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The first and second of these objects are accomplished as I suppose, by the discoveries of natural religion, and by the promulgation of the moral law, under the Old Testament dispensation. The third is accomplished, by the revelation of the facts of the New Testament, and, specially, by the revelation of God, as the author of a new and a remedial dispensation.

Hence, we see that the sources of moral light, irrespective of conscience, are,

1. The precepts of natural religion.

2. The precepts and motives of the sacred Scriptures.

From what has been remarked, in the present chapter, a few inferences naturally arise, which I will insert in this place.

It is mentioned above, that the evil consequences of doing wrong, are manifestly of two kinds. First, those connected with an action as right or wrong, and arising from the present constitution of things; and, secondly, those resulting from the action as innocent or guilty; that is, as wilfully violating, or not, the obligations due to our Maker.

Now, from this plain distinction, we see,

1. That no sin can be of trifling consequence. The least, as well as the greatest, being a violation of an obligation more sacred and awful than we can conceive, must expose us to punishment more dreadful than we can comprehend. If it be said, the thing in itself is a trifle, the answer is obvious: How wicked must it be, for the sake of a trifle, to violate so sacred and solemn an obligation as that which binds us to our Creator!

2. Hence, we see how unfounded is the assertion sometimes made, that God could not, for the momentary actions of this short life, justly inflict upon us any severe or long enduring punishment. If an act, whether long or short, be a violation of our obligations to God; if ill-desert be, according to the greatness of the obligation, violated; and if no one can pretend to comprehend the vastness of the obligations which binds the creature to the Creator; then, no one can, à priori, pretend to decide what is the punishment justly due to every act of wilful wickedness. It is evident, that no one can decide this question but He who fully knows the relation between the parties; that is, the Creator himself.

3. Since every impure, revengeful, deceitful, or envious thought, is a violation of our obligations to our Maker, and, much more, the words and actions to which these thoughts give rise; and since even the imperfect conscience of every individual accuses him of countless instances, if not of habits, of such violation; if the preceding observations be just, it is manifest, that our present moral condition involves the elements of much that is alarming. It surely must be the duty of every reasonable man, to inquire, with the deepest solicitude, whether any way of escape from punishment, and of moral renovation, has been revealed by the Being against whom we have sinned; and, if any such revelation have been made, it must be our most solemn duty to conform our lives to such principles as shall enable us to avail ourselves of its provisions.

4. The importance of this duty will be still more clearly evident, if we consider, that the present is a state of probation, in which alone moral change is possible; and which must speedily terminate in a state, by necessity, unchangeable; for which, also, the present state therefore offers us the only opportunity of preparation. To neglect, either to possess ourselves of all the knowledge in our power on this subject, or to neglect to obey any reasonable precepts which

afford the least probability of improving our condition for the future, seems a degree of folly for which it is really impossible to find an adequate epithet.

5. Nor does it render this folly the less reprehensible, for a man gravely to assert, that we do not know any thing about the future world, and, therefore, it is needless to inquire respecting it. This is to assert, without inquiry, what could only be reasonably asserted after the most full and persevering inquiry. No man can reasonably assert that we know nothing respecting the other world, until he has examined every system of religion within his knowledge, and, by the fair and legitimate use of his understanding, shown conclusively that none of them throw any light upon the subject. By what right, therefore, can a man utter such an assertion, who, at the outset, declares that he will examine none of them? What should we think of the man who declared that he would not study astronomy for that no one knew more about the heavens than he did himself? Yet many men neglect to inform themselves on the subject of religion for no better reason. It is very remarkable, that men do not perceive the absurdity of an assertion respecting religion, which they would immediately perceive, if uttered respecting any thing else.

CHAPTER SEVENTH.

OF NATURAL RELIGION.

In the preceding chapter, I have endeavored to illustrate the nature of our moral constitution, and to show that, in our present state, conscience, unassisted, manifestly fails to produce the results which seem to have been intended; and which are necessary to our attaining the happiness which is put within our power; and to our avoiding the misery to which we are exposed. That some additional light will be granted to us, and that some additional moral power will be imparted, seems clearly not improbable. This I suppose to have been done by the truths of natural and revealed religion. In the present chapter, I shall treat of natural religion under the following heads.

1. The manner in which we may learn our duty, by the light of nature.

2. The extent to which our knowledge of duty can be carried by this mode of teaching.

3. The defects of the system of natural religion.

SECTION I.

OF THE MANNER IN WHICH WE MAY LEARN OUR DUTY

BY THE LIGHT OF NATURE.

In treating upon this subject, it is taken for granted,

1. That there is an intelligent and universal First Cause, who made us as we are, and made all things around us capable of affecting us, both as individuals and as societies, as they do.

2. That He had a design in so making us, and in constituting the relations around us as they are constituted; and that a part of that design was to intimate to us his will concerning us.

3. That we are capable of observing these relations, and of knowing how various actions affect us and affect others.

4. And that we are capable of learning the design with which these various relations were constituted; and, specially, that part of the design, which was to intimate to us the will of our Creator.

The application of these self-evident principles to the subject of duty is easy. We know that we are so made as to derive happiness from some courses of conduct, and to suffer unhappiness from others. Now, no one can doubt that the intention of our Creator in these cases was, that we should pursue the one course, and avoid the other. Or, again, we are so made, that we are rendered unhappy, on the whole, by pursuing a course of conduct in some particular manner, or beyond a certain degree. This is an intimation of our Creator, respecting the manner and the degree in which he designs us to pursue that course of conduct.

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