Glossary.

Motions for

&c., may be

at the crown side, or actions of Quare Impedit therein; the orders of the Court of Common Pleas in relation to fines and recoveries, or in relation to the statute passed in the 4th and 5th years of the reign of his late majesty King William the Iv., entitled "An Act for the abolition of Fines and Recoveries, and for the substitution of more simple modes of Assurance in Ireland," or actions of Quare Impedit therein; or the orders of the Court of Exchequer at the revenue side thereof.

AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED,

II.

That whenever any word is used in any of the following General Orders, importing the singular number, or the masculine gender only, the same shall apply to several persons as well as one person, and to bodies corporate as well as to individuals, and to females as well as males; and the word "Judge" shall be taken to mean also "Baron;" and the word " County" shall include (when necessary and consistent) any county of a city or county of a town or city, or county of a place, or city and county as the case may be; and the word "Court" shall apply to a Judge or Baron sitting alone or in chamber, as well as to the full Court; and the word "Party" or "Person" shall extend to and include any corporation or other public body; and whenever the entry of a side-bar rule, "as of course " is authorized, it shall be understood that such rule may be entered without the production of any affidavit or other document to the officer; and the word "Affidavit" shall include an affirmation or declaration made by any person who is empowered to give evidence by affirmation or declaration in lieu of oath; and none of the following rules requiring the affidavit of, or any act to be done by the attorney, or the signature of attorney or counsel, or service on the attorney, shall apply to cases where plaintiff or defendant shall sue or defend in person; but all such acts shall be done by, and notices given to the party so suing or defending in person.

COURSE OF BUSINESS OF THE COURTS.

3. Motions for prohibitions or attachments, or for any relief prohibitions, or order against a sheriff or against an attorney, grounded on made during the jurisdiction of the Court over them as officers, may be made on any day during the sitting of the Courts.

sitting of Court.

Order of precedence

at the bar.

4. On the last day of term only, members of the bar shall take precedence according to juniority, without prejudice to the Attorney or Solicitor-General, moving officially in Her Majesty's causes, at any time they may seem convenient.

5. The days for the admission of attorneys shall be the first Days for and last days of the term, and every Monday in term.

COMPUTATION OF TIME.

admission of attorneys.

time. See

r. 174.

6. When, by any rule, order, or proceeding, time is to be Mode of computed by days, it shall be inclusive or exclusive of the holy- Computing days under the Common Law Procedure Amendment Act (Ire- Reg. Gen., land), 1853, as is by that statute directed; and when by the H. T., 1853, month, it shall be considered a calendar month; and when by the year, twelve calendar months; and in all cases it shall be exclusive of the first and inclusive of the last day, unless the last be a holiday under the Common Law Procedure Amendment Act (Ireland), 1853, when the following day shall be included.

The holidays to be observed and kept in the Superior Courts are pre- Holidays. scribed by section 232 of the C. L. P. Act, 1853; by which section it is also directed that the days in question are not to be reckoned or included in any notices or other proceedings except notices of trial and inquiry, and that Sundays are not to be reckoned or included in any notice or proceeding whatsoever. It is also provided by that section that when the last day included in any such notice of trial or inquiry shall happen to be a holiday, the next day which is not a holiday is to be considered as the last of the days in such notice.

The above order provides, as will be seen, that in all cases of computa- How time tion of time it is to be reckoned exclusive of the first and inclusive of the reckoned. last day-unless when the last is a holiday. It must, however, be remembered that when the time for the doing of an act is fixed by statute, it cannot be either enlarged or shortened by a general order. (Flower v. Bright, 2 Johns & H., 590; Evans v. Jones, 2 B. & S. 45; O'Meara v. Foley, Ir. R. 4 C. L. 116).

When a question as to the computation of time arises, the chief diffi- Exclusive or culty generally lies in determining whether the time is to be reckoned inclusive. exclusive or inclusive of the days upon which the events fixed as the ter

mini, between which the time is to be reckoned, happen. When the words

clear days" are used, no difficulty arises, as in that case both of the "Clear days." days in question must be excluded; and when a proceeding is to be taken

a certain number of days "at least" before the happening of an event, "At least." the days are to be reckoned as clear days. (The Queen v. The Justices of Shropshire, 8 A. and E. 173; Young v. Higgon, 8 Dowl. 212; Woolrych on Legal Time, p. 150).

66

Where a statute required a certain notice to be inserted in the Gazette not less than fourteen days before an election, it was held that the days Not less." were clear days (The Queen v. Lauder, Ir. R. 1 C. L. 225). On the other hand when a certain number of "days' notice" is required to be given— “Days' as for instance, ten days notice of trial, time is to be reckoned exclusive notice." of the first, but inclusive of the last of the days (see p. 111).

When a proceeding, such, for instance, as the filing of a defence, is re-.. quired to be taken within a certain time from a particular date, the day from which the time runs is to be excluded from the computation of time,

Within."

"After."

"From."

"Until."

Excluding days.

Extending time.

and the party has the entire of the last day of the time fixed for the doing of the act, but not the day after (see Boyd v. Nethery, 10 Ir. C. L. R. 369, referred to at p. 41). The word "within" is sometimes used for the purpose of prescribing a period of time which must elapse between the events, as for instance in the 207th section of the C. L. P. Act, 1853, which provides that in certain events judgment may be marked and execution issued within fourteen days after verdict. In such cases the days are clear days, and are to be reckoned exclusive of both the days on which the events in question occur (O'Meara v. Foley, Ir. R. 4 C. L. 116; The Queen v. Sweeny, 2 Ir. L. R. 278).

As a general rule, when a party has a certain time given him for the doing of an act, time is to be reckoned exclusive of the day on which the event which fixes the commencement of the term happens (O'Meara v. Foley, ubi supra, Young v. Higgon, 8 Dowl. 212). In Connolly v. Bremner, L. R 1 C. P. 557, where a day's time to plead was given to the Defendant from the return of a cheque, it was held he had the entire of the subsequent day for the purpose.

Where an order was made that the Plaintiff should be at liberty to mark judgment three days after service of the order, it was held that the days were clear days (Weeks v. Wray, 9 B. and S. 62). When a certain period of time from a particular date is prescribed for any purpose, no general rule can be laid down as to whether the day of the date is to be excluded from the computation of the term, as it depends upon the reason of the thing according to the circumstances (Lester v. Carland, 15 Ves. 248). In the case of leases where the term is for so many years from a particular date, the day of date is in general to be excluded. (Ackland v. Lutley, 9 A. & E. 879; Woolrych on Legal Time, p. 143). So also where a letter of licence was given for twelve months from a particular day, it was held that the day in question was not to be included in the computation of the term (Ammarman v. Digges, 12 Ir. C. L. R. Ap. 1). On the other hand, although it is provided by section 28 of the C. L. P. Act, 1853, that a writ may be renewed for six months from the date of renewal, the day of renewal is to be included in such term (Anon 1 H. & C. 664); and possibly on the principle that judicial acts are to be considered as taking place at the earliest moment of the day on which they are done (Wright v. Mills, 28 L. J. Ex. 223), the day upon which they take place is in such cases to be included in the computation of time.

When a party has until a certain day to do some act, he is entitled to the entire of that day for the purpose of doing it (Kerr v. Jeston, 1 Dowl. N. S. 538), but when execution is respited until a certain day, it may be issued upon that day (Rogers v. Davis, 8 Ir. L. R. 399). The rule in such cases is that the party who is to do the act has the day in question for doing it. Where goods were insured from the 14th February until the 14th August, it was held that they were protected during the entire of the latter day (Isaacs v. Royal Insurance Co., L. R. 5 Ex. 296).

When the last day included in a particular period of time is a holiday, it is to be excluded from the computation of time, in case the period is prescribed by any of the C. L. P. Acts, and is reckoned by days, but where the time is reckoned by weeks or months, the time cannot be extended to the next day (Rowberry v. Morgan, 9 Ex. 730; Flower v. Bright, 2 Johns H. 590). Where, however, the period of time is prescribed by the general orders, the time will, under such circumstances, be ex

tended. The fact that the offices of the court are closed upon the last day fixed for the doing of the act, is no reason for extending the time (Evans v. Jones, 2 B. & S. 45), unless the offices are closed throughout the entire period (Mayer v. Harding, L. R. 2 Q. B. 410), and therefore the days between the 1st August and 20th October are to be included in the period of six months fixed by section 37 of the C. L. P. Act, 1853, (Mullin v. Bonjor, 5 Ir. C. L. R. 475). If, however, a party is prevented from taking a proceeding upon the last day upon which it can be taken by the default of the offices, the court will allow the proceeding to be taken nunc pro tunc (Evans v. Jones, 2 B. & S. 45, 46). In cases not coming within the provisions of the C. L. P. Acts, or the General Orders, time cannot be extended in consequence of the last day falling upon a Sunday or Holiday (Flower v. Bright, ubi supra), unless the statute fixing the time specially provides for an extension of it, or unless in such a case as Mayer v. Harding referred to above.

As to excluding the holidays in the computation of time, the principles before mentioned are applicable. When the time is fixed by statute (not being one of the C. L. P. Acts), they cannot, in the absence of a special provision, be excluded (Peacock v. The Queen, 4 C. B. N. S. 264), unless the case be similar to Mayer v. Harding, referred to above. On the other hand, when the time is fixed by one of the C. L. P. Acts or by the General Orders, and is reckoned by days, they are to be excluded, and therefore in cases within the 84th G. O. which provides that a party excepting shall furnish a draft bill of exceptions, ten days before the commencement of the next succeeding term, it has been held that the holidays are to be excluded in reckoning the time (Hassard v. Caulfield, 7 Ir. Jur. O. S. 141; White v. Tyrrell, 5 Ir. C. L. R. 278).

WRIT OF SUMMONS AND PLAINT.

summons

7. In addition to the endorsement required by the Common Endorsement Law Procedure Amendment Act (Ireland) 1853, every writ of on writ of summons and plaint shall have the following memorandum and plaint. endorsed thereon, before service thereof :--

"N.B. This writ is to be served within six calendar months from the date thereof, including the day of such date, and not afterwards." [And if the action be for a liquidated demand, add: "And if the amount within claimed, and £ for costs, be paid to the plaintiff or his attorney within six days from the service hereof, further proceedings will be stayed."]

See ante, p. 5.

summons

8. When the sum claimed shall be paid, pursuant to such Attorney to endorsement, the defendant shall be at liberty to call upon the tax costs of plaintiff's attorney, by notice, for the taxation of the costs, and and plaint if if more than one-sixth shall be disallowed, the plaintiff's attor- required. ney shall pay the costs of the taxation, and return to the T., 1853, r. 1. defendant or his attorney the amount overcharged, otherwise the defendant shall pay such costs.

See R. G., H.

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE.

9. In every affidavit of personal service of the writ of summons and plaint, the process-server shall swear that he is acquainted with the person of the defendant whom he has served.

See ante, p. 34.

Admission of

next friend only an authority in particular

action. R.G., H. T., 1853, r. 5.

ADMISSION OF NEXT FRIEND.

10. A special admission of prochein ami, or guardian, to prosecute or defend for an infant, shall not be deemed an authority to prosecute or defend in any but the particular action or actions specified.

See ante, p. 46.

Imperfect description no ground of

BAIL.

11. Where the defendant is described in the capias or affidavit to hold to bail by initials or a wrong name, or without a discharge, if christian name, the defendant shall not therefore be discharged due diligence out of custody, nor the bail-bond delivered up to be cancelled, if H. T., 1853, it shall appear to the court that due diligence had been used to obtain knowledge of the proper name.

used. R. G.,

r. 2.

Fiats to be

witten on affidavit to

It is proposed by a bill at present before parliament to abolish arrest both on mesne and final process, except in a few special cases. It is therefore considered unnecessary to refer to any of the cases upon the subject.

12. Every affidavit to hold to bail shall be laid before the judge by the attorney for the party seeking a fiat, and every such hold to bail fiat shall be written or printed on the same sheet with the affidavit or one of the affidavits to ground such fiat; and in case the judge shall refuse such fiat, he shall endorse his initials thereon, with the words "no rule," and in such case such affidavit shall not be laid before another judge without apprising him of the fact of such refusal.

Notice of

ments in.

13. Every notice of bail and for security for costs shall, in bail. State- addition to the description of the bail, mention the street or place R. G., H. T., and number (if any) where each of the bail resides, and all the streets or places and numbers (if any) in which each of them has been resident at any time within the preceding six months, and whether he is a housekeeper, or householder, or freeholder.

1853, r. 100.