so clearly the dangers involved in the neglect of the national defense that it deserves to be quoted entire:

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

The insurrection which is yet existing in the United States, and aims at the overthrow of the Federal Constitution and the Union, was clandestinely prepared during the winter of 1860 and 1861, and assumed an open organization in the form of a treasonable provisional government at Montgomery, Ala., on the 18th day of February, 1861.

On the 12th day of April, 1861, the insurgents committed the flagrant act of civil war by the bombardment and capture of Fort Sumter, which cut off the hope of immediate conciliation. Immediately afterwards all the roads and avenues to this city were obstructed, and the capital was put into the condition of a siege. The mails in every direction were stopped, and the lines of telegraph cut off by the insurgents, and military and naval forces, which had been called out by the Government for the defense of Washington, were prevented from reaching the city by organized and combined treasonable resistance in the State of Maryland. There was no adequate and effective organization for the public defense. Congress had indefinitely adjourned. There was no time to convene them. It became necessary for me to choose whether, using only the existing means, agencies, and processes which Congress had provided, I should let the Government fall into ruin, or whether, availing myself of the broader powers conferred by the Constitution in cases of insurrection, I would make an effort to save it, with all its blessings, for the present age and for posterity.

I

I thereupon summoned my constitutional advisers, the heads of all the Departments, to meet on Sunday, the 20th day of April, 1861, at the office of the Navy Department, and then and there, with their unanimous concurrence, I directed that an armed revenue cutter should proceed to sea to afford protection to the commercial marine, especially to the California treasure-ships then on their way to this coast. also directed the commandant of the navy-yard at Boston to purchase, or charter and arm as quickly as possible, five steamships for purposes of public defense. I directed the commandant of the navy-yard at Philadelphia to purchase, or charter and arm an equal number for the same purpose. I directed the commandant at New York to purchase, or charter and arm an equal number. I directed Commander Gillis to purchase, or charter and arm and put to sea two other vessels. Similar directions were given to Commodore DuPont, with a view to the opening of passages by water to and from the capital.

I directed the several officers to take the advice and obtain the aid and efficient services in the matter, of his Excellency Edwin D. Morgan, the Governor of New York, or, in his absence, George D. Morgan, Wm. M. Evarts, R. M. Blatchford, and Moses H. Grinnell, who were by my directions especially empowered by the Secretary of the Navy to act for his Department in that crisis in matters pertaining to the forwarding of troops and supplies for the public defense. On the same occasion I directed that Governor Morgan and Alexander Cummings, of the city of New York, should be authorized by the Secretary of War, Simon Cameron, to make all necessary arrangements for the transportation of troops and munitions of war, in aid and assistance of the officers of the Army of the United States, until communication by mails and telegraph should be completely reestablished between the cities of Washington and New York. No security was required to be given by them, and either of them was authorized to act in case of inability to consult with the other.

On the same occasion I authorized and directed the Secretary of the Treasury to advance, without requiring security, two millions of dollars of public money to John A. Dix, George Opdyke, and Richard H. Blatchford, of New York, to be used by them in meeting such requisitions, as should be directly consequent upon the military and naval measures for the defense and support of the Government, requiring them only to act without compensation, and to report their transactions when duly called upon. The several departments of the Government at that time contained so large a number of disloyal persons, that it would have been impossible to provide safely, through official agents only, for the performance of the duties thus confided to citizens favorably known for their ability, loyalty, and patriotism. The several orders issued upon these occurrences were transmitted by private messengers, who pursued a circuitous way to the seaboard cities, inland, across the States of Pennsylvania and Ohio, and the northern lakes.

I believe that by these and other similar measures taken in that crisis, some of which were without any authority of law, the Government was saved from overthrow. I am not aware that a dollar of the public funds thus confided without authority of law to unofficial persons was either lost or wasted, although apprehensions of such misdirections occurred to me as objections to these extraordinary proceedings and

were necessarily overruled. I recall these transactions now, because my attention has been directed to a resolution which was passed by the House of Representatives on the 30th of last month, which is in these words:

"Resolved, That Simon Cameron, late Secretary of War, by intrusting Alexander Cummings with the control of large sums of the public money, and authority to purchase military supplies without restriction, without requiring from him any guarantee for the faithful performance of his duties when the services of competent public officers were available and by involving the Government in a vast number of contracts with persons not legitimately engaged in the business pertaining to the subject-matter of such contracts, especially in the purchase of arms for future delivery, has adopted a policy highly injurious to the public service and deserves the censure of the House. 71

Congress will see that I should be wanting equally in candor and in justice, if I should leave the censure expressed in this resolution to rest exclusively or chiefly upon Mr. Cameron. The same sentiment is unanimously entertained by the heads of the Departments who participated in the proceedings which the House of Representatives has censured. It is due to Mr. Cameron to say, that although he fully approved the proceedings, they were not moved nor suggested by himself, and that not only the President but all the other heads of Departments were at least equally responsible with him for whatever error, wrong, or fault was committed in the premises."

In contemplating the breaches thus made in the Constitution, it is manifest that the approval of Congress could not repair them nor could fear of its censure prevent them. Viewed in whatever light we may choose, the fact remains that in default of a judicious system for the national defense the President raised armies, provided navies, and opened the doors of the Treasury to irresponsible citizens.

Looking back to these violent times, it would seem impossible that at the beginning of the great civil war such strides toward despotism should not have proved fatal to the Union. Nevertheless, the history of the Revolution and the Rebellion encourages the hope, but let us not rely upon it too much, that when legislative wisdom fails the liberties of the country may still be safe in the hands of a Washington or a Lincoln.

OUR ARMIES ORGANIZED BY THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.C

In connection with the foregoing violations of the Constitution, there is anothor fact scarcely less startling.

So completely overwhelmed was the Secretary of War in providing arms and supplies for the 75,000 militia, that the subject of organizing the volunteers and regulars called out by the President's proclamation of May 3, was tossed over for solution to the Secretary of the Treasury. In the discharge of a military duty upon which depended the lives of hundreds of thousands of our citizens, if not the salvation of our cause, it was fortunate for the country that the Secretary was not left to the guidance of his limited experience. Three officers, Colonel Thomas, Adjutant-General, Major McDowell, Assistant

a President's message, May 27, 1862.

"There are two methods of destroying a republic-by usurpation and by inanity— one is active, the other passive. Governments die when the wind gives out, as with man. In 1861 it was not only the default of a judicious system, but because our inherited prejudices tied the hand of the Executive, leaving him at the mercy of Congress, and Congress always neglects their duty and throws off on 'servants.' Garfield's speech last summer was able on this subject.-W. T. S."

The above note on the original manuscript is in the handwriting of General Sherman.-EDITORS.

"New to me and most interesting.-W. T. S." Note by General Sherman.EDITORS.

Adjutant-General, and Captain Franklin, Topographical Engineers, were detailed to assist him.

The senior officer, like the Secretary of War, was so wholly engrossed in preparing orders for the Government, assignment, and instruction of the militia, that he could not be present at any of the discussions of the board.

The junior officer was a subordinate of the Secretary of the Treasury, being at the time in charge of the bureau now known as that of the Supervising Architect of the Treasury.

When Major McDowell and Captain Franklin reported to Mr. Chase, he informed them that "the whole matter of organization was left with him," and then directed them to draw up a programme.

In the informal board as then constituted, there was no equality between members. The officers were free to make propositions, but their acceptance or rejection rested wholly with the Secretary.

Both officers united in recommending for all of the troops a regimental organization of three battalions, two of which were to be kept in the field, the third to remain in depot for the purpose of drilling and recruiting. Not coinciding with the officers, the Secretary settled the difference of opinion by compromise. The three-battalion organization was accepted for the regulars, but rejected for the volunteers on the ground that it was inexpedient to abandon an organization with which the militia were already familiar. Like most compromises this solution proved unsatisfactory, the new regular regiments never were raised, while for the volunteers an organization was adhered to, descending from the Revolution.

The next recommendation, that the term of enlistment should be for three years, was accepted. A call for 300,000 men was also discussed. Captain Franklin recommended that they should be considered a part of the Regular Army, the regiments to be regularly numbered, the officers to be commissioned by the President, on nomination by the governors of States, the regiments to be apportioned to the States on the basis of Congressional representation, each regiment to be kept full, by recruitment from the district within which it was raised.

These propositions were rejected by the Secretary, who said "he would rather have no regiments raised in Ohio than that they should not be known as Ohio regiments."e

It was partly to meet these states-rights objections, and to relieve the fear of too great a centralization of power in the hands of the Government, that the proposition was made to permit the Governors to name the officers.

It will be seen from the foregoing recommendations that before being fatally committed to a system which had bankrupted the nation in the Revolution, and dissipated nearly all its resources in the war of 1812, an officer of the Army recommended the three-battalion organization, regimental depots, and territorial recruitment. Had he urged in addition, the adoption of the principle of obligatory military service-a principle the Government was forced to adopt two years later-the

a Letter from General Franklin, dated November 9, 1877.

This objection was entirely groundless. In Iowa, for example, the battalion or regimental organization was unknown, there being but three or four companies of militia in the State. The number of volunteers furnished and sent forth in new organizations from Iowa was 75,793.

In the language of General Franklin, "Here his states-rights feelings came in.” Letter from General Franklin, November 9, 1877.

system would have been identical with that of every nation famed for military power.

The general policy of the Government in favor of volunteers having been decided, the officers drew up two plans of organization for the regulars and volunteers, which were approved by the Secretary of the Treasury, adopted by the War Department, and published to the Army in General Orders, Nos. 15 and 16, dated May 4, 1861. Subsequently they were adopted by Congress in the laws of July 22, 25, and 29, and thus became the basis of organization for all the national forces. Novel as were the duties imposed upon the Secretary of the Treasury, he and his assistants deserved the gratitude of the nation. By simply fixing the term of enlistment at three years, thus giving the volunteers time to become veterans, they insured us against a series of disasters such as under the system of 1812, or that adopted for the volunteers at the beginning of the Mexican war, must inevitably have terminated in the dissolution of the Union. "

USE OF THE REGULAR ARMY.

To anyone familiar with our military history, the difficulties of recruiting regulars in competition with volunteers, would have suggested the reduction of the line of the Army to a cadre, and the dispersion of its officers as commanders and instructors among the new troops. Had this course been adopted every regiment of volunteer infantry, cavalry, and artillery might have had a regular officer for a leader, and with these to guide the instruction, three months would have sufficed to give us an army in fair drill and discipline.

At least one statesman in the Senate perceived the wisdom of such a policy. In discussing the increase of the Regular Army, Mr. Wilson said:

This Army of ours is paralyzed toward the head. Your ablest officers are young captains and lieutenants, and if I wished to-day to organize a heavy military force, such as we are calling into the field, I would abolish the Army as the first act, and I then would take officers from the Army and place them where their talents fit them to go, without reference to the rank they occupied in the old regiments.

The volunteers themselves felt the need of this policy, and when first called to arms, eagerly sought trained commanders.

Unfortunately for the country, the General in Chief and the Adjutant-General of the Army placed themselves in opposition. Fearing to ruin the Army, so little did the latter appreciate the value of instructing the volunteers, that officers already in command of regiments and brigades were ordered back to their companies to serve in obscurity, while officers of little or no education at once leaped to the command of divisions and armies.

For this deplorable result, entailing a prolongation of the war and

a The author is indebted for the above facts to Generals Franklin and McDowell. In reference to the part taken by the Secretary of the Treasury in organizing our armies, General McDowell in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, relating to events immediately preceding the battle of Bull Run, stated: "I have begged of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Treasury, who at that time was connected with the Secretary of War in many of the plans and organizations going forward, that I should not be obliged to organize and discipline and march and fight all at the same time. I said that it was too much for any person to do." (Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 2, p. 37.) b Senate Debates, July 13, 1861.

a useless sacrifice of life and treasure, our military counselors at Washington were chiefly responsible. But they were not alone in the conviction that the policy of detaching officers to command the volunteers, "would ruin the Army," for as late as 1864 General Meade, the commander of the Army of the Potomac, refused to let a subaltern of engineers take a regiment, on the ground that "a lieutenant of engineers was of more importance than a colonel of volunteers."

Being persuaded, through the intercession of a corps commander, to withdraw his opposition, the lieutenant within six months was advanced from a regiment to a brigade, and within a year was leading a cavalry division.

So strong was the opposition to this policy and so ardent the desire of officers to accept regiments that, reflecting the popular feeling on the subject, Congress, in the law of July 29, 1861, organizing the new regiments, authorized the Commanding General, in his discretion, to "detail any of the officers now in the Regular Army to service with the volunteer regiments now in the field, or which may hereafter be called out, with such rank as may be offered them in said volunteer regiments, for the purpose of imparting to them military instruction and efficiency."

The defeat of the law, so excellent in intention, scarcely needs vindication. For want of being mandatory, it permitted the fatal opposition to continue, until the volunteers began to feel themselves soldiers no longer requiring trained officers to lead them. "

The failure at the War Department to appreciate the value of professional training operated against individuals outside of the Army. When General Grant, in 1861, addressed the Adjutant-General, stating that, having received a military education, he felt it his duty to place at the disposal of the Government whatever skill or experience he had formerly acquired in its service, no notice was taken of his application, nor was his letter deemed of sufficient importance to preserve.

This neglect, however, proved to himself and the country a blessing in disguise. Five weeks later, placed at the head of a regiment by Governor Yates, of Illinois, he began the marvelous career which led him to the command of all our armies, and still higher, to the Presidency of the Republic.

Other graduates of the Military Academy were scarcely less fortunate in being out of the Army. Wherever they were living, popular instinct designated them to fill the highest commands, to become at once prominent characters in the war.

To establish the fact that the Government did not know how to utilize the professional skill at its disposal, let us again refer to statistics:

Total number of graduates of the Military Academy, from 1829 to 1861, both years inclusive..

Total died within same period

1,426

363 1,063

750

313

a As an instance of the opposition of the Adjutant-General, the first War Governor of Iowa made a personal application for the detail of a graduate of the Military Academy as colonel of an Iowa regiment, and was refused. He afterwards succeeded, by carrying the application to the Secretary of War. (Statement made by ex-Governor Kirkwood, March 15, 1879.)

↳ Badeau's Military History of Ulysses S. Grant, vol. 1, p. 9.