WHI [Extracted from a late Author.] [Continued from page 117.] Liberty confiflent with Government, HEN it is faid that liberty would make us abfolutely ungovernable, by God or man; to underftand the ftrength of this conclufion, it is neceflary to know diftinctly what is meant by government. There are two kinds of govern ment, very different in their nature. The one we may, for diftinction's fake, call mechanical government, the other moral. The first is the government of beings, which have no active power, but are merely paffive and acted upon; the fecond, of intelligent and active beings. An inftance of mechanical government may be that of a commander of a fhip at fea. Suppofing her skilfully built, and VOL. XIV. X furnished furnished with every thing proper, to govern her requires much art and attention: and, as every art has its rules, or laws, fo has this. But by whom are those laws to be obeyed, or those rules obferved? not by the fhip, furely, for fhe is an inactive being, but by the governor. A failor may fay that the docs not obey the rudder; and he has a diftinct meaning when he fays fo, and is perfectly underflood. But he means not obedience in the proper, but in a metaphorical fenfe: for, in the proper fenfe, the fhip can no more obey the rudder, than fhe can give a command. Every motion, both of the ship and rudder, is exactly proportioned to the force imprelled, and in the direction of that force. The fhip never difobeys the laws of motion, even in the metaphorical fenfe; and they are the only laws fhe can be subject to. The failor, perhaps, curfes her for not obeying the rudder; but this is not the voice of reafon, but of paffion, like that of the lofing gamefter, when he curfes the dice. The hip is as innocent as the dice. Whatever may happen during the voyage, whatever may be its illue, the fhip, in the eye of reafon, is neither an object of approbation nor of blame; because the does not ac, but is acted upon. If the material, in any part, be faulty; who put it to that ufe? If the form; who made it? If the rules of navigation were not obferved; who tranfgreffed them? If a ftorm occafioned any difafter, it was no more in the power of the fhip than of the mafter. Another inftance to illuftrate the nature of mechanical government may be, that of the man who makes and exhibits a puppet-fhow. The puppets, in all their diverting gefticulations, do not move, but are moved by an impulfe fecretly conveyed, which they cannot refift. If they do not play their parts properly, the fault is only in the maker or manager of the machinery. Too much or too little force was applied, or it was wrong directed. No reafonable man imputes either praise or or blame to the puppets, but folely to their maker or their governor. If we fuppofe for a moment, the puppets to be endowed with understanding and will, but without any degree of active power, this will make no change in the nature of their government for, understanding and will, without fome degree of active power, can produce no effect. They might be called intelligent machines; but they would be machines ftill as much fubject to the laws of motion as inanimate matter, and therefore incapable of any other than mechanical government. Let us next confider the nature of moral government." This is the government of perfons, who have reason and active power, and have laws prescribed to them for their conduct. Their obedience is obedience in the proper fenfe; it must therefore be their own act and deed, and confequently they muft have power to obey or to difobey. To prefcribe laws to them which they have not power to obey, or to require a fervice beyond their power, would be tyranny in the highest degree. When the laws are equitable, and prefcribed by juft autho rity, they produce moral obligation in those that are subject to them, and difobedience is a crime deferving punishment. But if the obedience be impoffible; it is felf-evident, that there can be no moral obligation to what is impoffible, that there can be no crime in yielding to neceffity, and that there can be no justice in punishing a perfon for what it was not in his power to avoid. There are firft principles in morals, and, to every unpre judiced mind, as self-evident as the axioms of mathematics. Having thus explained the nature both of mechanical and of moral government, it is easy to fee how far liberty or neceffity agrees with either. On the one hand, I acknowledge that neceffity agrees perfectly with mechanical government. This kind of govern ment is moft perfect when the governor is the fole agent; every thing done is the doing of the governor only. The praife of every thing well done is his folely; and his is the X 2 blame t blame if there be any thing ill done, because he is the fole, agent. It is true that, in common language, praife or difpraise is often metaphorically given to the work; but, in propriety, it belongs folely to the author. Every workman understands this perfectly, and takes to himself very justly the praife or difpraise of his own work. On the other hand, it is no lefs evident, that, on the fuppo fition of neceffity in the governed, there can be no moral government. There can be neither wisdom nor equity in prefcribing laws that cannot be obeyed. There can be no obligation upon beings that have no active power. There can be no crime in not doing what it was impoffible to do; nor can there be juftice in punishing such omiffion. If we apply these principles to the kinds of government which actually exift, whether human or divine, we fhall find that, among men, even mechanical government is imperfect. Men do not make the matter they work upon. Its various kinds, and the qualities belonging to each kind, are the work of God. The laws of nature, to which it is fubject, are the work of God. The motions of the atmosphere and of the sea, the heat and cold of the air, the rain and wind, which are useful inftruments in moll human operations, are not in our power. So that, in all the mechanical productions of men, the work is more to be ascribed to God than to man. Civil government among men is a fpecies of moral government, but imperfect, as its lawgivers and its judges are. Human laws may be unwife or unjuft; human judges may be partial or unfkilful. But in all equitable civil governments, the maxims of moral government above mentioned, are acknowledged as rules which ought never to be violated. Indeed the rules of juftice are so evident to all men, that the most tyrannical governments profefs to be guided by them. That That a man cannot be under an obligation to what is impoffible; that he cannot be criminal in yielding to neceffity, nor jufly punished for what he could not avoid, are maxims admitted, in all criminal courts, as fundamental rules of juftice. In oppofition to this, it has been faid, that human laws require no more to conftitute a crime, but that it be voluntary; whence it is inferred that the criminality confifts in the determination of the will, whether that determination be free or neceffary. This is the only poffible plea by which criminality can be made confiftent with neceflity, and therefore it deserves to be confidered. [To be concluded in our next.] ** * * * * * * * ** SER MON LXII. On MATT. xxii. 12. How cameft thou in hither, rot having a wedding garment? [Concluded from page 120.] 11. ROM the very time that the Son of God delivered FROM this weighty truth to the children of men, That all who had not the wedding-garment would be caft into outward darkness, where are weeping and gnashing of teeth, the enemy of fouls has been labouring to obfcure it, that they might fill feek death in the error of their life: and many ways has he tried to difguife the Holinefs, without which we cannot be faved. How many things have been palmed, even upon the christian world, in the place of this! Some of these are ut Some were no terly contrary thereto, and fubverfive of it. ways connected with or related to it, but useless and infignificant trifles. Others might be deemed to be fome part of it, but by no means the whole. It may be of use to enumerate some of them, left ye fhould be ignorant of Satan's devices. 12. Of |