we had no reason to expect more permanent advantages from the one than from the other. Were it not therefore more adviseable to conclude a peace, if an honourable peace could be obtained, with the prefent government of France, and truft to our caution and vigilance for the prefervation of evil defigns against this country, than to continue hoftilities, attended with an enormous wafte of blood and treafire, but not more producive of fecurity than a pacification? Allowing the danger to be equal in either cafe, that which freed us from an immenfe charge was, queftionlefs, preferable to the other. It was vain to calculate the refources of the French at the rate of a commercial proportion. They had No commerce; they derived no expectations from any other funds than the productions of their foil: thefe were the gifts of nature, and could not be taken from them: their induftry and ingenuity knew how to turn them to the beft account. The depreciation of their paper-money had not depreffed their affairs it had not retarded a moment the vigour nor the celerity of their military operations. Wherever men were willing and refolved to bear with hardships, hiftorical experience had proved that their refources were inexhauftible. Courage and ability were the two main fupports in all difficulties, whether of a public or of a private nature. The French had confpicuously verified this maxim; and it behoved us, while we teftified our abhorrence of their conduct in fo many inftances, to do them juftice in this particular: but Info doing, we fhould alfo recolleft how ftrong a proof it afforded VOL. XXXVI. of the inutility of our efforts to reduce fuch a people to compliance with our demands. It was not long fince we had made a trial of this nature, to our fatal cost. Our American colonies were, if poffible, in a fituation more defperate and forlorn than the French: yet, amidft our daily taunts at their dif trefles, and our fanguine hopes of their being finally compelled to yield, they baffled all our ftrength, all our courage, all our fkill, and, what we chiefly relied on, as we do at this prefent hour, all that profufion of treafure which had nearly brought us to deftruction, as it certainly tended to fuch an iffud at this no lefs unhappy, if not more unfortunate period. In fhort, they might be faid to have fought our riches with their poverty: a ferious leffon to thofe who think that affluence can compafs all things. Mr. Fox, in a very ferious tone of voice, implored the attention of the Houfe to this topic, as a blind and obftinate confidence in our own pecuniary refources, and in a failure of the pecuniary refources of France, was the great fpring of the calamities with which we were now befet and further threatened, even to national difgrace and ruin. Money is, in fact, only a mark or fign of the value of labour. In a general and comprehenfive view of things, money is not fo much the caufe, as the effect of exertion. Virtus preflantior auto. Great defigns are not to be regulated and circumfcribed by the little rules of vulgar calculation. A nation may be fo powerful, and fo fertile in invention, as to fet derangements in finance, in fome mesfure, at defi ance. Productions of art, as well as reproductions of nature, may be carried carried on with very little, or even it is a refource that enables them without any money, as the French had already proved. The enthufiafm of liberty, though not, properly fpeaking, itself a refource, conducts men, by its native heat and light, to the difcovery and invention of. refources. It excites every latent Faculty of the foul; and the energies of the mind, in full exertion, fall upon means which it would have wholly overlooked in a state of inaction. Though in the prefent advanced state of commerce money be a general reprefentative, and equivalent for commodities of all kinds, among which we reckon military ftores and military fervices, the order of nature, by which all things are procured by induftry and exertion, is not inverted. In times of peace men purfue the medium of exchanging, the fign of commodities. In times of war they sometimes, nay, very frequently, purfue by more compendious ways the thing fignified. In war it fometimes happens that courage and rage fupply the want of ordinary arms. Xenophon, in his Cyropædia, has obferved, that iron commands gold. The French, when their affignats fail, as it is predicted that they will do, may plunder their neighbours. It must be allowed that plunder is but a fleeting fource: yet when a nation has abandoned habits of peace and induftry, and acquired the views and manners of predatory warriors, to fpread oppreffion and defolation far and near. The Arabs did not conquer fo large a portion of Afia and Africa, and even part of Europe, by money. The Tartars, or Scythians, had no money, not even affignats; yet they fubdued the Roman empire, as the Romans themfelves had by their hardihood and military difcipline and valour triumphed over the money and numerous mercenaries of Carthage. In our own times we have feen a people without money defeating the richest nation at prefent on earth. Are we certain that when the refource of the affignats fhall be exhausted, if it shall be exhausted, the energy of liberty and the fertility of French invention will not be able to open others? The refources of commerce are fleeting and tranfient: but never, in the divided state of individuals and nations, can there be a conjecture in which courage and numbers may not alarm the fears, and political intrigues, in various ways, practife on all the various paffions of human nature. It is not pofli ble, faid Mr. Fox, to imagine what new means of continuing the war may be invented by an ingenious people, actuated by a spirit of national independence and honour: and he deplored from the bottom of his heart the fatal error which administration was at so much pains, in various ways *, to propagate. Mr. Alluding probably to certain pamphlets that were published at this time, endeavouring to prove that the certain ruin of the French affignats would be the certain ruin of the French republic. It was fome time after this, however, that Sir John d'lvernois (author of a tract publifhed in 1782, and another in 1795, relpecting revolutions, at thofe periods, in Geneva) published his reflections, Sur is Guerre," and his "Etat de Finance," &c. In the firft of thefe works his object is to fhew, it, That the French republic will be ruined, juft as the monarchy. was, by the state of the finances; and that before the expiration of the year 17959 Mr. Fox returned again to the ubject of the American war; between which and the prefent there were fo many ftriking points of refemblance, particularly in the fatal point, that in neither would minifters liften to any arguments or any reports, other than thofe that were agreeable to their own preju dices and paffions. The lofs of America, through our felf-delufion, pride, and obftinacy, fhould teach us to be more moderate in our views of conqueft and fubjugation; especially when directed towards a country and people less liable than any other to become the flaves of their neighbours, and long accustomed to infpire them all with terror. After protracting the war with America to a ruinous length, Great Britain was glad to treat with that rebelhous foe. Why not affent to a treaty with a power never dependant on our jurifdiction, and whose offences, however great, have been committed within itself, and are amenable only to the tribunal of opinion? It had been predicted, that to yield to the demands of America, would be treason to Great Britain; but neceffity forced us to yield. It had been foretold that the ceffion of independence to America would produce every fpecies of national calamities, and fink us at once to the lowest degradation. But were either of these predictions accomplished? acquiefcing in thefe demands, did we not in a fhort fpace emerge out of every difficulty which that con teft had engendered? We loft in deed a multitude of fubjects, but we acquired a multitude of useful connexions, far more profitable than if retained in fubjection by purchase or by terror. In the fame manner, by relinquishing an attempt beyond the strength of Europe to atchieve, we fhould fail back into that profperous courfe which that enemy, whofe ambition we had taken up arms to reprefs, would never be able to disturb, while we convinced the world by our conduct, that his imputations to our disadvantage were unjuft, and that our intercourfe with other nations was founded on the strictest principles of good faith and equity. at fartheft. 2d, That Mr. Pitt will be confidered by futurity as a greater mi nifter, if poffible, than his father. The chances of war Sir John certainly fhewed to be all in favour of that party who poffeffed most resources for prolonging the conteft. His mistake lay in affuming that the only refource and nerve of war is money: that the whole power of the French republic, and even its military existence, depended exclufively on the affignats; and that its momentary conquests were wholly owing to the profufion of paper-currency. Mr. de Calonne demonftrated the fallacy of this opinion with great clearness of reasoning, and with an air of gaiety and pleafantry. The conftant and repeated predictions of Sir John d'Ivernois were uniformly falfified by events. He then took refuge in the obfer. vation, that the French republic must have been ruined, as he had predicted, if it had confined its exactions to France, and not alfo laid violent hands on property of other nations: but that they would, in cafe of neceffity, be guilty of fuch violence, was a cafe very likely to happen. It was faid, and is fomewhere hinted by Sir John d'Ivernois himfelf, that he was employed to publish his doctrine refpect ing affignats by Mr. Pitt; who was naturally very defirous of convincing both humfelf and others of what he anxiously wished to be true. This difpofition in all en, particularly the great, is the most plentiful fource of the greatest errors. 02 Another Another advantage would refult from a willingnets on our fide to treat for a peace with France it would convince the French that we were not inveterately deter-, mined to continue their enemies. This would naturally leffen their Enmity to this nation, and difpofe them to be lefs fubfervient to that violent party among them which refufed amity to all but thofe who embraced its opinions. It would do ftill more; it would reconcile the difcordant in, this country, by fjewing thofe who difapproved of the war, that it was a measure of, neceflity and defence. A cordial, union of all parties would inftantly be produced by fuch a conviction; and the miniftry would meet with none but approvers of the moft vigorous profecution of the war. All thefe, things duly confidered, it was time to depofe that wrathful and malevolent fpirit which led to fo much ufelefs crimination and, abufe. Instead of contemplating with indignation the guilt of a peos, ple fo ftudioully reprefented as the melt infamous of mankind, we; should coolly reflect what mode of acting towards them would be moft conducive to our own' welfare. True policy in a commercial people, confitted in avoiding caufes of difcontent, efpecially to potent ftates, more jealous of their honour, and more inclined to refent real or imaginary affronts than many inferior powers, who think themfelves aggrieved. The feelings of neither of them could with fafety be flighted; but far greater was the facility as well as the danger of offending a mighty neighbour: deeds and words ought to be carefully weighed the latter fometimes were apt to create as high, if not higher refentment than the for mer. For these reafons, dropping cenforious language, and all manner of invective, it became a British parliament to occupy itfelf folely with the concerns of its conftituents. Whatever was irrelevant to thote objects wherein they were interested, did not belong to par liamentary difcuffioris. The real queftion before them was, Whether parliament was bound to counte nance thofe affertions in the royal, or rather, as notoriously underflood, the minifterial fpeech, which reprefented the affairs of this country. in a flourishing state. From what had been ftated on both fides in the courfe of the debate, it clearly appeared that the general fuccefs of the war was in favour of France. No impreffion of any confequence had been made upon that country and people, not withstanding the numerous and well difciplined armies that had been unremittingly employed against them, and the prodigious fums expended to maintain the vaft num-. ber of their enemies, and to create fresh ones in every quarter: hence. it would be the meanest adulation to coincide with the minifterial affertions, which were fo glaringly contradicted by facts, obvious to all men. It were more confiftent with the fituation of public affairs to addrefs the Throne for peace, inftead of pledging themfelves to fupport the continuance of war: were even fuch a measure advifeable, thofe under whofe aufpices it had been conducted, had proved themfelves to deficient in talens and aptitude for its profecution, that they were no longer fit to be trufted with fo arduous a charge. They had fallen into errors and impropriatic improprieties in almost every attempt under their direction: they had framed plans, without providing the means of execution. The failure at Dunkirk, which proved the origin of the many fubfequent difafters, was entirely owing to mifmanagement. The advantages that might have refulted from the poffeffion of Toulon, were loft by want of decifion, and by an unpardonable procraftination of what should have fuffered no delay. But waving thefe and other failures, and adverting only to the fitness of terminating this unpropitious war, it ought to be recommended, as an amendment to the addrefs, that, without further objectious to the fyftem of government established in France, the crowns fhould treat with it for peace, upon fafe and honourable conditions. 'On putting the question, the addrefs, without the amendment, was carried by 277 votes against 59. CHAP. XI. Military Preparations and Strength of France and Great Britain in the Courfe of 1793. A Body of Hefsian Troops arrive in the Isle of Wights This Measure cenfured by Oppofition in the House of Commons. Defended by the Minifterial Party. Motion for increafing the Number of Seamen for the Service of the Navy. For referring to the Committee of Supply, a Treaty with the King of Sardinia. That the Land Forces for the Service of the Current Year, Jhould confifi of 60,000 Men. Converfations and Difputa tions that arife in Confequence of thefe Motions. Supplies for the Profecution of the War. New Taxes. Act for refraining the Payment of Money to Perfons refiding in France during the War. Annual Motion by Mr. Wilberforce, for Leave to bring in a Bill for the Abolition of the Slave Trade, in the House of Commons. Garried. Petitions against the Abolition of the Slave Trade. Motion by Mr. Maitland, respecting French Officers in British Pay. Negatived. THE HE attention paid by the British miniftry to the means of profecuting the war againft France, was equal to the importarce of which both they and the ority of the people feemed to confider it. The French, at the pofe of 1793, were complete mafters of the field on all their fron: tiers: they had expelled the Auf trians and Pruffians from their Country: they had taken poffeffior, of the Netherlands, and menaced Holland with an invafion. Great Britain, the principal guardian of the balance of Europe, faw itfelf involved by the critical circumftances of that period, in the difagreeable neceflity of interpofing between the contending powers, in order to preferve that equipoife between them, on which its political importance and commercial profperity fo effentially depend. The naval ftrength of the kingdom confifted of no more than forty-five hips fit for fervice, of which onethird was of the line. They were manned by about 15,000 feamen. The army amounted to its ufual peace establishment, of about 20,000. But the vigour and activity of go 03 vernment |