Dismission of Bill for want of Prosecution, p. 212.

MOTION to dismiss bill for want of prosecutionCross motion for leave to amend, by striking out part of the case made, and of the relief prayed by the bill-Plaintiff allowed to amend; he paying the costs of both motions, and undertaking to file his amendments within ten days, and a replication within a week afterwards. (The Duke of Leeds v. Earl Amherst, 6 Jur. 92.-V. C. S.).

Breach of Injunction, p. 236.

THE mere fact of amending a bill does not of itself dissolve a common injunction. A defendant in equity having obtained a judgment at law, the plaintiff in equity obtained an injunction restraining him from proceeding to execution; the former notwithstanding obtained a rule nisi:-Held, that, in so doing, he committed a breach of the injunction. (Brooks v. Purton, 6 Jur. 94.-V. C. B.).

Confidential Communications, p. 298.

As to confidential communications it has recently been stated, by the highest authority, that where an attorney is employed by a client professionally, to transact professional business, all communications relative to the business on which he is so employed are privileged communications, and that this is the

privilege of the client and not of the attorney." (Herring v. Clobery, 6 Jur. 202-C.)

Distringas, (See Gen. Ord. App. lxxxix).

SOME time previously to the passing of the 5 Vict. c. 5, whereby the equity jurisdiction of the Court of Exchequer was transferred to the Court of Chancery, a party sued out and lodged at the Bank of England a writ of distringas, in consequence whereof a restraint was put on the transfer of and payment of the dividends upon certain sums of stock standing in the bank books in the name of a deceased testator; but no bill was filed by such party for an injunction to stay the transfer. After the act had come into operation, the same party, upon notice from the bank, presented a petition to the Lord Chancellor under the 4th section of this act, and obtained an injunction, ex parte, restraining the transfer and payment of the stock and dividends. The executrix thereupon moved to discharge the order granting the injunction. The Lord Chancellor said, “In this case, which came on yesterday, I have read the petition, and it appears that in the month of August last a bill of discovery was filed in the Court of Exchequer. It also appears, that in the same month a distringas was sued out and served upon the Bank of England. That operates as a precautionary measure, and the party has the opportunity of filing a bill in the ordinary way, and moving for an injunction; and having the stock, in the mean time, secured. The practice

has been for the Bank of England to give notice to the party who has sued out the writ, that unless within a certain time a bill is filed and an injunction obtained, the restraint on the transfer will be taken off. The period, I believe, according to the usual practice, is a week. This was the position of things when the act of Parliament came into force for transferring the equity jurisdiction of the Court of Exchequer to this Court. Now, had that jurisdiction continued-if the party had sued out a second writ of distringas, which he might have done, the bank would have paid no attention to it. That would have been the state of things if the jurisdiction of the Court of Exchequer had continued. Then the act came into operation; and, by the 4th and 5th sections of that act, as I have always understood them, and as it is fairly to be collected from the act itself, it was the intention that those two remedies should be substituted for the remedy of distringas given in the Court of Exchequer; and, therefore, a party has the right to sue out the distringas, or he may avail himself of the other proceedings under the 4th section, if he thinks proper. It does not appear to me that a party should be placed in a better situation, since the passing of the act for transferring the jurisdiction of the Court of Exchequer, than that in which he would have stood if that act had not passed." And, accordingly, his Lordship discharged the order made on the petition, and with costs, as well as the application, for it ought not to have been made. (Ex parte Amiot, 6 Jur. 137).

APPENDIX.

LORD LYNDHURST'S ORDERS of 3rd April, 1828, (2 Russ. App. p. 5), as altered and extended by the Orders of LORD BROUGHAM, of 23rd Nov. 1831*, (1 R. & M. p. 769).

I. THAT every plaintiff, as well in a country cause as in a town cause, shall be at liberty, without affidavit, to obtain an order for a subpoena returnable immediately; but such subpoena in a country cause is to be without prejudice to the defendant's right to eight days' time to enter his appearance after he has been served with the subpœna.

II. That a writ of subpoena to appear, or to appear and answer, shall be sued out for each defendant, except in the case of husband and wife defendants; and that the costs of all such writs shall be costs in the cause.

III. That a defendant in a country cause shall no longer be permitted to crave the common dedimus; but shall either put in his answer within eight days after his appearance, or shall obtain the usual orders for time.

IV. That in all cases, whether the defendant's answer be filed in term time or in vacation, the plaintiff shall be allowed two months to deliver exceptions to such answer; but if the exceptions be not delivered within the two months, the answer shall thenceforth be

* The Orders of November, 1831, are distinguished by an Asterisk prefixed. The words printed in Italics indicate the variations from the Orders as originally promulgated by Lord Lyndhurst, and the brackets indicate the additions made to them.

b

deemed sufficient, and the plaintiff shall have no order to deliver exceptions nunc pro tunc.

V. That when exceptions taken to an answer for insufficiency are not submitted to, the plaintiff may at the expiration of eight days after the exceptions are delivered, but not before, unless in injunction causes, refer such answer for insufficiency; and if he do not refer the same within the next six days, he shall be considered as having abandoned the exceptions; in which latter case such answer shall be thenceforth deemed sufficient.

VI. * That if the plaintiff do not, within three weeks after a defendant's second or third answer is filed, refer the same for insufficiency on the old exceptions, such answer shall thenceforth be deemed sufficient.

VII. That if the plaintiff do refer a defendant's second or third answer for insufficiency on the old exceptions, then the particular exception or exceptions to which he requires a further answer shall be stated in the order.

VIII. That if upon a reference of exceptions the Master shall find the answer insufficient, he shall fix the time to be allowed for putting in a further answer, and shall specify the same in his report, from the date whereof such time shall run, and it shall not be necessary for the plaintiff to serve a subpoena for the defendant to make a better answer; and any defendant who shall not put in a further answer within the time so allowed, shall be in contempt, and be dealt with accordingly.

IX. That if upon a reference of exceptions the answer be certified sufficient, it shall be deemed to be so from the date of the Master's report; and if the defendant submit to answer without a report from the Master, the answer shall be deemed insufficient from the date of the submission.