Transaction Cost Economics and Beyond: Towards a New Economics of the FirmPsychology Press, 1994 - 214 oldal Transaction cost economics have come to dominate discussions about the nature of the firm. In this critical analysis of the transaction cost paradigm, Michael Dietrich argues that whilst it offers some vital insights, the transaction cost approach is an inadequate basis for a general theory of the firm. Beginning with an overview of transaction costs, it outlines both the advantages and the disadvantages of the approach. Assuming that the organization of the firm is static, transaction cost economics is least effective in explaining the dynamic aspects of firms' behaviour. However, rather than rejecting the whole approach on these grounds, Michael Dietrich looks at ways in which the theory can be enlarged and its explanatory power increased. Considering such recent innovations as total quality control and just-in-time management the book presents a vision of the firm in which decision making can be both hierarchical and creative. The implications of this for business policy are assessed. |
Tartalomjegyzék
FIGURES | |
PREFACE | |
1 INTRODUCTION | |
BEYOND TRANSACTION COSTS | |
BEYOND TRANSACTION COSTS | |
A NEW ECONOMICS OF THE FIRM | |
Más kiadások - Összes megtekintése
Transaction Cost Economics and Beyond: Toward a New Economics of the Firm Michael Dietrich Korlátozott előnézet - 2008 |
Transaction Cost Economics and Beyond: Towards a New Economics of the Firm Michael Dietrich Korlátozott előnézet - 1994 |
Transaction Cost Economics and Beyond: Toward a New Economics of the Firm Michael Dietrich Korlátozott előnézet - 2008 |
Gyakori szavak és kifejezések
activity addition advantage alternative approach argued argument arms-length asset specificity assumption behaviour bounded rationality capital market Casson central characteristics comparative static competitive complexity conglomerate contracting decentralised decision defined detail discussed in Chapter diversification dominant dynamic earlier economies of scope effects efficiency emphasis endogenise ex ante example exist exogenous exploit facilitate factors firm follows governance structure benefits governance structure costs Hence hierarchy Hodgson idiosyncratic implies important in-house increase individual industrial policy information asymmetries inputs inside contracting institutional internal organisation internalisation intra-firm involved knowledge long-run M-form managerial market-based monopoly power neo-Schumpeterian opportunism organisation costs particular path dependent perspective possible potential private sector problems processes production profit maximisation public sector putting-out system quasi-integration strategies recognise relationships relevant resource allocation result shift short-run static suggested tacit knowledge technological theory tion transaction cost analysis transaction cost economics transaction cost reasoning uncertainty vertical integration Williamson Williamsonian