the inducement: but this distinction has been overruled by the judges (q). § 511. Self-disserving statements made by a party when his mind is not in the natural state ought nevertheless, at least in general, to be received as evidence, and his state of mind taken into consideration by the Drunkenness. jury as an infirmative circumstance (r). Thus a confession made by a prisoner when drunk has been received (s); and although all contracts entered into by a party in a state of total intoxication are void, at least if the opposite party knew of the intoxication, it is otherwise where it is only partial, and insufficient to deprive of consciousness (t). So, what a person has been heard to say while talking in his sleep, seems not to be evidence against him (u); for here the suspension of the faculty of judgment may fairly be presumed complete (x). The acts of persons of unsound mind also are Talking in sleep. Persons of unsound mind. (p) R. v. Dunn, 4 C. & P. (r) "Circa ejusmodi instru- (s) R. v. Spilsbury, 7 C. & P. 187. (t) Gore v. Gibson, 13 M. & W. 623; 9 Jur. 140 and the note there. See also Mascard. de Prob. Concl. 580. (u) This point arose in the case of R. v. Elizabeth Sippets, Kent Summ. Ass. 1839, where Tindal, C. J., was inclined to think the evidence not receivable. Ex relatione. See also per Alderson, B., in Gore v. Gibson, 13 M. & W. 623; 9 Jur. 140. (r) But such a phenomenon |