done upon their other veffels. Being now fully fenfible of their inferiority, they took the opportunity which the darkness of the aight afforded, of endeavouring to escape from their prefent imminent danger, hoping to obtain helter and protection at Crown Point. Arnold concerted and executed this defign with ability, and fortune feemed at firft fo favourable to his purpose, that they were out of fight by the next morning. The chace being, however, continued without intermiffon both on that and the fucceed. ing day, the wind, and other circumftances peculiar to the naviga tion of the Lake, which had been at first in favour of the Americans, became at length otherwife, fo that they were overtaken and brought to action a few leagues fhort of Crown Point, about noon on the 13th.

A very warm engagement en fued, and continued about two hours, during which thofe veffels that were most a-head, pushed on with the utmoft fpeed, and paffing Crown Point, eicaped to Ticonderoga; but two gallies and five gondolas which remained with Arnold made a defperate refiftance. During this action, the Washing ton gailey, with Waterburg, a Brigadier General, and the fecond in command, on board, ftruck, and was taken. Arnold, at length, finding it was impoffible to withftand the fuperiority of force, skill, and weight of metal, with which he was overborne, and finding himfelf but ill feconded by the Captains of fome of his veffels, determined that his people fhould not become prifoners, nor the veffels a prey to the enemy. He

executed this defign with equal refolution and dexterity, and run the Congrefs galley, in which himfelf was, with the five gondolas, on fhore in fuch a manner, as to land his men fafely and blow up the veffels, in spite of every effort that was used to prevent both.

Lofs and defeat were so far from producing their ufual effect with refpect to Arnold, that his conduct in this command raised his character till higher than it was before with his countrymen. They faid that he not only afted the part of a brave foldier, but that he alfo amply filled that of an able naval commander. That the most experienced feaman could not have found a greater variety of resources, by the dexterity of manœuvre, evolution, and the most advantageous choice of fituation, to compenfate for the want of force, than he did; that when his veffels were torn almoft to pieces, he retreated with the fame refolution that he fought, and by the happieft and most critical judgment, prevented his people and them from falling into the hands of the enemy. But they chiefly gloried in the dangerous attention he paid to a nice point of honour, in keeping his flag flying, and not quitting his galley till fhe was in fames, left the enemy fhould have boarded and ftruck it.

Thus was Lake Champlain recovered, and the enemy's force nearly deftroyed, a galley, and three fall veffels being all that efcaped to Ticonderoga. The enemy, upon the rout of their feet, having fet fire to the houses, and destroyed every thing which they could not carry off, at Crown Point, evacuated that place, and

[4] 3

retired

retired to their main body at Ticonderoga. Gen. Carleton took poffeffion of the ruins, where he was foon joined by the army. As he continued there till towards the end of the month, and, befides feveral reconnoitring parties, pufhed on at one time ftrong detachments on bota fides of the Lake, who approached within a fmall ditance of Ticonderoga, at the fame time that veffels appeared within cannon fhot of the works, to examine the nature of the channel, and found its dpth, little doubt can be entertained that he had it in contemplation to attempt that place. The strength of the works, the difficulty of approach, the countenance of the eremy, and the ignorance of their number, with other cogent reafons, prevented this defign from taking place.

It was evident that this poft could not be forced in its prefent ftate, without a very confiderable lofs of blood, whilst the benefit arifing from fu cefs would be comparatively nothing. The feafon was now too far advanced to think of paffing Lake George, and of expofing the army to the perils of a winter campaign, in the inhofpitable, and impracticable wilds to the fouthward. As Ticonderoga could not be kept during the winter, the most that could be expected from fuccefs, would be the reduction of works, more indebt ed to nature than art for their ftrength, and perhaps the taking of fome cannon; whilst the former would be restored, and the Jatter replaced by the enemy, before the army could interrupt their proceedings in the enfuing fumBut if the defence fhould

mer.

be obftinate, although the army were in the end fuccefsful, it would probably thereby be fo much weakened, that all prospect of advantage in the future campaign would, in a great measure, be annihilated. The difficulty, perhaps impoffibility, of keeping open the communication with Canada, and fubfifting the army during the winter, was obvious. General Carleton therefore reimbarked the army without making any attempt, and returning to Canada, cantoned them for the winter in the best manner the country afforded.

It is fit that we should now turn our attention to the important tranfactions in the South. We faw towards the conclufion of the laft campaign, that Lord Cornwallis had not only overrun the Jerfeys, but that the Delaware was the only apparent obftacle, which feemed capable of retarding the progrefs of his army, in the reduction of Philadelphia and the adjoining provinces. The American army was indeed no more. It is faid that the greateft number which remained embodied did not exceed 2500 or 3000 men. This was all that remained of an army, which at the opening of the campaign amounted, as it is faid, to at least twenty-five thousand. There are fome who reprefent it as having been at that time much stronger. The term of their engagement being expired, which, along with the obligation of duty, discharged all apprehenfion of dif grace, there was no keeping together, at the heel of a ruinous campaign, troops broken and dif pirited, equally unaccustomed to fubordination, and to a long abfence from their countries and fa

milies,

milies. Thofe fmall bodies, who from perfonal attachment, local circumftances, or a fuperior perfeverance and bravery, ftill continued with the Generals Washington and Lee, were too inconfiderable in force, to demand much attention on the one fide, or to inspire confidence on the other; whilft the fupport to be derived from new levies, not yet formed, was too remote and precarious, to afford much prefent confolation to the Americans.

In this critical fituDec. 13th. ation of their affairs, the capture of Gen. Lee feemed to render them ftill more hopeless. That officer, at the head of all the men which he could collect or keep together, being on his march to join General Washington, who had affembled the Penfylvania militia to fecure the banks of the Delaware, was, from the distance of the British cantonments, be-. trayed into a fatal fecurity, by which, in croffing the upper part of New Jersey from the North river, he fixed his quarters, and lay carelessly guarded, at fome diftance from the main body. The operation of zeal, or defire of reward in an inhabitant, having communicated this fituation to Col. Harcourt, who commanded the light horfe, and had then made a detu.tory excurfion at the head of a fmall detachment to obferve the motions of that body, he conducted his measures with fuch addrefs and activity, and they were fo well feconded by the boldness and rapidity of motion which distinguish that corps, that the guard was evaded, the centries feized without noife, the quarters forced, and Lee carried off, though all that

part of the country was in bis favour, and that feveral guarded pofts, and armed patrols, lay in the

way.

The making of a fingle officer prifoner, in other circumstances, would have been a matter of little moment; but in the prefent state of the raw American forces, where a general deficiency of military kill prevailed, and the inexperience of the officers was even a greater grievance than the lack of difcipline in the foldiers, the lofs of a commander, whofe fpirit of enterprize was directed by great knowledge in his profeffion acquired by actual fervice, was of the utmost importance, and the more diftreffing, as there was little room to hope it could be foon fupplied.

The rejoicing in Great Britain on this occafion was equal at least to the dejection of the Americans. It was conjectured, that fome perfonal animofities between this General and feveral officers in the army, as well as perfons of power at court, contributed not a little to the triumph and exultation of that time.

The capture of Gen. Lee was alfo attended with a circumstance, which has fince been productive of much inconvenience to both fides, and of much calamity to individuals. A cartel, or fomething of that nature, had fome time before been established for the exchange of prifoners between the Generals Howe and Washington, which had hitherto been carried into execution, to far as time and other circumftances would admit. As Lee was particularly obnoxious to government, it was faid, and is fuppofed, that Gen. Howe was

[4] 4

tied

tied down by his inftructions from parting with him upon any terms, if the fortune of war should throw him into his power. Gen. Washington not having at this time any prifoner of equal rank with Lee, propofed to exchange fix field of ficers for him, the number being intended to balance that disparity; or if this was not accepted, he required that he should be treated and confidered fuitably to his ftation, according to the practice eftablished among polished nations, and the precedent already fet by the Americans in regard to the British officers in their hands, until an opportunity offered for a direct and equal exchange.

To this it was anfwered, that as Mr. Lee was a deferter from his Majefty's fervice, he was not to be confidered as a prifoner of war, that he did not at all come within the conditions of the cartel, nor could he receive any of its benefits. This brought on a fruitlefs difcuffion, whether Gen. Lee, who had refigned his half pay at the beginning of the troubles, could be confidered as a deferter, or whether he could with juftice be excluded from the general benefits of a cartel, in which no particular exception of perfon had been made; the affirmative in both thefe pofitions being treated by Washington with the utmost indignation.

In the mean time Lee was confined in the closest manner, being watched and guarded with all that ftrictnefs and jealoufy, which a ftate criminal of the firft magnitude could have experienced in the most dangerous political conjuncture. This conduct not only fufpended the operation of the

J

cartel, but induced retaliation on the other fide, and Colonel Campbell, who had hitherto enjoyed every degree of liberty confiftent with his condition, and had been treated with great humanity by the people of Bolton, was now thrown into a dungeon, and treated with a rigour equal to the indulgence he had before experienced. Those officers who were prifoners in the fouthern colonies, though not treated with equal rigour, were, however, abridged of their parole li berty, and deprived of other comforts and fatisfactions, which had hitherto rendered their condition uncommonly eafy. It was at the fame time declared, that their fu ture treatment fhould in every degree be regulated by that which Gen. Lee experienced, and that their perfons fhould be anfwerable, in the utmost extent, for any violence that was offered to him.

This was not the only inftance in which the Congrefs manifefted a firm and undaunted refolution, In the midst of the dangers with which they were environed, far from giving way to any thing like unconditional fubmiffion, they made no overtures towards any kind of accommodation. On the other fide none were made to them. They prepared to renew the war, and to repair their fhattered forces with all diligence. They were now convinced of the inefficacy of temporary armies, engaged only for a fhort term, and calculated merely to repel a fudden invafion, when oppofed to the conftant war of a powerful enemy, and the inceffant efforts of regular forces. It could never be hoped, with new men thus changed every year to

make

make any effectual ftand against veteran troops, and their prefent critical fituation afforded too alarming an experience, of the fatal confequences which might attend that period of utter imbecility, between the extinction of the old army, and the establishment of the new. To guard against this evil in future, which could not be remedied for the prefent, they issued orders about the middle of September, for the levying of 88 battalions, the foldiers being bound by the terms of enliftment to ferve during the continuance of the war.

The number of battalions which each colony was by this ordinance appointed to raife and fupport, may be confidered as a pretty exact political scale of their comparative ftrength, framed by thofe who were interested in its correctnefs, and well acquainted with their refpective circumstances. Maffachufett's Bay and Virginia were the highest on this fcale, being to furnith 15 battalions each; Pensylvania came next, and was rated at twelve; North Carolina 9, Connecticut and Maryland 8 each, New York, and the Jerfeys, the latter confidered as one government, were, in confequence of their prefent fituation, fet no higher than 4 battalions each.

The liberality of the Congrefs in its encouragement to the troops, was proportioned to the neceffity of fpeedily compleating the new army. Befides a bounty of twenty dollars to each foldier at the time of enlifting, lands were to be allotted at the end of the war to the furvivors, and to the reprefentatives of all who were flain in action, in different ftated proporions, from 500 acres, the allot

ment of a Colonel, to 150, which was that of an Enfign; the private men, and non-commiffioned officers, were to have 100 acres each. As a bar to the thoughtleffness and prodigality incident to foldiers, and to prevent the moft worthless and undeferving from obtaining for trifles, thofe rewards due to the brave for their blood and fervices. all these lands were rendered unalienable during the war, no affignment or transfer being to be admitted at its conclufion.

The Congress had before, as an encouragement to their forces by fea and land, decreed that all offcers, foldiers, and feamen, whe were or might be difabled in action, fhould receive, during life, one half of the monthly pay to which they were entitled by their rank in the service, at the time of meeting with the misfortune. Notwithstanding thefe encouragements, it feems as if the condition of ferving during the indefinite term of the continuance of the war, was not generally agreeable, to a people fo little accustomed to any kind of fubordination or refraint; fo that in the month of November, the Congrefs found it neceffary to admit of another mode of enlistment for. the term of three years, the foldiers under this compact receiving the fame bounty in money with the others, but being cut out from any allotment of lands.

With all thefe encouragements given by the Congrefs, the business of recruiting went on, however, but heavily; and it mult not be ima gined, that the army actually railed, did at any time bear any proportion in effective men to that which was voted.

The holding out a promife of lands