When the application should be made.

The security

in all cases

of £100.

a plaintiff who has wilfully misdescribed his residence will be ordered to give security for costs; (Sandys v. Long, 7 Sim. 140); but this rule does not extend to cases where it is done innocently and from mere error. (Simpson v. Burton, 1 Beav. 556.)

The application for this security, generally, should be made before the defendant takes any steps in the cause; for if the defendant, knowing from the bill itself, or by other means, that the plaintiff is abroad, takes a step in the cause, he cannot have this security for costs. (2 Ves. 24; 2 Bro. C. C. 609). But if the defendant is at the time this step is taken ignorant of the above fact, he may obtain the security in any stage of the cause, as soon as it comes to his knowledge. (2 Ves. 24; 2 Dick. 799). And if the plaintiff goes abroad after answer, with the intention of residing and being domiciled there, a security for costs will be required, as well as in the ordinary case, where he is abroad on filing the bill. (14 Ves. 518). But the mere fact that the plaintiff is going abroad, is not sufficient to induce the Court to require this security. (5 Ves. 699; 15 Ves. 2). Neither will it be sufficient that the plaintiff has actually left the kingdom, unless also it appears he had done so to settle abroad (2 Dick 775); much less, if it appears he intends to return to this country. (15 Ves.

3).

By the 40th (L. & B.) it is ordered, "That the to be a bond penal sum in the bond to be given as a security 'to answer costs by any plaintiff who is out of the 'jurisdiction of the Court, be increased from forty 'pounds to one hundred pounds." Upon this Order

it has been held, that a bond in the increased penalty of £100, as required by this order, is to be given in all cases where security for costs is required by the Court. (Bailey v. Gundry, 1 Kee. 53).

in Chancery.

A BILL in Chancery, according to its usual forma- Form of a bill tion, consists of nine separate parts: 1st. The Address; 2nd, the Names and Descriptions of the Plaintiffs; 3rd, the Stating Part, which contains the various allegations on which the plaintiff grounds his claim to the aid of the Court, or to relief, as it is technically called; 4th, the General Charge of Confederacy; 5th, the Special Charges; 6th, the Averment that the acts complained of are contrary to Equity, and that the plaintiff has no remedy at Law; 7th, the Interrogatories, in which the plaintiff interrogates the defendants to the facts stated or charged; 8th, the Prayer for Relief; and 9th, the Prayer for Process.

Effect of Lord Cottenham's orders.

The orders recently issued by Lords Cottenham and Langdale have laid the foundation for extensive alterations in the forms of equity pleading. In regard to the bill especially, they are of the most sweeping character, and strike at the root of the very principles on which it has hitherto been constructed. These orders apply to three of its most essential parts: the Parties, the Interrogating Part, and the Prayer of Process.

The old rule, that all persons interested must be

dered.

SECTION 2.

Parties.

THE rule has hitherto been, that all persons, hav

ing any, the slightest, interest in the matters in litiparties, consi- gation, were necessary parties to the suit: this rule,most unnecessary, certainly, for the attainment of the substantial ends of justice,-has been the prolific source of expense and delay, and, not unfrequently, of the total denial of justice. To this rule, necessity has long since supplied some exceptions. One of these is, that a single creditor may sue on behalf of himself and all other creditors of a deceased party for the administration of his estate. Another is, that in a suit for the administration of the estate of a testator or intestate, the general creditors and legatees are not necessary parties, but are sufficiently represented by the executors or administrators. It has also been settled, where there are a great number of persons having a common interest, and when it would be impossible, if all were made parties, that the suit

6

could ever be brought to a conclusion, that a few individuals may sue on behalf of all the members of the company, except such as are made defendants: but the rule is so vague and uncertain that it is extremely difficult to apply it in individual cases. The rule of the Court in cases of this sort was on several occasions the subject of observation, and its inconvenience pointed out by the late Lord Chancellor. On the last of these occasions (Walworth v. Holt, 5 Jur. 237), his Lordship said-"There are strong ' authorities to shew, that, to a bill praying dissolution, 'all the partners must be parties, and here they are so numerous, that that is impossible. If, therefore, 'the two rules contended for, namely, that a dissolu'tion must be prayed, and all the partners made par'ties to the bill, are to be supported, it is manifest, 'that the doors of the Court would be shut against 'suitors in all cases where the partners were nu6 merous; which would be nothing less than an ' absolute denial of justice. The result is sufficient to shew that cannot be the law. In Mare v. Malachy, (1 My. & C. 559), and more recently in 'Taylor v. Salmon, (4 My. & C. 134), I have had 'occasion to observe, that, 'It is the duty of the 'Court to adapt its practice and course of proceed'ings as far as possible to the existing state of society, and to apply its jurisdiction to all those new cases which, from the progress daily making in the affairs ' of men, must continually arise, and not, from too 'strict an adherence to forms and rules established ' under very different circumstances, decline to ad'minister justice, and to enforce rights for which

C

'there is no other remedy.' This has always been ' its principle, though it has not always been attended 'to. On this principle the Court has acted in doing away with the necessity of making persons parties. 'In Cockburn v. Thomson (16 Ves. 326), Lord Eldon says, 'The strict rule is, that all persons, materially ' interested in the subject of the suit, however numerous, ought to be parties, that there may be a 'complete decree between all parties having material interests; but, that being a general rule, established 'for the convenient administration of justice, must not be adhered to in cases, to which, consistently ' with practical convenience, it is incapable of appli'cation.' The difficulty is one which must be overcome, and if it were necessary to go further than ' is required by the present case, or even to go against any established authority, in order to open the 'doors of the Court to those who cannot find relief

elsewhere, I should not shrink from such an exer'cise of its jurisdiction; but there is sufficient autho'rity, and more in favour of this bill than against it." From this line of remark it may be inferred, that whenever a suitable case should have arisen, his Lordship would not have hesitated to apply a judicial correction to a rule of practice so little adapted to the transactions of the present day. To the case, here adverted to, the new Orders have not applied any remedy. They have, however, introduced some beneficial alterations, which might with great advantage have been made more extensive.

It has been observed, that general creditors and legatees are, according to the present practice, repre