The profeffions of neutral powers were reprefented as friendly; but their armaments fufpicious-The failure of the conciliatory measures, was regretted-The neceflity of active exertions by fea and land, pointed out by the fituation of affairs, was urged in general terms, without specifying any plan of operations With regard to the American war, a total filence was obferved.

The addrefs of the Houfe of Commons, with the ufual profeffions of attachment and fupport, repeated, in nearly the fame expreffions, the fentiments contained in the speech. The oppofition moved to fubftitute, in the place of part of the address, the following amendment To affure his Majefty, that with the trueft zeal for the honour of the crown, and the warmest affection for his Majelty's perfon and family, the Houfe was ready to give the most ample fupport to tuch meatures as might be thought neceffary for the defence of theie kingdoms, or for fruftrating the defigns of that reftlefs power, which has fo often difturbed the peace of Europe; but that they thought it one of their most important duties, in the prefent melancholy posture of affairs, to enquire by what fatal councils, and unhappy fyftems of policy, this country had been reduced from that fplendid fituation, which in the early part of his Majefty's reign, made her the envy of all Europe, to fuch a dangerous ftate, as that which had of late called forth our utmost exertions, without any adequate benefit."

It was contended on the fide of oppofition, that if the unanimity, fo trongly recommended by the

propofers of the addrefs, was indeed an infallible refource in the ruin of public affairs, the minilers, it must be owned, had ufed every means to induce the people to concur in its neceffity. But, they faid, that the utility of a general concurrence in any meafure, depended entirely upon the wifdom of the measure in queftion. That the approbation of measures muft be either retrofpective, or prospective. With regard to the firft, no plans already executed, could be affected by any fubfequent difference of opinion. With regard to the latter, as no plan for the conduct of the war was announced in the fpeech, or even hinted at by minifters, to agree to unanimity upon an object not yet propofed, was perfectly abfurd. Then what was to induce the Houfe to unanimity, but the recommendation of a fet of men, who were known to agree with each other in no one article, of difpofition, principle, council, or action? Unanimity, they faid, was a plaufible and fpecious word, but the thing could hardly ever exift; because the wife and the ignorant would always differ; and if it ever fhould take place, infinite mischief would enfue, as that could only happen through the prevalence of obitinacy, which is the natural and conflant companion of folly. That, in the prefent inftance, it would ferve only to give fanction to the past, and energy to the future blunders of administration; and to commit the fate of the nation in a new and ftill more dangerous war to the inability of the fame men, who had in fo wretched, and fo ruinous a manner conducted the old. That, to concur in an addrefs, which

conveyed

conveyed an idea of the flighteft fatisfaction in the prefent minifters, inftead of producing vigour in our own exertions, or terror in our enemies, would only ferve to fill Englifhmen with defpair, and French men with joy and confidence, at feeing that the deliberative government was as abject as the execative was contemptible, and that the incapacity of the one, could only be equalled by the fervility of the

other.

Confidering the fpeech from the throne, merely as the words of the minifter, it was infifted, that it advanced an abfolute falfehood. For the speech afferted, that our arms had not been attended with the fuccefs which the justice of our cause, and the vigour of our exertions, feemed to promife. But they infifted, that the faccefs was far greater than could have been expected, confidering the inferiority of our fleets, and the fhame. ful tardiness of our preparations. That, taking in thefe circumftances, our escaping in any manner from rain or difgrace, might well be accounted as a very high degree of good fortune; and indeed, as far exceeding all rational expectation. And that confequently, the fpeech not only afferted a falfehood, but that it alfo threw a falfe, unjust, and illiberal flander, on the commanders in the service of the crown; loading them with a cenfure which ought to fall on the minifters alone."

They further urged, that the fpeech included no lefs than a direct libel upon parliament, in call ing the late measures which had been taken to pacify America, the plans of parliament. That the arrival of the commiffioners at Phi

ladelphia, without any knowledge of the intention to evacuate that city, had faddled them from the beginning with the diftruft which was held of their immediate employers, and had taken away that appearance of openness, and that opinion of confidence and authority, which form the neceffary foundation of every treaty and every pacification. It was afked, whether the glaring abfurdity of that conduct was the plan of parliament? Or was parliament called together every winter for no other purpose, than to relieve the minifters from the yearly burthen of difgrace, which was the certain refult of all their measures.

The conciliatory propofitions themselves were arraigned, as being at once humiliating to England, and unfatisfactory to America. But, it was afferted, that notwithstanding its defects and abfurdity, the adoption of that scheme could not be laid to be wholly useless-For it had cut up by the roots, every faliacious argument, by which minifters had beguiled the nation into the fatal American war, by the univerfal furrender of all its objects.

With regard to the fyftem to be recommended in the conduct of the war, oppofition feemed to hold no fecond opinion, and to call out, as with one voice-Attack France -France, faid they, entered into alliance with America from motives of intereft. When he finds herfelf vigorously attacked, and feels the heavy impreffions of war, with all their confequences and diftreffes, in her own dominions, she will grow weary of the profpect of remote and uncertain advantages, and abandon an ally, from

whom

whom she receives nothing but a participation of war and calamity. -On the other hand, they faid, the fpirit of America is fuftained by the powerful incentives, both of Jiberty and felf-prefervation. Every effort we make to fubdue that fpirit, drives our colonies ftill more into the arms of France; who, in the mean time, feels no inconvenience from the protection she affords. And confequently, every drop of English blood which we fhed in America, ferves only to cement an alliance, fatal to the power and happiness of the British empire.

On the other fide, the friends of administration seemed rather to follow the example of the fpeech, by declining to enter into a difcuffion of the policy of the American war: either, because it was not thought prudent to avow the determination they had made in their own minds, or that they chofe to leave themfelves open, to embrace whatever fyftem of conduct, the neceffity of affairs might hereafter require. But upon the past conduct of the war, and the preparation and diftribution of the armaments employed in the fummer, they entered into a detailed justification.

They faid, that if the fleet under Admiral Byron, had been fent out earlier than it was, an opportunity would have been given to the fleet under M. d'Estaing, to have joined that at Breit; and thereby, that France would have obtained a fuperiority in the Channel. That fuch a conduct would have left us in a ftate of weakness at home, of which it would be impoffible that the enemy fhould not take advantage. That, by maintaining the fuperiority in the Chan

nel, we prevented France from making our own feas, the scene of her exertions: and in a manner obliged her to detach and divide her forces. And, what nation would not, if fhe could, keep the feat of war at a distance from her own territories?

It was likewife contended, that the evacuation of Philadelphia, was a measure dictated by the foundest principles of policy. For, they faid, that on the acceffion of France to this war, the defence of our own islands, and the attacking hers, became an object, though not, as the oppofition would have it, an exclufive object. That this of neceffity drew off a confiderable body of our troops; and the grand army being thus weakened, it had been judged neceffary to diminish the extent of our line, in order to unite and compact our forces. That it was too well known to require argument or proof, that the operation of a closely united force was far more efficacious, ferv ing at once to imprefs terror, and to overpower refiftance, than if it had been weakened by extenfion and distance. That, to garrison every town on the continent of America, was an undertaking for which no army could fuffice; and that an attempt of the fort, was certainly not the method, by which any man could hope to crush the prefent rebellion. It being therefore neceffary to compact the forces into one body, the only question was, when one or the other must be adopted, whether New York or Penfylvania fhould be abandoned? And, faid they, what reafon could be affigned for collecting the whole army into Philadelphia? The fituation is not near fo central

with regard to the colonies as New York; nor is it near fo convenient in other refpects, whether with regard to the co-operation of the fleet, the receiving of fupplies, or to the general operations of the

war.

Thefe arguments must be allowed to be fatisfactory with regard to the measure in queftion. But the oppofers of administration were too acute, not to turn them to their own advantage. They accordingly afferted, that the juftification of the individual measure, was the full condemnation of the whole fyftem from which it arose. That the advocates of the American war, had themselves now fully demonftrated the impoflibility of fuccefs. For they had fhewn, that every advance which the army could make in America, reduced it to this alternative, either, by retaining the acquifition to divide and debilitate its own ftrength, or elfe to ftand expofed to the difgrace and mortification, by treading back their own fteps, to fhew the inutility of all their labours. That no man could dream of conquering a continent, by fitting down in a fingle town. That therefore, while the nation perfifted in carrying on an offenfive war in America, whether our ar my advanced, whether it retreated, or whether it ftood still, the effect would be the fame; a fruitless, hopeless, expenfive, and cruel, because unneceffary, war.

Although the minifters were obferved to decline entering into a fubject, which had already been fo often, and fo thoroughly debated, and upon which their adverfaries always fhewed a defire to prefs them, there arose from a

new and unexpected quarter, an advocate for the continuation of the fyftem of coercion. One of the gentlemen employed in the late commiffion to America, whether the information he received in that country induced him to confide in the operation of force, or whether a nearer view of the object, mixed with a sense of dif appointment at the failure of one plan of pacification, had animated him with the hopes of conqueft, in a long fpeech, here and there interfperfed with fome expreffions of diffidence, ftrongly urged the continuance of an offenfive war with America.

accom

He faid his view had always been, that force should pany conceffion, and that the Americans should fee in this country, a manly determined spirit of perfeverance: that thereby they might be moved to confider well, between the evils of war in a dubious conteft, and the immediate advantages of peace upon honourable and advantageous terms. He faid, it was neceffary to confirm the minds of your friends, as well as to terrify your enemies; that he believed two-thirds of the people of America, fully defired to return to their antient connection with Great Britain; that nothing but a furrounding army, and the diffidence they had in the fupport of government, prevented that fpirit from breaking out into acts of hoftility with the Congress. And that therefore the failure of the conciliatory plans, was to be imputed to the fudden retreat of the army from Philadelphia, and not to the weakness of the English intereft there.

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