any quarter, and, above all, the propriety of proving to the world that the fpirit of national refiftance had not entirely deferted the Dutch, and that they did not prefer the throwing themselves into the hands of the French to the danger of repelling a foreign yoke at the risk of their lives and individual property all thefe various motives combined, had induced the public in every country, to look on the fiege of Nimeguen as an event that would terminate in great celebrity, from its duration, the number of brilliant actions it would produce, and the unyielding obftinacy with which it would on both fides be accompanied. The fudden and unexpected difappointment of all thefe expectations put an end to the hopes that had been entertained, that, laying afde the animofity of parties, the Dutch would at length cordially unite in oppofing the threatened invafion of the French. Plain reafon pointed out the infatuation of committing themfelves to the good faith of ftrangers interefted in keeping them under fubjection, and preventing them from acting as an independent people. Thofe Dutchmen who exhorted their countrymen to fubvert their prefent government, and call in the affiftance of the French to erect another on its ruins, did not confider that fo mighty and fo victorious a nation would, like all other conquerors, confult their own views, and render thofe who fubamitted to them the inftruments of their future wars and conquefts. Hiftorical experience fpoke invariably this language; and the pretended establishment of liberty, fa continually held forth as an inducement to join the French, was either the plea of that fond credulity which is incident to ignorance, and the ufual concomitant of fanaticifm and all violent paffions, or of that general enervation, felfiflinefs, and indifference to their country, which feems to have fallen on fo great a portion of the Dutch nation. The Hollanders had been now fo long unaccustomed to war, that they could not well be expected to meafure their ftrength with troops that had conquered the Emperor. As little was it to be expected that there should be any cordial union between the Belgians and Batavians for the fupport of the Emperor and the Stadtholder, whofe power and government were odious to fo great a portion of their refpective people. If the Flemings and Dutch had been at liberty to follow their own inclinations, they would have remained neutral like the Danes, and the people of Hamburgh. There is a period of declination and degradation in the hiftory of ftates, when they become reconciled to the idea of acting a fubmiffive and cunning part, and when they refemble the beadles and doorkeepers of thofe churches in Switzerland and Germany that are open to Lutherans and Calvinifts in their turn; and who pay equal refpect to whichfoever of thefe fectarians is in actual pof. feflion. That the French were determined to conquer for themselves, and in order to attain that end would employ all the means that could accelerate it, was obvious to all perfons of difcernment. The moft soft efficacious of these means, was, to fettle the government of every country of which they obtained poffeffion, exactly on the plan of their own. This was an act of the profoundeft policy. They feemingly divefted themselves of all direct authority over the natives, whom they appeared to leave in the fulleft plenitude of their free dom, both in their public and private concerns. But they took care, at the fame time, to retain it thro' the infallible influence of the power which they exercised in virtue of their oftenfible connexions with the state, and their fecret intrigues with the party that having firft introduced, was now neceflitated to fupport them. That fuch would be the fate of the Dutch was no longer doubted: the unwillingness teftified by the Inhabitants of both the towns and country to co-operate with the military against the French, was open and avowed. They feemed even fincerely defirous of their abfence; and expreffed their wishes with little or no diffimulation. Such a state of their minds was very aftonishing to thofe who were acquainted with the long ftanding habits of coolnefs and circum fpection in their general conduct, for which the natives of this part of Europe have been fo ufually noted. It proved that uncommon pains must have been taken to alter their ideas; unless it may be fuppofed that, being convinced the treer of the French was utterly irrefiftible, they judged that the foonthey made terms with that conquering people, the better treatment they would experience. Reasonings of this nature began at this time to be very common among the commonalty, both in the Belgic and the United Provinces. Not only the lower but the middling claffes evinced a decided repugnance to efpoufe the caufe of any king; and attributed the invincible character of the French to the conviction they were under, that they were no longer fighting for their kings, but for their country. A perfuafion of this kind, well or ill founded, was alfo diffufing itself very fast in many parts of Germany; and was the real caufe of the repugnance which the people on the frontiers of the empire visibly exhibited when called upon, with exhorta❤ tations and menaces, to join heart and hand in repelling the French from the confines of Germany. When thefe various confiderations are laid together, it was not furprizing that the French themselves, eonfcious of the partiality their cause excited in the majority of the inhabitants of those countries they were invading, fhould, by fo flattering and cogent a motive, be actuated to the moit indefatigable and daring exertions; and prove in the iffue fuperior to thofe who contended against them, under fo heavy a difcouragement as the hatred of the natives of thofe countries which they were employed to defend, not for them, but for their mafters. The very lofs of the town, which has given occafion for the foregoing obfervations, was imputed to the fecret machinations of thofe within the walls who were labouring for the fervice of the French, and continually giving them notice. of whatever was tranfacted in in the garrifon. While fuch prac tices were on foot, it was impoffible for either courage or military skill to be of much avail; and thofe who were fo ready to extol the French for their exploits, ought to have acknowledged that, fituated as their enemies were, thefe deferved no lefs admiration for bearing up to refolutely against difficulties, in their nature infurmountable; as they were infallibly calculated to baffle all intrepidity of fpirit and wifdom of exertion. The lofs of Nimeguen was accompanied with that of another place, ftill more famous for the various fieges it had fuftained at different periods, during the three laft centuries. This was the ftrong and important town of Maestricht. It had, by its noble defence against commanders of the highest fame in their day, acquired a reputation which, it was prefumed, it would not fail to maintain; while thofe who were intrufted with its defence recollected the motives that fhould animate them. The garrifon confifted of felect officers and foldiers, and amounted to upwards of 8000 men, abundantly furnished with the means of a brave and obftinate refiftance. The honour that would refult from the taking of fuch a place was a very ftimulating motive among the French. The perfon chofen to command on this occafion was General Kleber, who had already fignalized himself by his courage and conduct. He fummoned the town upon the 26th of Sptember; but was given to understand that it would not yield but in the laft extremity. The befieging army was very numerous, and the corps of engineers attending it compofed of the most expert in that department. On the town's refufal to furrender, a number of batteries whence the town was annoyable. were planted on every fpot from Their execution proved formidable; and it became neceffary for the garrifon to exert its utmost efforts to counteract them. As there was a confiderable body of cavalry in taken to employ it in making a the place, a determination was tery, of which the fituation required fudden and rapid fally on a batan expeditious attack. It was accordingly attacked and entirely deftroyed, and one of the guns carried off. Encouraged by this fuccefs, the befieged made another fally enemy was duly prepared, and the on the French batteries; but the attempt duly mifcarried. A third fally fucceeded better; and the battery againft which it was directed was almost entirely demolished. But thefe vigorous efforts, on the part of the befieged, produced no permanent benefit. tainous ground in the environs of The mounthe town, afforded fo many fituations to erect battering pieces; and thofe which were injured by the befieged, were fo fpeedily replaced by others, that the befiegers, being conftantly fupplied with heavy cannon, and constructing additional batteries wherever they could be ferviceable, furrounded the town with them in fuch a manner, that their firing continued without intermiffion. No part of the town remained unexpofed, and many parts were laid in ruins. This deftructive fcene lafted feveral days flaughter was made of the garrifon and nights, during which a great and having completed their approaches, and effected fufficient breaches, were preparing to give a general alfault, when the magiftracy of the place waited on the Governor, to requeft he would not deliver them to certain death, by continuing a refiftance which could only terminate in a maffacre of the garrifon and people. Thefe remonftrances induced him to confent to a capitulation; by which the garrifon were to be confidered as prifoners of war till exchanged. On thefe terms Maeftricht surrendered to General Kleber on the 4th of November, after having ftood a fiege of forty days, and fuffered a lofs of more than 2000 houfes and public buildings, either totally demolished or materially damaged. The capture of two cities of fuch high confideration as Nimeguen and Maeftricht, filled the ruling party in Holland with the most evident confternation; they now began thoroughly to defpair of being able to make head against France, efpecially as their domeftic enemies were well known to have formed the refolution of taking an active part in favour of the French, the moment they could do it with any profpect of perfonal safety. The invafion of Holland was an object of univerfal expectation in Europe. The force under the command of General Pichegru, who was placed at the head of this great expedition, amounted to no is than 200,000 men. His abilities, and thofe of the officers who were to ferve under him, annexed a fecurity to the enterprize, which equally clated the French and depreffed their enemies. In lefs than two years from the acceffion of the governing powers in the UnitedProvinces to the confederacy which was to have reduced France, they found themfelves on the point of becoming the fubjects of that irritated power, by the most humiliating and difgraceful of all means, thofe of fubjugation and conqueft. The ftrength which was to oppofe this vaft and victorious army, confifted in the remains of the British troops and thofe in their pay, and of the Dutch troops. But their numbers were beneath confideration, when compared to the multitude of their enemies; and though far from deficient in military knowledge any more than in fpirit, they did not appear adequate to the arduous talk of preferving Holland from the defigns in agitation against it. A neutral party fubfifted in Holland, which, without inclining to the Stadtholder or to his enemies, were decidedly averfe to the entrance of the French; which they forefaw muft put an end to the independence of the Dutch as a nation. But their remonstrances on the neceffity of a reunion of all parties against a foreign inva fion, were loft in the fixed determination of thofe in authority to truft none but their adherents; and in the no lefs obftinate refolution of their antagonists to deftroy their authority through the affistance of the French. CHAP. Military Operations of the French in Spain. Difference between the prefent and former State of Spain. Its Decline and want of Population fufficient to encoun ter the French. Their Preparations for the Campaign of 1794. They fuft attack the Wefern Borders of Spain, and rout the Spaniards near St. Jean Deluz, and at other Places, and take a Number of Prifoners, with an immenfe Quantity of Artillery and Warlike Stores. General Dugomniter forces a Spanish Army to lay down their Arms. Count De L'Union defeated by the French, in attempting to raife the Siege of Bellegrade, which furrenders to them, with a large Garrafon. General Dugomriler obtains a fignal Victory over the Spaniards, but is flain. Honours decreed to his Memory. Battle of St. Fernando Defigueres, wherein a large Army of Spaniards is forced into its Entrenchments, and Count De L'Union killed. St. Fernando Defigueres taken by the French, together with a numerous Garrifon, and an immenfe Booty of all Kinds. The Spaniards again defeated, and unable to keep the Field on their Eaftern Frontiers. Succeffes of the French on the Western Borders of Spain. General Delafor de forces the Spanish Camp at St. Jean Deluz, and takes a large Number of Prifoners, and a great Quantity of Military Stores and Provifions. A remarkable Victory gained by the French over a Spanish Army of Superior Force. Loffes and Confternation of the Spaniards & Rapid ty of the Motions and Succeffes of the French. Fontarabia and St. Sebaftian Submit to them with their Garrisons. Immenfe Magazines of all Kinds fall inta their Hands. Conduct of the French towards the Spaniards, diminishes their Averfion to the Politics of France. Alteration in the Spanish Character fince the French Revolution. A large Body of Spaniards defeated by a finall one of French. Defertion of fome Spanish Troops to the French. The Spanish Lines, extending near forty Leagues, are forced by the French, and the Spaniards routed with great Lofs of Men killed and taken, Difcouragement of the Spanish Court and Minifiry. Their fruitless Attempt to raife the People in a Mass. Diftrefs of the Spanish Government. The Methods it employs to raife Money. Military Operations of the French in Italy. Political Fiew of the Effects produced by the Revolution on their National Capacity and Strength of Exertion. Former Difappointments and Difafters attending the French in the Larvation of Italy. They open the Campaign in that Country by the Siege of Oneglia. Their cautious Conduct towards the Republic of Genoa. Oneglia befieged and taken by them. Confequences of this Capture. They defeat the Sardinians and Auftrians, penetrate into Piedmont, and feize large Quantities of Provisions and Warlike Stores. Exploits of Dumerlion their chief Commander. He forces a frong Encampment of the Sardinians. Numbers of them are killed and taken, with all their Cannon and Magazines. He attacks and carries the Sardinian Entrenchments at Colde Sanda, and compels them to abandon that Pafs with great Lofs. Confternation of the Court of Turin. It forms the Project of raising the Inhabitants of Piedmont in a Mafs. They affemble in large Numbers, but are quickly difperfed by the French. Succeffes of the French in the Alps. Their General (Dumas) attacks the Fortifications of Mount Cenis, and drives the Sardinians from them, with great Lofs. The Sardinians again defeated. The Auftrians and Sardinians form a Projec |