secuting the hostile designs which they had manifested, and enabled them to hold in their hands the issues of peace and war, and to arbitrate the fate of the Dekan according to their interests or caprice. The position and state of Scindiah's forces, under the command of French officers in Hindostan, and the machinations of Monsieur Perron with the adjoining states, and with the subjects of the company and of the vizier, manifested additional proofs of the hostile designs of the confederates, and furnished those chieftains with additional means of prosecuting such designs. Such are stated by the marquis of Wellesley to be the grounds which constituted a just, distinct, and lawful cause of war. If implicit confidence be placed in the accuracy and fairness of this representation, it would be difficult to dispute the existence of a legitimate object of hostility. It should, however, always be recollected, that in the investigation of the origin of the war in India, we are unfortunately obliged, in a great measure, to form our opinion upon documents supplied by only one of the belligerent parties. On the other hand, the wisdom and moderation displayed by the noble marquis in the late war against Tippoo Sul taun, presumptively guaranty the correctness and fidelity of the representation. The judgment may be further assisted by an investigation of the discussions which took place antecedently to the rupture with the Marhatta chieftains. It may be proper to exhibit, in a distinct and connected form, all the material circumstances which produced a dissolution of the relations of amity between the British government and the confederated chieftains, Dowlut Rao Scindiah, 1804. and the rajah of Berar. But, in the first place, it is important that the system of policy pursued by the governor-general should be concisely explained. It differs, indeed, but little from the system formerly adopted by the marquis Cornwallis :-to weaken the Marhatta power, or, what produces the same effect, to strengthen the British dominion by a defensive alliance with some of the most considerable chieftains of that confederacy. In forming a defensive alliance with the Marhatta power against the sovereign of Mysore, lord Cornwallis formerly resorted to the acknowledged supreme authority of the peishwah, as the best foundation for such an alliance. His lordship, therefore, negotiated and concluded, on the 1st of June 1790, the treaty of Poohnah with the peishwal, without reference to any of the subordinate chieftains. It is to be observed, that the power of the peishwah has, for many years past, been acknowledged by all the feudatory states composing the Marhatta power, and universally by all the other states of India, to be the constitutional representative of the sovereign executive authority of the Marhatta empire. The principal chieftains have been regarded as the feudatory subjects and officers of the peishwah's go.vernment. But previously to the late hostilities in Mysore, the usurpation of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, of whose military power the most ef ficient part was under the command and influence of French adventurers, had in effect dissolved the alliance formed by lord Cornwallis with the Marhatta power upon the basis of the peishwah's paramount authority. The destruction of the hostile power of Mysore, in the year 1799, accompanied with the formation P formation of an alliance with the court of Hyderabad, had left, among the native states in India, no power any way hostile to the British government, excepting the Marhattas. These states, however, without the assistance of an European ally, or without a general confederacy of the feudal chiefs of the empire, under the direction of a skilful, active, and enterprising leader, could scarcely ever become formidable to the British power in India. In conformity to a system of policy, similar indeed to that which lord Cornwallis had formerly adopt ed, the marquis of Wellesley endeavoured to effect such an arrangement, as should prevent a general union of the Marhatta states, by which the tranquillity of our possessions, or of those of our allies, might be menaced. He therefore directed his attention to the establishment of a general defensive system. For this object the treaty concluded with the nizam in 1800, appeared to lay a suitable foundation, and several of the Marhatta states were invited to enter into subsidiary engagements with the British government, in order that they might receive protection from a general alliance. Upon this principle, a subsidiary treaty was concluded with the guikwar. That chieftain, therefore, became attached to the company, and his alliance secured to them an important territorial acquisition in the maritime province of Guzerat. But the most efficient arrangement for the security of our possessions appeared to be an intimate alliance with the peishwah, the acknowledged sovereign power of the Marhatta empire; which, at the same time that it would render our influence and resources the main support of that power, might have the effect of preserving a due balance between the several states composing the Marhatta confederacy, and would probably prevent an union dangerous to the safety of the British possessions. The policy of accomplishing such a system of alliances is manifestly confirmed, by the necessity of preventing the French government from extending its authority within the peninsula of Hindostan. It may preclude the occurrence of such internal convulsions, as would afford to France a favourable opportunity for effecting her ambitious designs. The views of the French government would, under such circumstances, be materially favoured by the strength and efficiency of the force of Monsieur Perron, whose territorial dominion extended to the most vulnerable part of our north-western frontier of Hindostan. Besides, the power and influence of Monsieur Perron became more important, from the circumstance of his holding the person and nominal authority of the unfortunate Shah Aulum, the deposed Moghul emperor, in the most abject and degrading subjection. Under all these circumstances, the governor-general conceived it expedient to endeavour to establish such a connection between the peishwah and the British government, as might secure the stability and efficiency of the peishwah's authority, under the protection of the British power, but without affecting the interests or the rights of the feudatory chieftains of the Marhatta empire. Several efforts for that purpose had failed of success. Their failure was attributable to the ascendancy over the counsels of the peishwah, which was maintained by Scindiah, who, at the same time that he was jealous of the British power, was actuated by an inordinate desire of usurping the same authority at Poohnah, the capital of the peishwah's dominions, which Holkar was preparing to seize. It is remarkable that the peishwah, notwithstanding the many and evident advantages which he would derive from an alliance with the British government, obstinately persisted in refusing to accede to the moderate and salutary propositions which were offered to his acceptance, until his authority was subverted, his country and capital abandoned to devastation and plunder, and he himself expelled from Poohnah, by Holkar, his feudatory chieftain. But when Scindiah perceived that his separate dominions and hereditary interests would be exposed by the eventual success of Holkar, he no longer opposed the alliance of the peishwah with the company, but left his highness at liberty to embrace the British protection. It was not, however, before Holkar had actually arrived, at the head of a large army, in the neighbourhood of Poohnah, that he at all consented to the governor-general's propositions. The combined army of the peishwah and of Scindiah marched from Poohnah for the purpose of encountering Holkar's force. On the 25th of October 1802, the two armies engaged; the combined army was totally defeated, and Holkar took possession of the peishwah's capital. On the same day, his high ness sent his minister to the Bristish resident, desiring the establishment of a subsidiary force of six batta lions of sepoys, with the usual compliment of artillery, and conveying a sunnud, or grant, for territory to the annual amount of twenty-five lacs of rupees, to be ceded in per petuity to the company, for the payment of that force. The resi dent was at the same time assured of the peishwah's earnest desire to conclude, with the least possible delay, a general defensive alliance with the honourable company, upon the principles of the treaty concluded at Hyderabad in the month of October 1800. A treaty to this effect was concluded at Bassein the 31st of December 1802, or the 5th of Ramzaum, A. H.1217. The aid which the peishwah so licited was immediately granted. His highness was in consequence restored, by means of this assistance, to the exercise of his authority in his territorial dominions; and the engagements which he afterwards contracted with the British government were calculated to secure his rights and independence against the future designs of any foreign or domestic enemy. Nor did these engagements contain any stipulations injurious to the just rights of the feudatory chieftains of the Marhatta empire, but provided additional security for the unmolested exercise of those rights. It is of importance to remark, that three months after the conclusion of the treaty, Dowlut Rao Scindiah distinctly expressed his approbation of the measures which had been adopted for the restoration of the peishwah's authority; and upon a copy of the treaty of Bassein being put into his hands, with an assurance that it was merely of a defensive nature, he admitted that it was not injurious either to his own rights, or to those of the feudatory chieftains. After some discussion, he also admitted, that the peishwah possessed the right to conclude the treaty of Bassein, without the concurrence of the feudatory P. 2 feudatory Marhatta chieftains. It appears, however, that he was in some degree mortified at not having been consulted. As guarantee to the treaty of Salbye, he expected this mark of attention. Notwithstanding this acknowledgment of Scindiah's, with respect to the operation of the treaty of Bassein, he still persisted in soliciting the junction of the rajah of Berar, with the whole body of his forces, for the avowed purpose of deciding the question of peace or war; or, in other words, of eventually employing their united power and resources to invade our territories and those of our allies, and to subvert the arrangements concluded at Bassein between the British government and the peishwah. In compliance with the solicitations of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, the rajah of Berar commenced his march, in order to effect the proposed junction of their numerous armies, and to maintain a menacing position on the frontier of the nizam, the ally of the British government. The marquis of Wellesley distinctly states, that the hostile measures of these chieftains were not adopted with a view either to defend their own rights and interests against any apprehended aggression, or to secure the protection and internal settlement of their own possessions in the vicinity of the nizam's dominions. Their measures, on the contrary, are stated to have been avowedly concerted to carry into effect their eventual resolution of undertaking a war of aggression against the British government and its allies, with a view to usurp the authority of the peishwah, and to destroy a treaty, the tendency of which they had not arraigned, and which the peishwah acknowledged to be competent to conclude, even by the direct admission of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. These and other indications of hostility induced the British government to require that Scindiah and the rajah of Berar should retire with their armies to their usual stations in Berar and the north of Hindostan. It was at the same time proposed, that the British army in the Dekan should also retire in a similar manner. But before we explain the nature of the discussions which took place relative to the withdrawing of all these forces to their usual positions, it may be necessary to state the precise views of Scindiah and the rajah of Berar, and the motives which induced them to assume a hostile attitude. The proceedings of Scindiah, since his accession to the dominions of his uncle Madhajee Scindiah, have manifested a systematic design of acquiring an ascendancy in the Marhatta state. It was upon the ruins of the peishwah's authority that he intended to establish his supremacy. The government and person of the peishwah have long been subjected to the degrading control of Scindiah, who, for a considerable period of time, had remained with a numerous army in the vicinity of his capital. At the commencement even of the last war between the company and the sovereign of Mysore, the usurpation of Scindiah existed in full force. His influence in the Marhatta empire, at that crisis, deprived the British government of every advantage which might have arisen from the nominal alliance with the peishwah. It moreover supported the cause of Tippoo Sultaun, and menaced the nizam's dominions previously to the expulsion of the French from Hyder abad abad in October 1798, and subsequently in 1799, while the nizam's contingent was actually employed with the British forces in the common cause of the triple alliance against Tippoo Sultaun. Nothing but the direct interposition of the British government prevented Scindiah, at that time, from attempting the actual invasion of the nizam's dominions. The courts of Poohnah and Hyderabad were nevertheless influenced by the terror of his arms. But the successful progress of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, in the north of Hindostan, compelled him to retire from Poohnah, in the year 1800, for the protection of his own territories. Holkar, however, completely succeeded in establishing his authority at Poohnah, and, as we have already stated, entirely defeated Scindiah's troops, in the month of October 1802. This event required the utmost exertion of his power against his victorious enemy. The marquis of Wellesley expresses his conviction, that if Scindiah had succeeded in subverting the power of Holkar, he would certainly have taken advantage of that success, in order to establish his own authority in the state of Poohnah. Had he reinstated the peishwah Bajee Rao in his government, or raised another to the musnud, it would have been merely to have constituted him the pageant of his own power. If the disposition of the other chieftains of the Marhatta empire should have encouraged an expectation of acquiescence, it is more than probable he would have usurped the supreme ministerial authority in his own name. Such a determination, it is to be remarked, has in no instance been avowed by Scindiah. It is only inferred from the uniform tenour of his conduct, his personal character, habits, and disposition, and the invariable principles of Asiatic policy. These considerations render it impossible to suppose that he would have aban doned the absolute power which he would have acquired by the entire subversion of Holkar's usurpation. Nor was it to be expected that he would have adopted the liberal policy of restoring the exiled peishwah to the exercise of his su preme authority. These suspicions are not removed by the circumstance of Scindiah's soliciting the co-operation of the British forces for the restoration of the peishwah. For this assistance was requested after the signal success of Holkar had produced a well-founded alarm. There is, according to the governor-general's statement, reason to believe, that he hoped with this aid to succeed against Holkar, without suspending or defeating his project of restoring his own undue ascendancy at Poohnah upon a more extensive basis. For it appears that the active and powerful exertions em. ployed by the British government, at the express solicitation of the peishwah, for his highness's complete restoration to his supreme authority, were neither desired nor expected by Scindiah. The restoration of the peishwah, under British protection, Scindiah was perfectly aware, would have the effect of defeating the accomplishment of the objects of his ambition, injustice, and rapacity. It was equally manifest that a defensive alliance with the peishwah, while it secured the stability and efficiency of his authority,would diminish the influence and power of Scindiah, who in his quality of deputy to the vaquel ul mutuluk, an office simi |