Oldalképek
PDF
ePub

3. That no one has a right to oblige another to place himself under such conditions.

4. That the frequent use of oaths tends, by abating our reverence for the Deity, to lessen the practical feeling of obligation to veracity.

5. That no reason can be assigned, why this crime should be treated so differently from every other. Other crimes, so far as man is concerned, are left to human punishments; and there can be no reason why this crime should involve the additional punishment intended by the imprecation of the loss of the soul.

6. It is said, that those sects who never take an oath, are as fully believed upon their simple affirmation as any others; nay, that false witness among them is more rare than among other men taken at random. This is, I believe, acknowledged to be the fact.

Those who defend the lawfulness of oaths urge on the contrary,

1. That those passages in the New Testament which have been referred to, forbid, not judicial oaths, but merely profanity.

2. That our Saviour responded, when examined upon oath. This, however, is denied by the other party to be a fair interpretation.

3. That the Apostles, on several occasions, call God to witness, when they are attesting to particular facts. The instances adduced are such phrases as these: "God is my witness;" "Behold, before God I lie not." The example, in this case, is considered sufficient to assure us of the lawfulness of this sort of appeal.

4. That the importance of truth, to the purposes of justice, warrants us in taking other measures for the prevention of perjury than are taken for the prevention of other crimes; and specially, as this is a crime to the commission of which there may always exist peculiarly strong temptations.

These are, I believe, the principal considerations which have been urged on both sides of the question. It seems to me to need a more thorough discussion than can be allowed to it in this place. One thing, however, seems evident, that the multiplication of oaths, demanded by the present practice of most Christian nations, is not only very wicked, but that its direct tendency is to diminish our reverence for the Deity; and thus, in the end, to lead to the very evil which it is intended to prevent.

III. Interpretation of oaths.

As oaths are imposed for the safety of the party administering them, they are to be interpreted as he understands them. The person under oath has no right to make any mental reservation, but to declare the truth, precisely in the manner that the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, is expected of him. On no other principle would we ever know what to believe or to expect from a witness. If, for the sake of personal friendship, or personal advantage, or from fear of personal inconvenience, or from the excitement of party partiality, he shrink from declaring the whole truth, he is as truly guilty of perjury as though he swore falsely for money.

IV. Different kinds of oaths.

Oaths respect either the past or the future, that is, are either assertory or promissory.

1. The oath respecting the past is definite. A transaction

either took place, or it did not take place, and we either have or have not some knowledge respecting it. It is, therefore, in our power either to tell what we know, or to tell what, and in how much, we do not know. This is the proper occasion for an oath.

2. The oath respecting the future is of necessity indefinite, as when we promise upon oath to discharge, to the best of our ability, a particular office. Thus, the parties may have very different views of what is meant, by discharging an office according to the best of our ability; or this obligation may conflict with others, such as domestic or personal obligations; and the incumbent may not know, even with the best intentions, which obligation ought to take the precedence, that is, what is the best of his ability. Such being the case, who, that is aware of the frailty of human nature, will dare to peril his eternal salvation upon the performance, to the best of his ability, of any official duty? And, if these allowances are understood by both parties, how are they to be limited; and if they be not limited, what is the value of an oath? Such being the case, it is, at best, doubtful, whether promissory oaths of office ought ever to be required. Much less ought they to be required, as is frequently the case, in the most petty details of official life. They must be a snare to the conscience of a thoughtful man; and must tend to obliterate moral distinctions from the mind of him who is, as is too frequently the case, unfortunately thoughtless. Why should one man, who is called upon to discharge the duties of a constable, or of an overseer of common schools, or even of a counsellor or a judge, be placed under the pains and perils of perjury, or under peril of his eternal salvation, any more than his neighbor, who discharges the duty of a merchant, of an instructer of youth, a physician, or a clergyman? It seems to me that no man can take such an oath of office, upon reflection, without such mental reservation as must immediately convince him, that the requirement is nugatory; and, if so, that it must be injurious.

CLASS SECOND.

DUTIES WHICH ARISE FROM THE CONSTITUTION OF THE

SEXES.

Ir has already been remarked, that the very fact, that our Creator has constituted us with a capacity for a particular form of happiness, and has provided means for the gratification of that desire, is, in itself, an intimation that he intended that this desire should be gratified. But, as our happiness is the design of this constitution, it is equally evident, that he intended this desire to be gratified, only in such manner as would conduce to this result; and that, in estimating that result, we must take into view the whole nature of man, as a rational and accountable being, and not only man as an individual, but man also as a society.

1. The subject upon which we now enter, presents a striking illustration of the truth of these remarks. On the one hand, it is evident that the principle of sexual desire, is a part of the constitution of man. That it was intended to be gratified, is evident from the fact, that without such gratification, the race of man would immediately cease to exist. Again, if it were not placed under restrictions, that is, were promiscuous intercourse permitted, the race would perish from neglect of offspring, and universal sterility. Thus, universal celibacy and unlimited indulgence, would both equally defeat the end of the Creator. It is, therefore,

as evident, that our Creator has imposed a limit to this desire, as a part of our constitution, as that he has implanted within us the desire itself. It is the object of the law of chastity to explain and enforce this limit.

2. As it is manifestly the object of the Creator, that the sexes should live together and form a society with each other, in many respects dissimilar to every other society, producing new relations, and imposing new obligations, the laws of this society need to be particularly explained. This is the law of marriage.

3. As the result of marriage is children, a new relation arises out of this connection, namely, the relation of parent and child. This imposes special obligations upon both parties; namely, the duties and rights of parents, and the duties and rights of children.

This class of duties will, therefore, be treated of in the following order:

Chapter 1. The general duty of chastity.
2. The law of marriage.

3. The rights and duties of parents.
4. The rights and duties of children.

« ElőzőTovább »