change (g), are presumed to be acquainted with its rules; and parties claiming under a lease to know the title under which they took, and the circumstances connected with it (h). § 388. There are other presumptions derived from Other instances. the ordinary conduct of mankind. Thus the cancel ling (i), or taking the seals off (k), a deed, or tearing a will in pieces (1), is primâ facie evidence of a revocation: though the presumption may be rebutted (m), &c. ments. § 389. It may be stated as a general rule that, primâ Date of docufacie, all documents should be taken to have been made on the day they bear date (n). Thus a letter must be presumed to have been written at the time it bears. date (o), and the same holds in the case of bills of exchange and promissory notes (p) and the indorsements on them (q). So, a deed is presumed to have been executed (r) and delivered (s) on the day it is dated. This presumption is however easily displaced, and the rule is subject to exceptions (t). (0) Hunt v. Massey, 5 B. & (q) Smith v. Battens, 1 Moo. (r) Anderson v. Weston, 6 Bingh. N. C. 300. (s) Stone v. Grubbam, 1 Rol. (t) Anderson v. Weston, 6 Presumptions from course of business. § 390. Many presumptions are drawn from the usual course of business in public offices. Thus, if a letter is In public offices. put into a post-office that is primâ facie proof, until the contrary appear, that the party to whom it is addressed received it in due course (y). Presumptions of this kind are also made from the course of business in private offices: such as those of merchants (z), attornies (a), &c. In private offices. Other presump tions from the § 391. There are several other presumptions drawn usages of trade. from the usages of trade. Thus, where a partnership is found to exist between two persons, but there is no evidence to shew in what proportions the parties are interested, it is to be presumed that they are interested in equal moieties (b). So, bills of exchange and promissory notes are presumed to have been given for consideration (c), &c. &c. 739; Edwards v. Crock, 4 Esp. (y) Kuph v. West, 3 Esp. 54; (z) Hetherington v. Kemp, 4 Campb. 193; Toosey v. Williams, 1 Mood. & M. 129; Hawkes v. Salter, 4 Bingh. 715; Pritt v. Fairclough, 3 Campb. 305; Hagedorn v. Reid, Id. 379. (a) Doe d. Patteshall v. Turford, 3 B. & Ad. 890. (b) Farrar v. Beswick, 1 Moo. & R. 527, per Parke, B. (c) Byles on Bills, 2, 6th Ed. For other instances see Carter v. Abbott, 1 B. & C. 444; Houghton v. Gilbart, 7 C. & P. 701; Leuckhart v. Cooper, 7 C. & P. 119; Cunningham v. Fonblanque, 6 C. & P. 44. SUB-SECTION VI. PRESUMPTION OF THE CONTINUANCE OF THINGS IN THE STATE IN WHICH THEY HAVE ONCE EXISTED. of the conti § 392. It is a very general presumption that things Presumption once proved to have existed in a particular state are to nuance of things be understood as continuing in that state, until the con- in the state in which they trary is established by evidence, either direct or circum- have once stantial. Thus, where seisin of an estate has been shewn existed. its continuance will be presumed (e); as also will that of а parochial settlement (f), of the authority of an agent (g), &c.; and there are several instances to be found in the books, where this presumption has been held stronger than the presumption of innocence, or those derived from the course of nature. Thus, on an indictment for libelling a man in his capacity of public officer, on proof of the prosecutor having held the office previous to the publication of the libel, his continuing to do so was presumed (h); and where adultery has been proved, its continuance will be presumed while parties live under the same roof (i). So, although the law in general presumes against insanity, yet where the fact of insanity has once been shewn its continuance will be presumed, and the proof of a subsequent lucid interval lies on the party who asserts it (j). the continuance § 393. There are two particular cases which will re- Presumption of quire separate consideration, namely, the presumption of debts, &c. (e) Wrotesley v. Adams, Plowd. 193; Smith v. Stapleton, Id. 431; Cockman v. Farrer, T. Jones, 181. (f) R. v. Tanner, 1 Esp. 304. (g) Smout v. Ilbery, 10 M. & W. 1. (h) R. v. Budd, 5 Esp. 230. (j) Butl. Co. Litt. 246 b, note payment. 4 Will. IV. c. 42, s. 3. of the continuance of debts, obligations, &c. until discharged or otherwise extinguished; and the presumption of the continuance of human life. With respect to the former of these, a debt once proved to have existed is presumed to continue, unless payment, or some other discharge, be either proved or established from circumstances (k). A receipt under hand and seal is the strongest evidence of payment, for it amounts to an estoppel, conclusive on the party making it(1); but a receipt under hand alone (m), or a verbal admission of payment (n), is in general only primâ facie evidence of Presumption of it, and may be rebutted. Of the presumptive proof of payment, the most obvious is that of no demand Previous to 3 & having been made for a considerable time; and previous to the 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 42, s. 3, the courts, by analogy to the Statute of Limitations, had established the artificial presumption that where payment of a bond or other specialty was not demanded for twenty years, and there was no payment of interest or other circumstance to shew that it was still in force, payment or release 3 & 4 Will. IV. ought to be presumed by a jury (o). By that statute it c. 42, s. 3. is enacted, that all actions for debt for rent, upon an indenture of demise, all actions of covenant or debt upon any bond, or other specialty, and all actions of debt or scire facias upon any recognizance, shall be commenced and sued within ten years after the end of the then session of Parliament, or within twenty years after the cause of action, but not after. Even though circumstances. this statute be not pleaded, the fact of payment may still be presumed by a jury from lapse of time, or other cir Payment presumable from 50. (k) Jackson v. Irvin, 2 Camp. Also in the Roman law, Cod. lib. 4, tit. 19, 1. 1. (1) Gilb. Evid. 158, 4th Ed. 305, 4th Ed. (n) Id. § 209. (0) Oswald v. Legh, 1 T. R. 270; Washington v. Brymer, Peake's Ev., App. xxv. cumstances which render the fact probable (o); as, for instance, the settlement of accounts subsequent to the accruing of the debt, and in which no mention is made of it (p). Where a landlord gives a receipt for rent due up to a certain day, all former arrears are presumed to have been paid, for it is likely that he would take the debt of longest standing first (q). Previous to the statute, it was laid down by Lord Ellenborough, in Colsell v. Budd (r), that, "after a lapse of twenty years, a bond will be presumed to be satisfied; but there must either be a lapse of twenty years, or a less time, coupled with some circumstance to strengthen the presumption." In Brembridge v. Osborn (s), also, the same judge told the jury, that, where there is a competition of evidence on the question whether a security has or has not been satisfied by payment, the possession of the uncancelled security by the claimant ought to turn the scale in his favour, since in the ordinary course of dealing the security is given up to the party who pays it (t). Where land is conveyed to trustees on trust to pay debts, with remainder over, payment of the debts may be presumed from long possession by the remainderman, joined with other circumstances (u). Release as well as payment Presumption of may be inferred from circumstances (»). release. § 394. On the same principle, although revocation or Presumption of (0) 3 Stark. Ev. 823, 3rd Ed. See Cooper v. Turner, 2 Stark. Ev. 497; Lucas v. Novisilienski, 1 Esp. 296; Sellen v. Norman, 4 C. & P. 80; Pfiel v. Vanbutenberg, 2 Camp. 439. 27. (p) Colsell v. Budd, 1 Camp. (9) Gilb. Ev. 157, 4th Ed. (r) 1 Camp. 27. See Oswald v. Legh, 1 T. R. 270. (s) 1 Stark. Ev. 374. (1) See Dig. lib. 22, tit. 3, 1. 24; and Mascard. de Prob. Concl. 477. (u) Anon., Vin. Abr. Ev., Q. a. pl. 7. (x) Washington v. Brymer, Peake's Ev., App. xxv.; Pickering v. Lord Stamford, 2 Ves. jun. 583; Reeves v. Brymer, 6 Id. 516. revocation or surrender. |