nefs of it. For example; in adultery, fodomy, beftiality, murder, treafon, blafphemy, the hating of God; though the obliquity and finfulnefs be foul and heinous, and therefore from man only; yet the act itself is very good, and therefore from God, and of his determining and production. PAG. Is there any good in adultery, &c ? why then do good men generally pray against it, and declaim against it (before the commiffion of it?) for if it be good, it is defirable, and to be commended and after commiffion, why are the criminals. enjoined penance, rather than obliged to give thanks, that God hath prevented them with fuch fweet mercies! And among ft men, why are fuch fevere laws continued againft adulterers, to cut off the fpurious brood from their father's inheritance? Dio. This feverity is practifed in deteftation of fo foul a fin, and to deter men from it. PAG. If the act of God be principal in the production (as I muft needs conclude from your doctrine that it is) I hope it is very clean and innocent; elfe a holy God would never have made fuch an ineluctable decree about it, much lefs would he predetermine man's will (without any prefcience of his own free and previous inclination) to it: and forafmuch as fuch an abfolute predetermination makes the act unavoidable, that inevitably makes the penalty unjuft, that is inflicted to deter from it, Dio. It cannot be unjuft to inforce the obfervation of the righteous laws of God; and we know, though he doth predetermine the will of man, to the production of the act itself, yet he forbids the finfulnefs of it under a fevere penalty, PAG. By this doctrine you will make as well the commands of God, as the prayers of men, against the fouleft fins, to be unjuft, irrational and abfurd; for, according to this doctrine, God ties men to impoffibilities of his own making; he ties them to divide things that are infeparable, either of their own nature, or by his divine conftitution. In blafphemy, and the hatred of God, (for example) the formal finfalnefs and the 3 R 2 material material act are infeparable; let the real enmity of these acts be determined by the will, acting with judgment and liberty, it is impoffible even to the abfolute power of God, but that the formal finfulness fhould follow it: if therefore God doth abfolutely and effectually fore-ordain, and intrinsically predetermine the will of man to the real entity of the act of blafphemy, or the hatted of God; and yet tie him to avoid the fin in these acts, he ties him to abfolute impoffibilities; nay, he ties him to do that which is impoffible to his own omnipotency; becaufe it implies a contradiction, that in these fins the act should be without the pravity, the entity without the finfulness, for thefe actions are evil, antecedently to any pofitive law; evil, intrinfically and effentially evil. And this opinion makes our prayers against fin, no lefs irrational and abfurd than God's commands; for what God does in time, that he decreed to do from all eternity. Suppofe then that God hath decreed to produce the act of adultery, blafphemy, hating of God in me; in praying against thefe, I must pray either that God would refcind his own decree for their production in me, or that he would separate the finfulness from the entity of them, which is impoffible. Dio. But I told you, though God doth produce the act, and predetermine the will intrinfically unto it, yet he doth but permit the finfulness of it. PAG. You may as well fay, he doth but permit the burning of the flax, who doth actually throw it into the fire; and the adulterer, affuming the act of his uncleannefs upon himfelf, might with as much how of realon, proteft that he was but the permitter of the obliquity of it. Some of your greatest fchoolmen do affirm, that the divine permiffion doth not tie a man up to one of the oppofites, that is, to evil; but leaves his will at liberty to make choice of either; that is, of the evil act, or the good one oppofed to it. This is impoffible for him to do, under the arreft of fuch an abfolute decree, and intrin. fical predetermination, and fimultaneous concourfe, as your permiffion permiffion importeth. Again, what God permits, doubtless it is in his power to hinder. Dio. It feems you will not diftinguish God's permission from his operation and efficiency; nor allow him to be the author of any act, but he must be charged with those imperfections alfo which it contracts through the deficiency of the fecond caufe. PAG. You are very much mistaken; for I think God's permiffion ought by all means to be diftinguifhed from his efficiency; but you do moft fhamefully confound them and I do acknowledge that fome acts are of that nature, that the act itfelf may be from God, and the vitiofity from the creature; as in the act of prayer and alms-giving. God may ftir up a an alms, and yet he may perform it man to pray, or to give an alms, and with a mixture of vain-glory, Matt. vi. 2. But in acts that are intrinfically evil in themselves, filthy and unclean, the vitiofity in those cannot really be diflinguifhed from the act; nor the act, fo long as the law that makes it fin ftands in force, be separated from the vitiofity, unless it he by a mere mental abftraction, as adultery, blafphemy, hating of God: in thefe, hethat is the author of the act, muft needs be the author alfo of the vitiofity. He that is the author of the inequality of the legs, or of the motion in fuch as are lame, is the author likewise of the halting. He that is author of the antecedent, is the author of that which doth neceffarily follow from that antecedent, whether it be positive or privative. He that is the author of the fun, is the author alfo of the light. He that is the author of the interpofition interpofition of the moon, betwixt the fun and the earth, is allo the author of the fun's eclipfe, and the darkness that follows it; for that rule holds here, "He that is the caufe of the caufe, is the caufe alfo of the effect, or that which is caufed." But give me leave to put one queftion to you. When God commands, "Thou shalt not commit adultery," is this the fenfe of that preceptTake heed, left while you produce the free act of adultery, any moral pravity or finfulnefs fhould attend it? Or is this the meaning of it-Abftain altogether from the free act of adultery, because the finfulness or pravity that deforms it, is infeparable? Is it the very act of adultery, murder, blafphemy, hating of God, that is forbidden by the law of God; or only fome defect or inordination fuperadded to it, and diftin&t from it? If fome defect or inordination. only, you may do well to difcover it, that the adulterer, being taught to diftinguish, may take the pleasure of the act, and yet keep himself innocent from the tranfgreffion. But if the act itself be forbidden by the law, and as fuch an act, then the author of the act is the author of what the law forbids, which is the fin. Where it is impoffible to divide them in the commiffion, as in adultery, blafphemy, hating of God, why should you diftinguish them in the imputation? You fay the first cause fo concurs with the fecond, that they produce but one and the fame action; that the firft is the principal, immediate, and predetermining caufe. If then the finfulness of the action [produced betwixt them] be as infeparable from it as heat from fire, and that action be avoidable to the first, but unavoidable to the fecond; nay, if the first cause ordains that action, and as it is finful too [for otherwife it will not ferve his turn to glorify his vindictive juftice, and impels the fecond cause to commit it; I pray confider impartially, to whofe account this action ought rather, in equity, to be imputed? Dio. But the fecond caufe is not compelled, but confents freely to the finful action, and takes pleafure in the commiffion of it, PAG. PAG. Indeed though you fay the will of man is God's intrument, yet you add, that it is not a pure and mere inftrument, but a free one. But wherein do you place this liberty? Not in a free determination to produce, or not produce, the entity of the act wherein certainly true liberty confisteth] but in the confecution (which is neceffary too] of that moral pravity, about which the free power is converfant only by accident, and through the intermediation of the entity of the act. If God therefore doth pre-move and predetermine the will to the finful act, and produce it in him, the man cannot be made culpable by co-operating to this unavoidable production with freedom and pleafure: becaufe this is the property and manner of working which God was pleafed to cencreate and preferve in him. Befides, where there is an extrinsical impulfion, he that is infuperably acted by it, is equally blameless, whether that impulfion be through flattering infinuations or open violence, if they be equally irrefiftible. So that this doctrine leaves a very fair plea to excufe wickednefs, and enables the malefactor, when he is upbraided with the enormity of his crimes, to return the exprobation upon the unavoidable predetermination and impulfe of his Maker; for it is not in his power to make his own ways either good or evil. He cannot perform one evil act, unless God doth firft apply and predetermine his will unto it. And whereas there are fo many feveral forts of finners in the world, this difference comes to pass, not more by God's reftiaining of some to less, then by his predetermining of others unto more wickedness. Infoinuch as, to my apprehenfion, you make God to have as great a hand in the production of fin as of virtue; and this is the opinion of Mr. Baxter, who faith, "If no free agent can act without the predetermination of God, as the first immediate phyfical cause, I cannot fee why all our acts, good or bad, are not equally by infufion."-Mr. Baxter on Saving Faith, page 29, 30. [To be continued.] A SERMON |