a Fearing exposure to the yellow fever, and beginning to look forward o their discharge six weeks before the expiration of their term of enlistment, General Scott, on the 4th of May, parted with seven of his eleven regiments of volunteers, numbering in the aggregate 4,000 men. Thus reduced by discharge, by expiration of service, and by disease to 5,820 effective men, our army, which had advanced to Puebla, within three days' march of the enemy's capital, was compelled for more than two months to remain on the defensive, while the enemy, profiting by the delay, reorganized an army of five times its number. In fact, after the discharge of the volunteers, having heard of no reenforcements, except 960 recruits ordered from New York and Newport, Kentucky, General Scott abandoned Jalapa, and with no communication with his base of supplies he found himself needlessly exposed to the danger of investment and capture. Formidable as had been our preparations, they appeared about to collapse, a calamity that was only averted by the superior quality of our troops. Had the small force of General Scott, embracing nine-tenths of the Regular Army, been captured, experience teaches us that with the system of short enlistments and inexperienced officers, 100,000 raw troops could not have retrieved the disaster. Our failure to appreciate the demands of a foreign war was again proven at this period of our history. The recommendations for a number of new regular regiments, it will be remembered, were not adopted till the 11th of February, 1847, which so delayed their organization that they arrived only in time to participate in the brief operations about the City of Mexico. The appointment of the officers of these regiments reveals another inconsistency in our military policy. From its foundation the Military Academy had been assailed by enemies who demanded its abolition; but Congress had wisely resisted this clamor, and, refusing to yield to a memorial from the legislature of a State which to-day among its West Point graduates boasts of a Grant, a Sherman, and a Sheridan, had steadily voted appropriations, until at the outbreak of the Mexican war nearly every regular officer below the rank of major had received the benefit of its instruction. Educated at no inconsiderable cost, had these officers been appointed colonels and captains of the new regiments, in a couple of months the latter would have begun to acquire the steadiness of veterans, and in battle would have made a handsome return to the nation for the expense incurred in training its officers. But a policy so wise was prevented by a defect or an omission, in the law, which was explained by the Secretary as follows: There is so much doubt whether officers now in the Regular Army would take commissions of not more than one or two grades above those which they now hold, that it is not probable many will be selected for the new regiments. As these regiments are to be disbanded by express provision of the law which authorizes them, at the conclusion of the war, those officers who may be transferred to them would be in great danger of being thrown out of the Army. b Had the law, with the object of using professional training to the greatest advantage, prescribed that even the field officers of the new regiments should be selected, as in the case of the additional majors, from the officers of the Army, with the further provision that they should not vacate their commissions, the new troops could soon have been made efficient. In the absence of such a provision, the Army a House Ex. Doc. No. 60, Thirtieth Congress, first session, p. 993. Register shows that, with the exception of six officers who were, or had been, in the Regular Army, the officers of the new regiments, numbering more than 400, were appointed fresh from civil life." As a consequence of this policy inexperienced colonels and ignorant captains led the new regiments to battle, while in the old battalions the future commanders of our armies were trudging as file closers in rear of their companies. Such a policy, bad enough for the infantry, when applied to the dragoons, an arm of service requiring for its efficiency years of training, could only result in a waste of the public treasure. At the same time that the new regiments were organizing, the Government as late as April, 1847, continued to accept fresh volunteers, all, it is needless to say, enlisted "for the war. These new troops, both regulars and volunteers, as fast as organized were forwarded to the little army which for three months had remained at Puebla, overlooking an enemy's capital numbering more than 180,000 people. The slowness with which reinforcements were forwarded to Mexico shows how impossible it would have been to afford succor to our army had the enemy been able to take the offensive. On the 4th of June a small detachment of 3 companies of dragoons and 6 of infantry, composed almost wholly of recruits, left Vera Cruz with a large train, but being attacked by guerrillas the second day out they were compelled to halt for reinforcements. June 8 General Cadwalader, with another detachment of 500 men, marched to the support of Colonel McIntosh, joined him on the 10th, and together after a sharp skirmish pushed on to Jalapa, where they arrived on the 15th. The 19th, having been joined by the garrison of Jalapa, General Cadwalader again resumed the march, arriving on the 21st at Perote. Here part of his animals having given out, he had to wait till the 23d to refit, when, as he was about to march, he received orders from General Pillow, who had arrived at Vera Cruz on the 13th, to delay till their forces could unite. This being accomplished on the 1st of July, the combined force of 4,500 men resumed the march on the 2d and 3d, and on the 8th joined the army at Puebla. The arrival of the puny reinforcement more than two months and a half after the battle of Cerro Gordo raised the total strength of the army to but 10,276, of whom 2,215, or nearly one-fourth, were sick." On the 19th of July another reinforcement of 3,000 men, composed chiefly of the new regular regiments and recruits for the old army, left Vera Cruz under General Pierce, and, reduced to 2,429 men," reached Puebla on the 6th of August. Reinforced in the aggregate to nearly 14,000 men, of whom 3,000 were sick or in hospital, while other detachments were made to guard this line of communications, General Scott, on the 7th of August, resumed the offensive against an army estimated by the Mexicans themselves at 36,000 men and 100 pieces of cannon. The composition of his army at the moment of advancing in the face of such overwhelming numbers was as follows: a The act of Congress of March 2, 1899, authorized the President to raise a force of not exceeding 35,000 volunteers. It has been said of these regiments that the Government has never had more satisfactory volunteers, and this has been largely attributed to their method of organization, and to the fact that the senior officers in each of the regiments were selected on their efficiency records from the officers of the Regular Army.-EDITORS. House Ex. Doc. No. 60, Thirtieth Congress, First session, p. 1013. € Ripley's War with Mexico, vol. 2, p. 166. d Ripley's War with Mexico, vol. 2, p. 161. Gen. William J. Worth's division. Bvt. Col. John Garland's brigade: Second Artillery, Third Artillery, Fourth Infantry. Col. Ñ. S. Clarke's brigade: Third Infantry, Sixth Infantry, Eighth Infantry, Light Company A, Second Artillery; Light battalion. Gen. David E. Twigg's division. Gen. P. F. Smith's brigade: First Artillery; Third Infantry; Rifle Regiment. Col. B. Riley's brigade: Fourth Artillery; Second Infantry; Seventh Infantry; Engineer company; Ordnance company; Light Company K, First Artillery. Gen. Gideon J. Pillow's division. Gen. F. Pierce's brigade: Ninth Infantry; Twelfth Infantry; Fifteenth Infantry. Gen. George Cadwalader's brigade: Voltigeurs; Fourteenth Infantry; Eleventh Infantry; Light Company I, First Artillery. Gen. J. A. Quitman's division. Gen. James Shields's brigade: New York Regiment; South Carolina Regiment; Marine Corps. Lieut. Col. S. E. Watson's brigade: Second Pennsylvania Volunteers; H Company, Third Artillery; C Company, Third Dragoons. Gen. Wm. S. Harney's brigade: First Battalion Cavalry; Second Battalion Cavalry. The relative composition of the army of regulars and volunteers should not escape the reader's attention. The President in his message asked Congress to give him "a large body of volunteers to serve not less than six or twelve months.” Congress, going beyond the request, gave him authority to call out 50,000 for twelve months," or "to the end of the war," and yet, through his own mistake, when the crisis arrived there were but four half-filled regiments present to participate in the conflict. But those regiments organized in December of 1846 had had the benefit of eight months' training, had already participated in the siege of Vera Cruz and the battle of Cerro Gordo, and were worthy of being called reliable troops. Advancing with an army of less than 10,000 effectives, the brilliant victories of Contreras, Cherubusco, El Molino del Rey, and Chapultepec opened the gates of the capital, which General Scott entered on the 14th of September. In the series of battles, beginning on the 20th of August, our largest force engaged was 8,479; our loss in killed and wounded was 2,703, which reduced the army when it reached the city to less than 6,000 men. The aggregate strength of the three regiments of volunteers which participated in these battles-the fourth being left to garrison Pueblawas on the morning of the battle of Contreras 1,580. The aggregate strength of the Army, regulars and volunteers, on the same date was 11,052. The forwarding of troops after the crisis had passed was not unlike that which followed the battle of Palo Alto. On the 19th of July the Secretary of War wrote to General Scott that since the 24th of May he had heard of the arrival at Vera Cruz of 4,603 regular troops (new levies and reorganized companies), 300 marines, and two companies of Pennsylvania volunteers 133 strong,' making an aggregate of over 5,000 men.' port a Official report of General Scott, dated National Palace, Mexico, September 18, 1847.-A. G. Ó. House Ex. Doc. No. 60, Thirtieth Congress, first session, p. 1003. On the 6th of October he again wrote: There is also a considerable volunteer force which was called out many months since, and has been slow in organizing, now on its way to your column. The Adjutant-General's estimate herewith of the total number of these troops and other detachments make the aggregate force en route under orders and being mustered into service about 15,000, since General Pierce's advance from Vera Cruz on the 14th of July, a Notwithstanding these numbers it was not until October 18,' that General Lane with 3,300 reached Puebla. November 10, General Patterson with 2,600 arrived at Jalapa; December 14, these combined reinforcements, advancing in two or three columns, concentrated at Puebla to the number of 9,000; December 17, their advance reached the City of Mexico. In the meantime such was the sickness of the troops in the army at the capital that those present for duty on December 4, were reported by General Scott as only about 6,000. These figures show that in consequence of errors of statesmanship and a bad system of recruitment we needlessly exposed our army to the dangers of capture for a period of more than six months. Had the strength of the army during this time been calculated with nicety, based on a knowledge of the numbers and discipline of the enemy, we might applaud the apparent economy which achieved such results; but with the fact already stated, that for want of a bureau of military statistics, the chief of the most important department of supply could not learn at Washington whether wagons could be used in Mexico, we must ascribe the perils of our troops to the same mismanagement and want of reflection that supplied the means for military operations in 1812. Notwithstanding the delays in forwarding men and supplies, such was the quality of our troops that the enemy, no longer able to oppose them, listened to propositions of peace, and on the 2d of February, 1848, ratified the treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo. Pursuant to this treaty and the President's proclamation, our army on the 5th of the following July, 26 months after the commencement of hostilities, evacuated Mexican territory. STATISTICS. With the salient facts before us, that General Taylor fought the first battles of the war with 2,100 regulars, when, but for the defect of the law, he might have had, by a simple increase of the rank and file, a force of 8,000; that the 13 regiments of the Regular Army with which General Scott landed at Vera Cruz could have been raised to 15,000 men; that with such an army he could have entered the City of Mexico on the heels of Cerro Gordo; that at no time before the event his maximum force exceeded 13,500, and that after a brilliant series of battles he finally entered the Mexican capital with less than 6,000 men, let us next consider the number of troops the Government employed: Regulars (old establishment). Army of occupation, May, 1846.. Number of recruits and troops who joined the Army in Mexico. Total a House Ex. Doc. No. 60, Thirtieth Congress, first session, p. 1008. b Same, p. 1030. Same, p. 1031. d Same, p. 1039. e Same, p. 1033. f Scott's Autobiography, vol. 2, p. 420. 3, 554 15,736 19, 290 Regulars (new establishment). 1 regiment of dragoons, 8 regiments of infantry, 1 regiment of voltigeurs.... 11,186 Total, Regular Army. Battalion of marines 30,476 548 Total, regular forces 31, 024 Reenforcements for the old army to the number of 19,066 started for Mexico, leaving, after deducting 15,736 who joined, 3,930 who never reached their destination. The whole number of troops and recruits sent to the new establishment was 11,976, of whom 790 failed to join. For the old establishment from May 1, 1846, to July 5, 1848, 21,018 men were enlisted. For the new establishment during the same period the number was 13,991. Total 35,009. Resolving the volunteer force of 73,260 into the different arms of service, it consisted of Resolving it into officers and men, it consisted of Officers. Noncommissioned officers and privates 3, 131 70, 129 In this mass of men, who were totally inexperienced at the beginning of their service, there was a leaven of between thirty and forty officers who were in, or had been in, the Regular Army. The total force employed during the war, including 31,024 regulars and marines, was 104,284. The actual number mustered in, exclusive of the army of occupation (3,554) and 548 marines, was 100,454. From these figures it will be perceived that the regular troops, 31,024, exceeded more than six times the number of regulars and volunteers with whom Taylor at Buena Vista defeated the entire Mexican army; while, omitting the three and six months' men and adding 31,024 to the 60,659 volunteers for twelve months and the war, the aggregate, 91,683 regulars and volunteers, was nine times as great as the effective strength of the army with which Scott fought the decisive battles around the City of Mexico. |