ART. 39-Instructions for Mariners, respecting the Management of Ships at Single Anchor, also general Rules for Sailing, to which is annexed an Address to Seamen. By Henry Taylor, of NorthShields. Fourth Edition. 12mo. Darton and Harvey.

THE brethren of the Trinity-house and the ship owners of Shields, have expressed their approbation of this little work, which ought to be put into the hands of every master and mate of a vessel. The instructions on the subject of single anchor are drawn up with great precision, and the address to seamen discovers piety and a sound understanding, combined with zeal for the class of life in which the author has spent the greater part of his days. The advice in keeping to sea as long as possible, will have weight with those who have witnessed the damages sustained lately by vessels in Ramsgate harbour. 'A good roadsted is better and safer than a bad barbour; therefore never leave the former for the latter but in cases of real necessity, and I know but of one case where it can be necessary, and that is, when you can ride no longer, and have no lee-road to fly to for refuge.' The writer thinks that many more ships are lost now than in former times by masters keeping near the land and grappling for harbours instead of standing out to sea, and we agree with him, that if the case is really so, it is most astonishing that a master who loses his ship through ignorance or carelessness finds little difficulty in obtaining the command of another without any stigma from the public, or any apparent contrition on his part."

CORRESPONDENCE.

WE have received a letter from Mr. Kirwan respecting an allusion made to him in our Review for February last. Agreeably to his desire, we subjoin its contents, and need only remark that nobody could certainly suspect that meritorious philosopher of forgery in aný instance, but at the utmost of inaccuracy.

Gentlemen, I found in perusing your Review for February last, that you thought my credit for accuracy severely injured by Ma Dalton's assertion, that not a trace of a table which I had given as Mr. Schmidt's, was to be found in Greu's Journal to which I referred. Mr. Dalton was certainly right; that table is not to be found totidem verbis in Greu's Journal, but this table contains several tables which I formed into one, conformable, as I thought, to the results of various of Schmidt's experiments; and hence I did not give it as a transcript from Schmidt. I am much obliged to Mr. Dalton for the polite apology he had the goodness to make for me; it is plain I could have no view in forging such a table, as I had no hypothesis to support by it. This account I hope you will have the goodness to publish, and am, Gentlemen, your constant reader, and humble servant, (Signed) R. KIRWAN.'

Dublin, March 24th, 1806.

Mr. C.'s request relative to the second edition of his work, shali be attended to,

N. B. The Appendix to the VIIth Volume of the CRITICAL REVIEW will be published on the 1st of next Month.

ART. IDe la Preponderance Maritime et Commerciale de la Grande Bretagne, &c.

A Treatise on the Maritime and Commercial Preponder ance of Great Britain; or, on the Interests of Nations, with Relation to England and France. By M. Monbrion. 8vo. Paris. 1805. Imported by Deconchy..

THIS work, from the beginning to the end, is a notable specimen of the vague and frothy declamation of the French nation. It appears to be written by some hireling of Bonaparte, and to be one of the vehicles of his virulent animosity against the English; of his mean, insidious, and impotent rage against our commercial consequence, and our maritime dominion. Its main object is to prove, though no proof whatever is adduced, except the impudent assertions of the writer, that the commercial prosperity and the maritime ascendant of the English are injurious to the interests of other nations; are the main causes of their poverty and decay; and consequently, that it behoves all nations vigorously to unite with France, in order to crush the power and to reduce the wealth and greatness of Britain. Such is the drift of this author's reasoning; and such are his assertions, which are echoed in almost every page. As his work is evidently designed for circulation in other countries as well as in France, and as the agents, the spies, and emissaries of Bonaparte, who are so widely diffused, will no doubt endeavour to push the sale of it as far as their influence extends, and as it is calculated to excite a sensation of ill-will APP. Vol. 7.

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against Great Britain wherever it is read, we think that we shall not render an unacceptable service to our patriotic readers, if we bestow a little pains on the refutation of its statements, and the counteraction of its influence.

It is a favourite assumption of the author that the prosperity of Great Britain is founded on the ruin of other states; that it rests on the basis of injustice and oppression; and that other nations can become rich only by making Great Britain poor. Thus it is endeavoured to incite the continental powers, not only by the feeling of jealousy and resentment, but of avarice and even self-preservation, to conspire with France to hurl us from the present towering height of our glory and our opulence, into the deepest abyss of poverty and disgrace. Were indeed our prosperity constructed of such materials as this author represents it, or were it founded on principles directly opposite to those of a sound morality, we, who are seriously impressed with a conviction of the moral government of God, could cherish no favourable hopes of the permanence of any prosperity which rested on such a fragile base and was so ill-deserved. But we hope to shew that the prosperity of Britain, great and unparalleled as it appears, is not inimical to the prosperity of other states, and that it does not repose on the crumbling pillars of injustice and oppression.

The prosperity of Great Britain is so far from being injarious to the prosperity of other nations, that it evidently tends to better their condition, to excite their industry, and to increase the sum of their enjoyments. Its tendency is not to depress, but to exalt, not to impoverish, but to enrich. And this will be clear from the following considerations, which we wish that we had lungs strong enough to make heard in the palace of the Thuilleries; and indeed over the whole of Europe.-Commerce is nothing more than an exchange of commodities; Great Britain does not send her merchantships to America, to Germany, or any other part of the world without bringing back something in return; either the fruits of labour or the fruits of the earth, either natural or manufactured produce; or else money, which, being only the representative of value, must be considered as equivalent to so much produce, whether natural or manufactured. does it not irrefragably follow that the commerce of Great Britain, viewed in this rational and simple light, must tend to excite the industry, to increase the wealth, and to multiply the enjoyments of every town or province with which she trades? The commerce of one country must act as a spur to the exertions of another.

Now

If Britain, in exchange for her manufactures, brings from other countries either raw or manufactured produce, either fruit or food, or any thing else, she must ultimately benefit those countries. If a nation have so much more subsistence than is requisite for her population, it cannot be better employed than in exchange for commodities which it wants. A nation must always be regarded as happy and prosperous, when it produces more food than is requisite for the wants of its inhabitants; this is indeed the only solid and permanent criterion of national prosperity and happiness. Now no individual will take pains to grow more of any article than he wants, unless he can dispose of the superfluity; and that country, which takes the superfluous produce of another in exchange for articles of utility or pleasure, encourages the growth; thus the manufactures of one nation may improve the agriculture of another. Would the agriculture of America flourish so much if it were not for the trade with England? We hold it for a truth too clear, to be contested, that it would not. England supplies America with articles of necessity and convenience, of use and ornament, and better and cheaper than she could provide for herself, or procure elsewhere. If America were entirely to shut her ports against the introduction of English manufactures, the effect would, be almost as pernicious to her as to Great Britain; in order to obtain something like a substitute for the articles of necessity, or convenience and comfort, with which she is sup plied by this country, America must transfer a portion of that industry which she now employs in a more productive, into a less productive channel. A part of her population must pass from the toils of agriculture to those of manufactures, from a healthy employment in the fields to the more sickly labours of the loom. The Americans might obtain: similar articles to those which they now procure from us, but coarser and dearer from the want of skill, of machinery, and capital. It is the skill, the machinery, and the capital of the English manufacturer and merchant, which would long enable us to supply America with various goods of a superior quality, and at a lower rate than she could supply. herself; and surely then the active powers of America are more wisely and more advantageously employed in producing such articles as they may exchange for these goods, than in less profitable exertions to procure the goods themselves. The same kind of reasoning may be applied to the commercial relations which subsist between Great Britain and other states, and from which those states, however, what is commonly called the balance of trade may,

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seem to be against them, must derive a considerable benefit proportioned to the extent of the trade.

We have therefore no hesitation in asserting, and we think that the arguments which we have adduced will justify us in asserting, that the commerce of Great Britain tends to enrich those countries to which it is directed, to vivify their industry, to increase the number and the sum of their enjoyments. Great Britain does not indeed make a gratuitous dispersion of her commodities; she cannot afford to be so liberal; nor is it requisite that she should. She will not send her manufactures where nothing is to be had in return; she demands an equitable equivalent. But what can this equivalent be, whether it consist of raw, of manufactured produce, or the precious metals, but something which previous exertion has procured? what then becomes of the pompous assertion of M. Monbrion, that the commerce of Great Britain reJaxes the industrious energies of other nations, that it undermines their prosperity, and accelerates their decay?

By shutting us out from the ports of Europe, France does not benefit but impoverish both herself and her allies; she does not excite but chill the spirit of industrious exertion. The industry which was employed in procuring a quantity either of raw or manufactured produce, which might be exchanged for English commodities, stagnates in action, or is turned into a less fertilizing stream.. The mind of Bonaparte, however well it may be versed in the art of war, is totally unacquainted with the principles of trade; he can direct the ravage of armies, better than he can superintend the beneficent operations of commerce; he knows how to impoverish, but he is totally unskilled in the science of enriching nations. His disposition bears more resemblance to the lightning which blasts, than to the dew which refreshes the verdure of the earth. While his present system continues, and the councils of France are influenced by his little, selfish, despotic, and narrow-minded policy, France never can become a great trading nation. Trade is a plant not to be forced; it will strike root only in a genial soil; it will, as history demonstrates, flourish only where civil liberty prevails. It cannot long endure the pestilential atmosphere of arbitrary power; it is only freedom which can supply a suitable nourishment for its roots or moisture for its leaves.

Before trade can be carried on to any great extent, capital must be accumulated. Nothing but a large capital can give long credit, support slow returns, engage in distant enterprizes, endure the reverses and contingencies of promising speculations, purchase expensive machinery, and conduct