is not presumable that he would desire to have it distributed among them sooner than it would have been among his grandchildren, and there is nothing in the language of the will that indicates such a desire. It is expressly provided that the property is not to be distributed till the termination of the three lives; until distribution, no part of the income, which would have been received by the daughters,is to go to the collateral relatives; upon the death of the daughters without issue, the portion of the estate, "both principal "and interest," which would have belonged to them, goes into the mass of the estate, and is to be invested in the securities named in the will; the collateral relatives are not provided for individually, but only as a class, and that class is the surviving descendants on the termination of three lives.

If, then, we have read aright the intention of the testator, the doctrine of the acceleration of remainders, which is the main reliance of the appellees, cannot be invoked in this case; for, as we have seen, that docrine is not only subordinate to the intention of the testator, but is itself based on the intention, or what is at least presumed to be the intention, of the testator.

But if this intention were not as clearly expressed as we think it is, the doctrine of acceleration would still be inapplicable, because the property given to the wife for life is only a part, and a very small part, of the property given to the ulterior devisees, and because the gift to the collateral relatives is a gift to those members of a class surviving at the death of a certain person, and until that death occurs, it cannot be ascertained who will take.

BOUTELL & WATERMAN,

OF COUNSEL.