ET us next confider rational motives, to which the name LE of motive is more commonly and more properly given.. Their influence is upon the judgment, by convincing us that fuch an action ought to be done, that it is our duty, or conducive to our real good, or to fome end which we have determined to pursue. They do not give a blind impulse to the will, as animal motives do. They convince, but they do not impel, unlefs, as may often happen, they excite fome paffion of hope, or fear, or defire. Such paffions may be excited by conviction, and VOL. XIV. P may may operate in its aid, as other animal motives do. But there may be conviction without paffion; and the conviction of what we ought to do, in order to fome end which we have judged fit to be purfued, is what I call a rational motive. Brutes, I think, cannot be influenced by fuch motives. They have not the conception of ought and ought not. Chil dren acquire thefe conceptions, as their rational powers advance; and they are found in all of ripe age, who have the human faculties. If there be any competition between rational motives, it is evident, that the strongest, in the eye of reason, is that which it is most our duty and our real happinefs to follow. Our duty and our real happiness are ends which are infeparable; and they are the ends which every man, endowed with reason, is confcious he ought to pursue in preference to all others. This we may call the rational test of the ftrength of motives. A motive which is the firongeft, according to the animal test, may be, and very often is the weakeft, according to the rational. The grand and the important competition of contrary motives is between the animal, on the one hand, and the rational on the other. This is the conflict between the flesh and the fpirit, upon the event of which the character of men depends. If it be asked, which of these is the strongest motive? The anfwer is, That the firft is commonly ftrongeft, when they are tried by the animal teft. If it were not fo, human life would be no state of trial. It would not be a warfare, nor would virtue require any effort or felf-command. No man would have any temptation to do wrong. But, when we try the contrary motives by the rational teft, it is evident, that the rational motive is always the strongest. And now, I think, it appears, that the ftrongeft motive, according to either of the tefts I have mentioned, does not always prevail. In every wife and virtuous action, the motive that prevails is the ftrongest according to the rational teft, but commonly the weakest according to the animal. In every foolish, and in every vicious action, the motive that prevails is commonly the strongest according to the animal test, but always the weakest according to the rational. 6. It is true, that we reafon from men's motives to their actions, and, in many cafes, with great probability, but never with abfolute certainty. And to infer from this, that men are necesfarily determined by motives, is very weak reasoning. For let us fuppofe, for a moment, that men have moral liberty, I would ask, what use may they be expected to make of this liberty? It may furely be expected, that, of the various actions. within the sphere of their power, they will chufe what pleases them most for the present, or what appears to be most for their real, though diftant good. When there is a competition between these motives, the foolish will prefer prefent gratification; the wife the greater, and more diftant good. Now, is not this the very way in which we fee men aft? Is it not from the prefumption that they act in this way, that we reafon from their motives to their actions? Surely it is. Is it not weak reasoning, therefore, to argue, that men have not liberty, becaule they act in that very way in which they would act if they had liberty? It would furely be more like reafoning to draw the contrary conclufion from the fame premises. 7. Nor is it better reafoning to conclude, that, if men are not neceffarily determined by motives, all their actions must be capricious. To refift the strongest animal motives, when duty requires, is fo far from being capricious, that it is, in the highest degree, wife and virtuous. And we hope this is often done by good men. To act against rational motives, must always be foolish, vicious, or capricious. And, it cannot be denied, that there are too many fuch actions done. But is it reafonable to conclude, |