upon being satisfied of the sincerity of such objection, to permit such person, instead of being sworn, to make his or her solemn affirmation or declaration in the words following; videlicet, "I A. B. do solemnly, sincerely, and truly affirm and declare, that the taking of any oath is, according to my religious belief, unlawful; and I do also solemnly, sincerely, and truly affirm and declare," &c. Which solemn affirmation and declaration shall be of the same force and effect as if such person had taken an oath in the usual form (rr). (rr) The provisions of this section apply both to Courts of criminal and civil judicature, sect. 98, post; and see, also, 32 & 33 Vict. c. 68, 3. 4. 24. If any person making such solemn affirmation or declaration shall wilfully, falsely, and corruptly affirm or declare any matter or thing which if the same had been sworn in the usual form, would have amounted to wilful and corrupt perjury, every such person so offending shall incur the same penalties as by the laws and statutes of this kingdom are or may be enacted or provided against persons convicted of wilful and corrupt perjury (s). (s) The provisions of this section apply both to courts of criminal and civil judicature, sect. 98, post. 25. A party producing a witness shall not be allowed to impeach his credit by general evidence of bad character, but he may, in case the witness shall in the opinion of the Judge prove adverse, contradict him by other evidence, or, by leave of the Judge, prove that he has made at other times a statement inconsistent with his present testimony; but before such last-mentioned proof can be given, the circumstances of the supposed statement, sufficient to designate the particular occasion, must be mentioned to the witness, and he must be asked whether or not he has made such statement (88). (ss) The provisions of this section apply both to courts of criminal and civil judicature, sect. 98, post, and see 28 Vict. c. 18, s. 3. Persons making a false affirmation to be sanie punishperjury. 17 & subject to the ment as for 18 Vict. c. 125, s. 21. Discrediting Previous to the present act the rule was, that a party calling a witness could not give general evidence to show that he was not to be believed upon party's own his oath (Ewer v. Ambrose, 3 B. & C. 746); and in this respect the law witness. has remained unaltered. It was also the rule, that a party might contradict Contradictthe evidence of his own witness upon facts material to the issue (see Melhuishing him. Proving previous inconsistent statement made by witness. Discrediting witnesses opposite party. v. Collier, 15 Q. B. 878); as for instance, in cases where an attesting witness denied his signature; and although the above section seems to limit this privilege to cases where the witness proves adverse in the opinion of the Judge, yet it seems to have been the opinion of the Court in Greenough v. Eccles, 5 C. B. N. S. 786, that the present section was not intended to deprive a party of the liberty of proving his case by other witnesses as he might have done previously. As to proving that a witness has previously made a statement inconsistent with his present testimony, the better opinion previous to the present statute was that such evidence was not admissible, on the grounds of being mere hearsay evidence; but now by the above section the party is enabled to give such statement in evidence, by the leave of the Judge, whenever the Judge is of opinion that the witness is adverse. A witness whose testimony turns out to be unfavourable to the party calling him is not therefore an adverse witness within the meaning of this section; to make him an adverse witness, he must in the opinion of the Judge be adverse in the sense of showing a hostile mind (Greenough v. Eccles, 5 C. B. N. S. 786). Where a witness gave evidence differing from his previous statements to the attorney, the Judge allowed him to be examined as to his previous statements so made, and also allowed the attorney to be called to contradict him (Amstell v. Alexander, 16 L. T. N. S. 830). In Faulkner v. Brine, 1 F. & F. 254; the Judge under similar circumstances allowed the witness to be asked whether he had not made such contradictory statements and to be dealt with as adverse, but only with a view to discredit him generally. In Reed v. King, 30 L. T. 290; it was, however, stated by Pollock, C. B., that the present section was not meant to apply to the loose statements made by the witness to the attorney with a view to prepare the evidence, and the Court in that case granted a rule nisi for a new trial on the ground that witnesses had been called at the trial to prove such statements. A series of letters may be used for contradicting a witness, although one only be directly inconsistent (Jackson v. Thomason, I B. & S. 745.) As regards witnesses called by the other side, a party may give general evidence to show that they are unworthy of credit (The Queen v. Brown & pro luced by Headley, L. R. 1 C. C. 70); but he cannot prove particular facts in order to discredit them (R. v. Watson, 2 Stark, 152). Where a party called the attesting witness to a will whose evidence was unfavourable, it was held that though he could not be considered a hostile witness, yet he was produced to satisfy the requirements of law, and was not to be regarded as the witness of the party producing him; and that the party producing him might put questions to other witnesses tending to throw doubts upon his general credibility (Coles v. Coles, 35 L. J. Prob. 40); and see further, Jackson v. Thomaubi supra. Evidence going to show that the plaintiff or his agent has by word or act admitted his case to be bad, is admissible without calling the plaintiff or his agent (Moriarty v. London Chatham and Dover Railway Co., L. R. 5 Q. B. 314). Proof of con tradictory of adverse son, 26. If a witness, upon cross-examination as to a former statements statement made by him relative to the subject matter of the witness, 17 & cause, and inconsistent with his present testimony, does not distinctly admit that he has made such statement, proof may be given that he did in fact make it; but before such proof 18 Vict. c. 125, s. 23. can be given, the circumstances of the supposed statement sufficient to designate the particular occasion must be mentioned to the witness, and he must be asked whether or not he has made such statement (f). (t) The provisions of the present section apply both to courts of criminal and civil judicature, sect. 98, post, and see 28 Vict. c. 18, s. 4. Previous to the present statute, a party might give evidence to show that a witness produced by the opposite party had previously made statements relative to the subject matter of the cause inconsistent with the testimony given by him, provided a foundation was laid for such evidence by asking the witness whether he had not made such contradictory statements (The Queen's Case, 2 B. & B. 301). It was, however, doubtful whether such evidence was admissible when the witness merely stated that he did not remember having made the statement, but any doubt upon the matter is now removed by the above section. Laying In order to render such evidence admissible, the witness must be asked as to the time, place, and person involved in the supposed contradiction. It is foundation not sufficient merely to ask him whether he has ever said so and so (Angus contradictory for proot of v. Smith, M. & M. 474, per Tindal, C. J.). In The Queen v. Connors, 4 Ir. statement. Jur. N. S. 263, it was held by the Court of Criminal Appeal, that counsel for a prisoner may, under this section, ask a witness on cross-examination whether he had not before the magistrate described the person who had committed the crime with which the prisoner was charged as answering a particular description, and on the witness stating that he does not recollect, he may under the following section give parol evidence of the alleged statement without producing and reading any part of the witness's deposition. nation as to in writing. 17 & 18 Viet. c. 125, s. 24. 27. A witness may be cross-examined as to previous state- Cross-examiments made by him in writing, or reduced into writing, re- previous lative to the subject matter of the cause, without such writ- statement ing being shown to him; but if it is intended to contradict such witness by writing, his attention must, before such contradictory proof can be given, be called to those parts of the writing which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him: Provided always, that it shall be competent for the Judge, at any time during the trial, to require the production of the writing for his inspection, and he may thereupon make such use of it for the purposes of the trial as he shall think fit (u). (u) The provisions of this section apply both to courts of criminal and civil judicature, sect 98, post, and see 28 Vict. c. 18, s. 5. Previous to the present statute, upon the grounds that the contents of a written document can only be proved by the writing itself, it was held in The Queen's Case, 2 B. & B. 286, that a witness could not be cross-examined as to previous statements made by him in writing, unless the writing was shown to him and the whole document put in evidence. Now, however, the Proving pre- witness may be examined as to such previous statement without producing vious contra- the originals (Sladden v. Serjeant, 1 F. & F. 322); but if he denies having dictory made the statement, his attention must be called to the contradictory porstatement. tion of it, if it is intended to give it in evidence. Proof of previous a witness may be, given. 17 & is Vict. c. 125, s. 25. In Henman v. Lester, 12 C. B. N. S. 776, it was held that a party to an action may be asked in cross-examination for the purpose of testing his credit, whether an action has not been brought against him in an inferior court of record upon a similar claim and a verdict against him has not been returned by the jury, he having given evidence in the cause, and this may be done without the production and proof of the record of that Court. And see The Queen v. Connors, referred to in the note to the last section, as to the nature of the evidence that may be given of the previous contradictory statements in writing. The provisions of the above section only apply to statements made by the witness himself in writing. He cannot therefore be cross-examined as to statements in writing made to him by third parties, see Macdonnell v. Evans 11 C. B. 930. 28. A witness in any cause may be questioned as to whether Conviction of he has been convicted of any felony or misdemeanor, and, upon being so questioned, if he either denies the fact, or refuse to answer, it shall be lawful for the opposite party to prove such conviction; and a certificate containing the substance and effect only (omitting the formal part) of the indictment and conviction for such offence, purporting to be signed by the Clerk of the Court, or other officer having the custody of the records of the Court where the offender was convicted, or by the deputy of such clerk or officer (for which certificate a fee of five shillings and no more shall be demanded or taken), shall, upon proof of the identity of the person, be sufficient evidence of the said conviction, without proof of the signature or official character of the person appearing to have signed the same (v). Attesting witness need not be called, except in (v) The provisions of the present section apply both to courts of criminal and civil judicature, sect. 98, post, and see 28 Vict. c. 18, s. 6. In Reg. v. Parsons, L. R. 1 C. C. 24, it was held that the certificate of a previous conviction required by 5 Geo. 4, c. 84, s. 24 (which section is almost similar in terms to the above section) is sufficient, by virtue of 8 & 9 Vict. c. 113, s. I (post in the Appendix), if it purports to be signed by an officer having the custody of the records, although that officer is therein described as the deputy clerk of the peace of a borough; and that the certificate need not aver that the quarter sessions at which the prisoner was convicted were held by the Recorder. 29. It shall not be necessary to prove by the attesting witness any instrument to the validity of which attestation 17 & 18 Vict. is not requisite; and such instrument may be proved by certain cases. c. 125, s. 26. admission, or otherwise, as if there had been no attesting witness thereto (w). (w) The provisions of the present section apply both to courts of criminal Attesting and civil judicature, sect. 98, post, and see 28 Vict. c. 18, s. 70. Previous to the passing of the present Act, it was a settled rule that whenever a deed or other instrument was subscribed by attesting witnesses, one of them at least should be called to prove the execution; and so strong was the rule that it was held that the plaintiff could not prove the execution of an attested deed by the testimony in open Court of the defendant who executed it, nor examine such defendant as to the contents of it (Whyman v. Garth, 8 Ex. 803). By the above section this rule has been altered as to instruments, to the execution of which an attesting witness is not necessary. to. witness. attesting witness dis pensed with. Where, however, as in the case of a will, an attesting witness is necessary, Where evithe instrument, &c., must be proved asbefore the statute, i. e., by the evidence dence of of the attesting witness, and the old law must therefore be occasionally referred Where however, the attesting witness is dead (Anon., 12 Mod. 607; Montgomery v. Joyce, 1 Cr. & Dix, 422); or absent in a foreign country (Prince v. Blackburn, 2 East, 252); or where he cannot be found after diligent inquiry (Jury v. Mark, 2 Ir. O. S. 276; Spooner v. Payne, 4 C. B. 328); secondary evidence will be admissible; and so, also, where it appears that he is colluding with the opposite party, such evidence will be received (Keating v. Smith, Bl. D. & O. 159). of disputed 18 Viet. c.123, 8. 27. 30. Comparison of a disputed writing with any writing Comparison proved to the satisfaction of the Judge to be genuine shall be writing. 17 & permitted to be made by witnesses; and such writings, and the evidence of witnesses respecting the same, may be submitted to the Court and jury as evidence of the genuineness, or otherwise, of the writing in dispute (x). (x) The provisions of the present section apply both to courts of criminal and civil judicature, sect. 98, post, and see 28 Vict. c. 18, s. 8. Formerly the rule of law was, that where witnesses were produced for the purpose of proving handwriting, it was necessary that their acquaintance Proving with the handwriting should not have been acquired pending the litigation, handwriting. for the purpose of proving or disproving the handwriting in question (The Fitzwalter Peerage Case, 10 Cl. & F. 193; Doe v. Suckermore, 5 Ad. & E. 703). By the above section that rule has been altered. Where the question in a cause was as to the genuineness of the signature to a bill, other documents, such as receipts not relevant to the issue, but proved to be in the handwriting of the defendant, were allowed to be put in for the purpose of comparison (Birch v. Ridgway, 1 F. & F. 270). On the cross-examination of an attesting witness to a codicil, he denying that it was in his hand-writing, other documents admitted by him to be in his writing, were allowed to be submitted to the jury for the purpose of comparison of handwriting (Cresswell v. Jackson, 2 F. & F. 24). Where the question was whether a memorandum was in the handwriting of a defendant, and in the |