history of this unfortunate war that will be long remembered. It threw a damp on the minds of all thofe who were friends to the first promulgated principles of the coalition; which went apparently no farther than to reftrain the inordinale ambition of those who conducted the affairs of France, and to keep that restless and long dreaded nation within its ancient limits, agreeably to the wife plan of the Emperor Leopold *. The Duke of Brunswick's refignation took place on the 6th of January 1794.

From the jealous behaviour of thefe two courts, it was evident that, as they were the two ruling powers of Germany, the fubaltern princes and ftates of the empire would fide refpectively with Pruffia or Auftria, accordingly as they might happen to be inclined to the caufe of the one or the other, from motives of intereft; or might find themselves under the neceffity of fupporting it, from the danger of refufing their concurrence in its measures. Such being the relative fituation of the Emperor and the King of Pruffia, the French government was now confidered as per manently established, and in no danger of being overturned by external force. The only perils it had henceforward to apprehend, were fuch as might arife from thofe internal convulfions, the feeds of which ftill lay too deep to be eradicated by any power but that of time. In this ftate of fuperior ftrength, it was not furprizing that the Convention and the authorities conftituted in France by its decrees, fhould affume a ftile of fpeaking and of acting full of confidence in

its exertions, and of defiance to all the hoftile powers furrounding it. They well knew that a disjunction of Pruffia from the confederacy against them, would weaken it to fuch a degree, as to reduce it to a mere phantom of what it had been at its primitive formation. That enemy, which of all others France was principally folicitous to humble, would, by the feceffion of Prusfia from the coalition, lofe at once all the benefits it had proposed to reap through that profufion of treasure it had lavished with sfo unfparing a hand, in order to fix this fickle and wavering power in the common intereft of the alliance against France. Could the republican administration succeed in detaching him from Great Britain and Auftria, the refentment and fufpicion accruing from fuch a dereliction, and breach of faith, would ba nifh all confidence in him ever after, and obviate all future reunion between these three courts.

As thefe fentiments were juftly founded, they were acted upon with all that folicitude and celerity, which characterized the conduct of the republican government. Every circumftance denoting a ceffation of real enmity between France and the Pruffian monarch, began at this time to be noticed by the political world. So early as the month of February, a friendly communication took place between them. oftenfible motive was a reciprocal exchange of French and Pruffian prifoners. On this pretext, commiffioners from the King and the republic were appointed to meet at Franckfort on the Maine. The French commiffaries made an entry

The

into that city which had much more the appearance of a folemn embaffy than of a meeting of commiffioners appointed to fettle an exchange of prifoners. They entered Francfort in a fort of triumph, riding in one of the most fuperb ftate-coaches that had been used on folemn occafions by the late unfortunate Lewis. The carriage had been ftripped of every fymbol of royalty, and instead of a crown, was now decorated with the cap of liberty and other revolutionary ornaments. The commiffaries were attended by afuite perfectly correfponding with the character of ambafladors; and their reception and treatment was grand and 1plendid to a degree, that eyidently fhewed they came on a moft welcome errand, of far greater importance than that which was pretended.

The public were under no deception as to the real object of this brilliant miffion of French commiffioners; and their fufpicions were amply confirmed by the character of the perfon employed on the part of the Pruffian court. He was no less a perfon than General Kalkreuth; a man deepest in the confidence of his Sovereign. The conferences between him and the French commiffioners were held in the profoundest secrecy. This alone pointed out their importance, and proved at the fame time, that they could not relate to a subject requiring fo little fecrecy as a mere exchange of prifoners: a tranfaction always carried on in the moft open manner, and demanding no manner of concealment.

This method of treating together on what was reprefented as fo unimportant a matter, convinced the world that the objects under the confideration of the negociating

parties, were of the higheft confequence, and proved no lefs that they were unfavourable to thofe from whom their purport was fo carefully concealed. It was now univerfally conjectured, on the fureft grounds, that Pruffia meant to withdraw itfelf from the confe deracy, and that France was willing to purchase a feceffion fo beneficial to it, on the most advantageous terms to the feceder. The court of Berlin acted on this occafion with its characteristical policy. Before it ventured to declare its intentions to abandon the coalition, it formally applied to the diet of the empire for a part of the expences it would incur for the defence of Germany. In this particular, however, the little confidence repofed in that court, operated to a refufal of its demands; and it must have fubmitted to the lofs of its pecuniary claims, had it not employed intrigues of a more effectual nature.

The difcerning part of the Britifh nation were by this time convinced, that however fair the Pruffian miniftry might think it prudent to carry it towards Great Britain, no dependence could be placed on the fincerity of its co-opcration with the confederacy. Whatever indeed its original allegations had been for taking up arms against France, and however well-pleafed the King to act the first part in fo fplendid a confederation, it was well underftood throughout Europe, that a partition of the French monarchy was in reality the ultimate view of the Pruffian cabinet, and that it promifed itfelf an ample share of the fpoil. When it became evident that a fubjugation of France was impracticable, the court of Berlin deemed it most consistent with its

intereft

in the warmest endeavours to induce the diet to efpoufe the quarrel againft France with the utmoftenergy. His miniftry perceived in that body a tardinefs, or rather indeed a. verfenefs, to co-operate in the views of the coalition. This difpofition proceeded from a conviction of the inefficacy of all the measures propofed against the French, and that it were wifer to leave the fettlement of that mighty people to themselves, than to provoke them to enmity against their neighbours by hoftilities that only tended to convert them into a nation of foldiers, and to render them regardless of all other objects but thofe of carrying war and deftruction into every country around. These sentiments, which were thofe of that immenfe majority of individuals which was defirous of peace, were very unacceptable to the Auftrian ministry. Undifcouraged by the difafters of the preceding campaign, it still cherished the hope of being able by frefh exertions to repair the loffes they had fuftained, and, if not to add new territories to their dominions, ftill to recover those which they had loft. For this end the imperial envoy to the diet, had in the month of February delivered a note to that affembly, wherein the neceffity was urged of recurring to every means of putting the frontiers of Germany in a condition to repel the expected invafion on the part of France. The propriety of embodying the people, and caufing them to rife in a mafs, was vehemently infifted on; the finances of Auftria were ftated to have been lavifhed in fupport of the empire; and that it was incumbent on the Germanic princes and ftates to come forward on this

critical occafion, with every exertion they could make for the ho nour and prefervation of their country.

The envoy expatiated on the zeal difplayed by the Emperor in his endeavours to protect the empire from the contagion of French principles, and to reprefs the fpirit of anarchy and irreligion with which it was threatened by the revolutionary rage that had per verted the fentiments of that people, and rendered them the declared enemies of all the established goverments in Europe. To stop the progrefs of an enemy that evidently aimed at their total fubverfion, extraordinary measures were indifpenfable, and it behoved the diet warmly to concur in levying the fupplies prefcribed by the Ger manic conftitution in cafes of emer gency, fuch as the prefent. To this purpofe it would be requifite to call on the princes and states for a triple proportion of their ufual contingent, in virtue of the regulation enacted during the last century, in a cafe fimilar to the prefent, when the Turkish armies had overrun all Hungary; and Vienna, after fultaining a long fiege, was on the point of falling into their hands. Notwithstanding the vehemenco with which the imperial envoy eularged on thofe various topics, he did not make that impreffion upon the diet which he had propofed. His fpeech was not altogether fo conciliatory as the occafion feemed to require; in fome parts of it reproaches of negligence in contributing their proportions of the general fupply, were levelled at fome of the members, and accompanied with menaces of compulfion in case of refufal. But the circumstance

which

which proved moft offenfive and alarming to the imperial court, was the oppofition of the Pruffian envoy to the propofal of raifing the people of the frontiers in a mafs. This was described as a fervile, and no lefs perilous imitation of the French. So violent was the difapprobation he expreffed, that he explicitly declared, in his mafter's name, that if such a measure was adopted, Pruffia would immediately renounce the confederacy, and recall its troops from all further fervice in that caufe.

Thefe various differences of fentiment in the princes and ftates of Germany, greatly debilitated the efforts that were intended to be made against France. It foon ap peared that, from this want of unanimity, nothing very decifive would be concluded on, and that, however ferious and fincere fome of the parties concerned in the war might be, there were as many who felt a repugnance to its profecution, and who could not therefore, notwith: standing their oftenfible concurrence with those whom they were fearful to difoblige, be reputed hearty and cordial in their affent to a meafure which they were well known to difapprove.

The intelligence of this change of difpofition in the Germanic powers, but especially the defection of Pruffia from the alliance of which it had, in concert with Auftria, been the primary promoter, roufed the indignation of that numerous and powerful party in Great Britain, who had fo warmly abetted the views of the confederacy. Fully aware that a good understanding between the courts of Vienna and Berlin was indifpenfably requifite for any effectual profecution of

But

The

hoftilities against France, no me thods were left untried to prevent a feceffion between them. mere exhortations and reafonings only, were loft upon a miniftry fo keenly intent on the promotion of its particular views as that of Pruffia. The obligations of a treaty framed on its own principles and coinciding with all its purposes, had vanished before the conviction that the ends of that treaty were no longer attainable. only character it now determined to act in, was that of a fubfidiary ally, Nor was it without an enormous expenditure that the British governiment was able to prevail on the Pruffian monarch to act in that capacity. No lefs than 2,200,0001. would be the fum accepted by his miniftry. In confideration of this, it engaged to furnish the combined armies with 60,000 men. But this engagement was accompanied by a claufe which, in the eye of impartial politicians, rendered it almost nugatory. This large body of troops was to be under the fole command of a Pruffian General, appointed by the King of Pruifia himself. Thus it exclufively depended upon him to regulate the motions of thefe troops; which at his fole and uncontrouled option were to be made ufeful or inactive. This implicit confidence was generally deemed very injudicially placed by the British public. In truth, after fuch proofs of an underftanding between Pruffia and France, it was a mark of a childisi weakness. The fufpicions that had arifen of an amicable difpofition to each other in the French and Pruffians, were openly expreffed in every country in Europe; and people were utterly at a lofs to ex